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PREFACE
This monograph, is a compendium of the individual works of eleven
students enrolled in a cross-listed course NR 545 (EIH 575). The focus of
this course, like prior years, is captured in its title 
Population-Environment Dynamics: Ten Case Studies.  The course
began with an examination of alternative theoretical constructs useful in
studying the interaction between human populations and the environment.
Also, at the beginning of the course, each participant was asked to select
a topic of inquiry and a geographical setting for their study. This
selection then became their major focus for the entire semester.
Students participating in the course this fall had a delightful mixture of
backgrounds and interests. Schools and colleges represented included the
School of Natural Resources and Environment, School of 
Public Health, School of Business Administration, College of  Engineering,
College of Architecture and Urban Planning, and College of Literature
Sciences and Arts. Participants included colleagues from the Continents of
North America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
A very important element in the seminar was the use of data sources which
recently have become available in machine-readable form. These data
sources permitted the students to quickly gain exposure in handling
longitudinal datasets, especially those which were not amenable to
modeling with linear functions.   The most useful and user friendly
dataset provided participants was The World Resources Institute Data
System.  Another tool used in the course was state-of-the-art PC-based
Geographic Information Systems. The GIS package selected as most helpful,
was ATLAS GIS version 3.03.  The digital maps, used as separators of
monograph chapters, help to unify monograph content as they depict, taken
together, a spatial view of population-environment dynamics. Students also
found maps of the Digital Chart of the World to be helpful, and a number
found maps on the World Wide Web to be of considerable use.  Dr. Sandra
Lach Arlinghaus, adjunct professor in The School of Natural Resources and
Environment co-taught the course, as she has in the five previous years in
which it was offered.
The success of the course resulted largely from the enthusiasm of the
participants. As in previous years, extra sessions were held near the end
of the semester, which often extended beyond scheduled meeting times.
Feedback from fellow participants was provided in these sessions. In
addition, each student was asked to develop a brief synopsis of how their
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study related to the other participants in the class. These thoughtful
remarks are presented as the last chapter of this monograph.  This
monograph was published during the winter term in the academic year
1996-97, although the work was completed in December, 1996.
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POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT DYNAMICS:  TOWARD BUILDING A THEORY
INTRODUCTION
This volume is a collection of separate but related studies focusing on
the relationship between human populations and the environment. The effort
consists of this introduction followed by seventeen chapters each written
by a seminar participant which investigates a different aspect and
geographic setting of the population-environment dynamic. A concluding
chapter provides comments written by each participant relating their work
to those of the others.
 
In this introduction we present a synopsis of the common framework, which
we call a family of transitions. In addition to the common framework, this
introductory chapter presents the abstracts for each ensuing chapter.  
Readers of the monograph reporting work from prior years should note that
the material in the following section on a family of transitions is
repeated here for background and therefore can be skipped.
1.    A FAMILY OF TRANSITIONS  
One way of viewing the complex dynamic relationships between population
and the environment is to visualize them as a family of transitions. That
is, not only is there a demographic and epidemiologic transition but also
a deforestation, toxicity, agricultural, energy and urbanization
transition as well as many others. In this chapter it is argued that for
each transition there is a critical period when society is especially
vulnerable. During that period, rates of change are high, societal
adaptive capacity is limited, in part, due to this rapid change, and there
is a greater likelihood that key relationships in the dynamic become
severely imbalanced. The trajectory society takes through a transition
varies, depending upon many factors operating at local and national
levels. Transitions not only are occurring in many different sectors but
also at different scales, both temporal and spatial. At times, a society
experiences several transitions simultaneously, which can raise social
vulnerability because of how they amplify each other.
1.1 TYPES OF TRANSITIONS
The Demographic Transition
Let us begin with a review of the ideas behind the widely accepted
demographic transition. At the onset of this transition, births and deaths
are both high and are in relative equilibrium with each other.
Historically, births exceed deaths by small amounts so total population
rises only very gradually. Occasionally, famine or an epidemic causes a
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downturn in total population but in general, changes in rates are low.
During the transition, however, death rates drop dramatically, usually due
to a change in the health condition of the population. This change in
health is caused by many, often interrelating factors. After some time
lag, the birth rate begins to drop and generally declines until it is in
approximate balance with the death rate again.
The Epidemiological Transition
The term epidemiologic transition was coined to describe the changing
source of mortality and morbidity from infectious diseases occurring
primarily in the younger age groups to degenerative diseases in older age
groups.  As with the demographic transition, there is considerable
volatility during the transition.  At the onset, infectious diseases begin
their decline usually due to extensions of health care and sanitation by
the national or local government. Single vector programs such as malaria
control and immunization programs are often the first implemented because
they are capable of ready extension and do not require as heavy a
commitment to education and other sustained infrastructure - especially in
rural areas. These single vector programs are then followed by
broader-based health care which demand heavier investment in
infrastructure. But an entirely successful move through this transition
does not always happen. At times, other sectors in transition overpower
the health care delivery system. 
The Agricultural Transition
For several hundred years, worldwide agricultural production has been
rising in relative harmony with population. Overall, increases in
production have kept up with and even outpaced growth in population. The
two factors that have been responsible for these increases are 1)
extensions of land under cultivation and 2) improvements in productivity.
At times changes have been dramatic. Formulating an agricultural
transition reflects the condition that, in general, sources 
of increase in production shift from extending land to intensifying
production on land already under cultivation. 
The Forestry Transition
At the onset of the forestry transition generally a large percentage of a
region is under forest cover. Rapid deforestation occurs during the
transition and finally forest cover stabilizes at a lower level determined
by many factors such as the local region's needs, the state of the local
and national economy, climate and soil characteristics. In most settings
this transition will end in a steady state equilibrium balancing growth
and harvest. Again, how society handles the vulnerable transition period
often determines in a profound way the quality of life for the region.
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The Toxicity Transition
The toxicity transition can be considered a composite of many transitions:
global atmospheric, local air pollution, surface water, ground water and
solid waste to name a few. Again, there are at least two sets of factors
operating in tandem. The transition begins with low levels of industrial
or agricultural production and correspondingly low levels of toxins. As
production and population increase, toxic byproducts increase to levels
which eventually become unacceptable to the general public. This in turn,
causes a public demand for pollution abatement. After an environmentally
costly time lag, remediation steps are taken which helps to bring
pollution under control.
The Urbanization Transition
The urbanization transition is driven by the dual forces of rural to urban
migration and central city population growth. The early stages of the
transition are characterized by rapid growth of urban population; however,
in later stages, growth declines and may reverse. Rural to urban migration
is a product of many forces - both  "pull"  and "push". In terms of the
population-environment dynamic, the urbanization transition often acts as
an amplifier as it interacts with other transitions.
The Fossil Fuel Transition
The fossil fuel transition is a special case of the energy transition.
Historically, many energy transitions have already occurred in different
regions and time periods. Significant transformations began in the
sixteenth century brought about by sail and later, by steam power. Today,
we are now in the most universal and perhaps critical energy transition:
fossil fuels. Studying this transition is especially instructive because
the record on different societies' passage through the vulnerable period
is varied and appears to be heavily influenced by public policy. 
1.2  GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSITIONS
Similarity of Trajectory Across Sectors
We have attempted to show in the seven example sectors discussed earlier
that the notion of transitions apply across all sectors of investigation.
Each class of transition, whether it be demographic, toxicity, forestry,
agriculture, urbanization, energy or epidemiological have similar 
patterns. It is this perception that has caused us to posit the existence
of a family of transitions possessing some common attributes useful in
analysis. The first common attribute of all  transitions is their
trajectory. They all begin in reasonable stability, then move to the
volatile transition period where change is rapid, and finally return again
to relative balance. Analytically, these are clearly nonlinear systems but
ones which have properties that lend themselves to well-understood
file:///C|/545/1996/introduction.html (3 of 7) [6/18/2008 10:51:49 AM]
Introduction
mathematical functions. 
Applicability of Transitions Across Scales
The second attribute has to do with scale. One of the most interesting and
at the same time vexing aspects of studying population-environment
dynamics is that many phenomena manifest themselves at all levels of
geographic and temporal scale. For example, data depict one  demographic
transition for an entire continent, a different one for a country within
that continent and still other different transitions at the regional
level. Local conditions may delay or advance the onset and or completion
of the transition in relation to the larger body. Thus, moving through the
demographic transition can take more or less time as the scale changes.  
This same variation seems to exist in all other population-environment
transitions that have been investigated. True, national or regional-level
determinants often set the stage for the local dynamic, but in the end it
is these local conditions which determine the timing, magnitude and
specific trajectory of the overall transition. 
One can think of our world, seeming to be chaotic, but instead consisting
of a multitude of well defined transitions in many sectors, each with its
own local characteristic. Different transitions begin at different times
and places, but ebb and flow in an overlapping way, sometimes reinforcing
one another and at other times dampening their dynamic. As adjustment
occurs, occasionally useful niches are created which are then exploited by
stressed elements of the ecosystem. Unfortunately, at other times,
different sectors interact with each other in a harmful way to broaden and
extend the susceptible period.
Societal Vulnerability
During transitions there seems to be a special vulnerability borne by
society. Ample evidence indicates that key relationships are most likely
to become out of balance during the transition. A primary cause of this
vulnerability is the rapidity of change during the high velocity portion
of the transition. Adaptive capacity is impeded because there is little
time for systems to adjust and often there are limited feedback mechanisms
operating which otherwise could help this process. Another contribution to
social vulnerability during a transition is the amplifying effects created
by transitions occurring simultaneously in several sectors.  Rapid rates
of change in several sectors could more easily overpower the available
infrastructure which leads us to the next source of vulnerability during
transitions: capital availability.
 
Capital or investment capacity can either amplify or reduce societal
vulnerability during a transition. If there are financial resources
available to deal with the effects of rapid change, remediation is easier
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to implement. Africa which is trying to deal with a difficult demographic
transition has almost no capital available for its use and will therefore
undergo great hardship. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are struggling
to find financial resources to deal with their flawed toxicity transition.
Another dimension of transitions which affects societal vulnerability is
the degree of interconnectedness. How closely is the local village
connected to the regional and national economy? How much does what happens
in one location determine what happens in another? There is no question
that interconnectedness is increasing worldwide. We also know that under
some circumstances linkage creates dependencies which in turn, increase
vulnerability. However, it can work in the opposite direction as well.
These very same links to a larger domain can also act as a safety net. If
there are connections, resources can be brought to the stressed area more
easily to mitigate the local adversity. The final and perhaps most
important dimension of transitions affecting vulnerability is feedback.
Analytic Properties of Transitions
We have seen that many characteristics of transitions are common across
all sectors and geographic scales. The question then, is whether there are
analytic techniques which might be useful in describing this family of
transitions. If so, these techniques may be helpful in portraying 
transitions in a way that facilitates comparison and thereby increases our
understanding. In this quest we are especially interested in techniques
and functions which reduce complexity and at the same time provide a
reasonably accurate portrayal of reality.
  
Functions which are candidates for consideration include exponential,
exponential to the limit L, logistic, Gompertz, and the power function.
Bounded functions which fit data more precisely but cannot be used for
predictive purposes may also be helpful in uncovering patterns.
1.3  POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION THEORY
But what does it gain us to fit an exponential or logistic or for that
matter any function to transition data? The answer lies in our ability to
gain insights by relating different transitions to each other. First,
consider the transitions within a given sector and at a given scale. We
know there are transitions in a sector which some societies have already
experienced while others have yet to endure. If the nature of these
experiences can be captured in general form, it is more likely that
knowledge can be transferred to other settings where a transition is first
starting. Of course, each civilization or local culture has its own unique
characteristics but any one emerging transition may be comparable to one
or more of those which have occurred before because conditions are
similar.
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Second, there may be useful comparisons across different scales. We
already surmise that a national-level transition, perhaps now in process,
is actually comprised of a myriad of local transitions also in process or
which have recently occurred. But there may be other locales in the region
for which the transition has yet to happened. If similar patterns emerge
because of similar local conditions, a useful prediction could be made
about the nature of the passage through the transitions yet to appear.
Third, there may be insights gained simply by the process of fitting a
function to historical data. Different mathematical functions often have
very specific underlying characteristics which can provide useful ideas. 
The next potential use of transition theory is to facilitate analysis
across sectors. There is, of course, no good reason to expect the
trajectory of, say, a forestry or agricultural transition to mimic an
epidemiologic transition. However, for any society at a given time, there
may be similarities in the rates of change across sectors. Developed
economies have slower rates of change in their agriculture sector than
developing economies when conditions are favorable. Rural based cultures
may be expected to have urbanization transitions which are steeper than
non-rural cultures. In short, it is worth testing to see if patterns can
be empirically determined which would be helpful in predicting the shape
of future transitions, given a stated level of intervention.
We have already mentioned the special societal vulnerability associated
with several sectors being in rapid transition simultaneously.  From a
modeling perspective this simultaneity a very difficult condition to
describe and analyze, which may be why less progress has been made in 
this area to date. However, being able to portray these multiple
transitions with specific functions could be helpful. There is no question
that each transition interacts with the other. And to the analyst this
means that a reliable model must be structured as a set of simultaneous
relationships. Describing transitions as functions facilitates this
manipulation.
Another potential benefit of transition theory lies in the identification
of lead indicators. If success is achieved in fitting transition data to
an appropriate function, then for a given condition and point in time, the
future trajectory can be predicted more accurately. Identifying lead
indicators is facilitated because with an orderly function, only one, or
at most, two parameters need to be determined to define the trajectory.
This advantage is even more evident when several functions are considered
simultaneously.
Finally and perhaps most importantly, transition theory may permit more
informed public and private intervention. At one level we find ourselves
believing that the trajectory of a transition is somehow fixed by an
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immutable law of nature. But at another level we know that this is not the
case. Public and private policy can make a difference as we have seen from
some of the cases discussed in this book. Rates of change can be
influenced by policy redirection and consequent resource allocation. To
the extent that we can link historical rate differentials with historical
policy implementation, a better determination can be made about which
intervention mix works best in dealing with problems facing society today.
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POPULATION-ENVIRONMENT DYNAMICS:  
TEN CASE STUDIES 
ABSTRACTS OF THE CASE STUDIES
Kazuhiro Arai
Evidence suggests that an agricultural transition currently is taking
place in the United States.  This transition consists of an increase in
organic farm acreage as well as an increase in consumer demand for organic
foods.  The purpose of this paper is to chart this sharp rise in organic
produce production and consumption in the United States.  It seeks to link
this transition with other transitions, including fertilizer, herbicide
and pesticide use, as well as an epidemiological and toxicity transition.
In addition, this paper intends to identify particular consumer attitudes
affecting the organic agricultural transition, specifically increased
concerns over pesticide use, overall health and environmental degradation.
Using modeling and graphical methods the paper creates a comprehensive
model for organic consumption behavior.  From this analysis and model,
policies and strategies to increase organic consumption are made. 
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Hideo Kuramitsu
It made me special aware of the urbanization in Egypt to attend the last
United Nations Conference, "City Summit, Habitat II", held in Istanbul on
June 1996, and to make a trip to Egypt for three weeks on August 1996.  I
saw a lot of urban problems in Cairo which were the same as what was
discussed in Istanbul.  These urban problems in Cairo made me feel like my
own and think why a lot of people gather this large city and what kinds of
urban problems will be brought about.  In this paper, I made a population
growth model, linked with GDP (Gross Domestic Product), by using STELLA
II.  I found some strong relationships between each distribution of GDP
and its birth or death factor, resulting from the multiple regression.  I
am sure this model may be applicable for further studies of the population
growth in the developing countries. 
Clive Lipchin
The issue of water scarcity is an international environmental concern.
Population growth coupled with consumptive patterns are increasing the
pressure on global water resources essential for the continual survival of
all of earth's living organisms. The Middle East region is becoming the
focus for an impending water crisis that may very well escalate to open
conflict amongst the nations of the region, forced to share common water
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resources. This paper focuses on two such conflicts: disputes over the
Tigris-Euphrates river system and disputes over the Jordan river valley
and groundwater resources. Both of these disputes are common in the levels
of mistrust amongst the riparian states and the attitudes of nationalistic
ownership of water resources that are in fact politically independent. The
political volatility and instability of the region, together with such
disputes has led to increasing international concern. Resolving the
conflicts will involve unprecedented long term international cooperation
amongst the riparian states. Policies that will allow for trading
agreements amongst the nations, where each can see the benefits of such
action as overriding the costs is required. In addition, a scaling down of
wasteful and inefficient agricultural and management practices, together
with trading agreements must occur, in light of the characterization of
the region as semi-arid to arid. Nationalistic pride and petty differences
must give way to open cooperation for the good of the region and the
planet as a whole.
Peter Murchie and Rebecca Spector
Evidence suggests that an agricultural transition currently is taking
place in the United States.  This transition consists of an increase in
organic farm acreage as well as an increase in consumer demand for organic
foods.  The purpose of this paper is to chart this sharp rise in organic
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produce production and consumption in the United States.  It seeks to link
this transition with other transitions, including fertilizer, herbicide
and pesticide use, as well as an epidemiological and toxicity transition.
In addition, this paper intends to identify particular consumer attitudes
affecting the organic agricultural transition, specifically increased
concerns over pesticide use, overall health and environmental degradation.
Using modeling and graphical methods the paper creates a comprehensive
model for organic consumption behavior.  From this analysis and model,
policies and strategies to increase organic consumption are made. 
Tamana Nishiguchi
                   Burma, which lies on the western edge of mainland
Southeast Asia, is one of the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs).
Historically, its economy was dominated by agriculture, which provides
employment for 60-70 percent of total labor force and accounts for the
country's major export earnings. The history of agricultural development
in Burma started in the mid 1970s when the authorities realized the
important role of agriculture in the entire economy through the failure of
industrialization in the 1960s. Some policies, which emphasized the
introduction of new technology contributed to the progress of Burmese
agriculture. However, other policies hindered it when the "Green
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Revolution" reached the saturation point. To achieve sustainable growth of
the economy, the development strategy should take into account the
agricultural sector, in particular, and the rural area, in general.   
Allain Rasolofoson
        The purpose of this project is to analyze the phenomenon of
deforestation in the case of Madagascar which desserves more attention
than that of a simple national plague, considering the uniqueness of many
species within the rich diversity of the country's natural ecosystems. It
aims to attribute possible connections between this phenomenon and other
past or present realities in the country. More precisely, it will
emphasize on the complex dynamics of population and the environment by
treating a family of transitions comprising:
 political transition describing the implications of the successive
regimes, through their policies and regulations, on the land uses.
 social transition treating the most important changes which have
influenced the land uses and the population's agricultural practices.
 economic transition showing the relevant data through the national
history, which affect the agriculture.
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 demographic transition indicating also an early stage of urban transition
which affects the profile of the rural area.
        The rest of the paper will be articulated according to the
different political eras defined within the political transition. At the
end, in the actual period of economic depression, an attempt is made to
bring a possible solution through the mobilization of the private sector
into a national program of "integrated patrimony management".
Julie Rodriguez
In the 1950's, Ecuador faced a growing population; a ballooning foreign
debt; and a sagging economy.  Ecuador's riches were composed primarily of
its cultural and biological diversity.  Since then, its gross national
product skyrocketed.  Oil development in Ecuador's Amazonian region is
responsible for this transformation.  Oil development also stimulated
other changes.   It opened the rainforest to logging and settlement.  Land
tenure laws encouraged the landless masses in Ecuador's cities to forge
east to the "unproductive" rainforest region.  Now Ecuador is challenged
with striking a balance between providing for its population and
protecting its environment.  Ecuador can move toward this balance by
increasing its reliance on market forces, reforming land tenure policies,
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and by investing in infrastructure, education, and research.  A continued
reliance on oil is unavoidable, but oil developers can be made to adopt
environmentally sound practices to reduce environmental and cultural
costs.  
Hitomi Sasaki
        This paper illustrated the various kinds of human resource,
environmental, social and economical problems caused by the urbanization
transition in Thailand.  In Thailand, there is no official definition of
the urban areas, however, I discussed the transition to Bangkok
Metropolitan Regions from other rural districts to make my ideas clear.  
        Why has Bangkok been expanded as such a huge primate city?  The
principal answer of this question was the centralization of direct foreign
investments toward Thailand since 1986 in order to create economically,
educationally and internationally well developed country.  However, these
investments actually aimed at creating the well developed city, Bangkok,
not the country as a whole.  This economical and political inconsistency
caused the regional imbalances.  A number of people in the rural areas
where no suitable jobs to support their families or the educational
institutes moved to Bangkok to compensate for their needs.  And this
excessive mobility of population to Bangkok caused environmental, social
and economical problems both in Bangkok and in other rural areas. 
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        There have been several trials by Thai government to reduce the
regional imbalance and environmental problems in Bangkok. One of the most
significant policies is the National Economical Social Development Plan.
In its Seventh Plan (1992-96), Thai government have carried out the
Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan to decentralize the urban population
by extending the Eastern Seaboard Project and developing the new industry
zone in Northern part of the metropolitan regions (Saraburi Industrial
Complex).  
        These Thai governmental policies are needed to be considered in
terms of how much succeed in the decentralization and reducing the
environmental problems.  However, Thailand have actually just realized
that it should consider the balanced development in both urban and rural
areas, so we should wait at least three years to criticize governmental
policies or bring the new suggestions.                  
Julie Smith
        Freshwater is a substance of paramount importance: it is pervasive
in all biological and physical systems, and its use is inextricably
intertwined with many of society's efforts to enhance economic and social
well-being.  In the arid East African Nile River Basin freshwater is
scarce and widely shared by countries with enormous economic, military,
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and political differences; over-exploitation, depletion, and deterioration
of the Niles' waters are prevalent problems.  The Nile River traverses
nine international borders and the water it provides is unevenly
distributed and used; thus the potential for conflict is great.  The Nile
basin countries share several common problems which could be mitigated
through combined efforts.  Instead of opposing each other, they could
direct their attentions toward multinational agreements and policies,
defining collective basinwide management strategies for mutual benefit.
Effectively developing the Nile's waters will require a cooperative
approach, treating the basin as one hydrologic unit and all riparian
states as equal stakeholding partners.
Luejit Tinpanga
        The population can be a positive or negative force to national
development.  In case of Vietnam,  its large population and unequal
distribution of population throughout the country has been one of many
factors that impedes socio-economic development.  The Vietnamese
government has adopted population policy:  family planning programs and
population redistribution since the early 1960s in order to control
population growth rate and reduce high population density in big cities
and deltaic plains.  The paper seeks to study how effective this policy is
and how it has an impact on its population and socio-economic development.
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Four sectors were elaborated:  labor force and employment,  agricultural
production,  urbanization,  and forestry.  At the end,  policy suggestions
are included.  




LABOR MIGRATION AND ITS INFLUENCE:
THE CASE OF YEMEN
Introduction
        Labor migration is one of the common phenomena in the Middle
Eastern countries.  People in this region migrate from one country to
another, mainly for economic reasons.  The destinations and the number of
migrant laborers are mainly determined by the economic and political
conditions of both sending and receiving countries.  From the 1970's,
substantial portion of Arab migrant laborers head to the Gulf States,
especially to Saudi Arabia.  The function and the impact of labor
migration has been discussed by many scholars.  It is said that labor
migration functions as a safety valve of the economy in the sending
countries of migrant laborers on the one hand.  When a country cannot meet
the need for jobs of its ever increasing population, labor migration could
serve as one of the solutions for surplus labors.  Besides, the
remittances from the migrant workers may benefit the economy of the
sending countries.  On the other hand, some points out the dangerous
aspects of the labor migration.  Large scale of migration may cause the
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shortage of labor force in the sending countries and thus hinders their
internal development.  Return migration is also a serious problem for the
sending countries.  The extensive scale of return migration inevitably
results in the serious destruction of the economy of the sending
countries.
        The present paper discusses the transition of labor migration of
Yemen from the 1970's until the beginning of the 1990's.  Yemen is a
typical country which depends on the migrant laborers and their
remittances.  The economy and the society of the country are closely
related to the situation of labor migration.  Both positive and negative
impacts of the phenomenon are observed in these few decades.  Through the
discussion, the cause, the influence and the problem of Yemeni labor
migration are examined, and a few suggestions for the future development
of the country will be made.
The Outline of the Country
        Yemen is located in the south east corner of the Arabian
Peninsula.  Because of its relatively humid climate and fertile land, this
area is most densely populated in the arid Arabian Peninsula.  People has
been living there since ancient times.  The country is usually divided
into two regions.  The west part of the country is called "Yemen Proper" 
or "Highland Yemen."   This part consists of high mountain region
including the capital city, San'a, and coastal region along the Red Sea.
The mountain part is characterized by quite humid climate in summer,
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sedentary population, and rain fed agriculture.  In contrast, the eastern
part of Yemen is rather dried. This part is usually called "Hadramawt."
This region consists of inland Wadis, i.e. dry river beds in the desert,
which runs parallel to southern coast of the Arabian Peninsula and of the
coastal region of the Arabian Sea.  The two regions differ in terms of
social, cultural and historical background.  This division roughly
corresponds to that of former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR, or North Yemen)
and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)
respectively.  These two countries were united in 1990 to found one
unified nation, Yemen Republic.
        The migration activities of the people of Yemen has history of
more than one thousand years.  Since the ancient times, people of Yemen
have been migrating to various part of the world.  From the thirteenth
century, the people of Hadramawt, a region in South Yemen, began to
migrate to the regions around the Indian Ocean, mainly for commercial
reason.  They played an important role in the Islamization of the region.
From the end of the eighteenth century, large number of Hadramis headed to
Southeast Asia.  It is reported that in the end of the nineteenth century,
more than 20,000 Arabs were living in today's Indonesia and Singapore, and
more than 90% of them were from Hadramawt (Van den Verg, 1886).   Until
recently, the length of Yemeni, especially Hadrami emigrants were
relatively long.  Some of them became permanent residents at their
destination, and it is not unusual that an migrant stayed there for more
than twenty years until he finally went back to the home land.  Recently,
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however, most of the length of stay became relatively short.  Most of the
immigrants are manual labors and go back to their home land after several
years.  The destination of migration came to be the Gulf States.
Political Transition
        Yemen has several political transitions in this century.  For the
study of labor migration in these few decades, four political transitions
should be taken account.  Before the unification in 1990, Yemen was
divided into two nations.  The North Yemen was ruled by Imams, the
religious leaders of Islam, until 1962 while the South Yemen was under the
British rule until 1968.  In north Yemen, a revolution happened in 1962,
and the new state, Yemen Arab Republic, was founded in that year.  After a
few years of political turmoil and the fight against pro-Imam groups, the
nation came to be recognized by all of the neighboring countries.  As for
the South, they became independent in 1968 founding a Marxist country,
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
        These two Yemeni nations continued to exist until May 22, 1990,
when they were unified to form one nation, Republic of Yemen.  San'a was
decided to be the political capital and Aden, former capital of South
Yemen, to be the economic capital.  Saudi Arabia was not pleased by this
unification, because the emergence of this relatively strong country
within the region could threaten the state security of neighboring
countries.   This distrust of Yemen would influence the situation of
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Yemeni migrant workers in Saudi Arabia.
        The unification of Yemen, however, was not complete at first.  The
people of former South Yemen felt that the whole country was ruled by the
former North government.  In 1994, a continuous conflicts between the
ruling classes of former North and South Yemen within the new government
resulted in a civil war.  Some of the members of the former South
government declared independence in Aden, the capital of former Peoples'
Democratic Republic of Yemen.  This war ended in the victory of former
North government and Aden was conquered by its army.  However, this
sequence of events unveiled the dissatisfaction of the people of former
South Yemen.  Now the most important matter for the government is the
consolidation of the country and the maintenance of the unification.  
Sources for the Study
        Obtaining reliable data on the labor migration of Yemen is really
problematic, because we have only limited information.  Considering the
fact that many migrant laborers use public taxis to cross the borders
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the main destination of Yemeni migrant
workers, and that Yemenis sometimes do not need even passports to enter
this neighboring country, it is almost impossible to know the precise
number of Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia.  Moreover, there is no census
of labor migration covering the whole Middle Eastern countries.  Given
such restriction, one of the most reliable information on the labor
migration is the amount of workers' remittances to their home countries.
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Both IMF and the World Bank gives the information on workers' remittances
in their publications.   However, most of money earned in foreign
countries is brought to Yemen by themselves.   Therefore the data provided
in the publications is just the tip of the iceberg.  It can be said there
is no quantitative data which represents the real situation of the labor
migration of Yemen.
        In addition to the limit of data, Yemen has a statistical problem
as well.  As I explained above, North and South Yemen were united in 1990
to form one nation.  Therefore the statistical data of both Yemens which
used to appear in separate places in the publications was also "united,"
that is, it was summed up, and the information on each region can no
longer be found.  As I state, both countries had different backgrounds in
terms of society, history and culture.  Thus the data of newly formed
Yemen Republic may not indicate some of the transitions of a particular
region.
        Considering these facts, one has to depends on fragmented
information for the study of labor migration of Yemen.  Therefore the data
used in this paper mostly comes from various studies done by individual
scholars.  Some of the studies give useful statistical information such as
the reason for migration, the occupation of the migrant laborers in both
foreign countries and their home country, and the use of accumulated money
after returning to the home countries.  Although the focus of those
studies are limited to a certain region in Yemen, the information provided
in the studies may reflect the reality of labor migration of Yemen to some
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extent.
Current Trend of Labor Migration in the Middle East
        Although the present paper focuses on the labor migration of
Yemen, the phenomenon is commonly observed in most of the Middle Eastern
countries.  It is partially because they laid special emphasis on the move
of the people in the history.  It is better to move to various places than
staying in the same place in one's lifetime.  Throughout the region,
substantial amount of people migrate to other countries for a certain
period, mainly looking for better job opportunities.  The typical pattern
of labor migration is that people from poor countries head to richer
countries, searching for jobs.  The destinations of the emigrants are
mainly industrialized countries such as Europe and the United States and
oil producing countries such as the Gulf States and Libya.  Some of them
settle in the host countries.  However, most of them are temporary
residents.  After several years, they go back to their home countries.
This section examines the trend of labor migration in the Middle Eastern
countries.
Overview of the Labor Migration
        The trend of labor migration in the Middle East can be seen in the
amount of workers' remittances in each countries.  Table 1 shows the
private unrequired transfers, i.e. workers' remittances, of the Middle
Eastern countries from 1973 to 1993.  The minus value means that the
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amount of money sent from the country exceeds that sent to the country.
It can be said that the countries whose amount of remittances is minus are
receiving countries of migrant laborers.  Figure 1 is the chart of the
data in 1988.  As we can see, there is a clear distinction between oil
producing countries and the others.  Saudi Arabia seems to offer the most
job opportunities in the region.  Egypt and Turkey send more workers to
foreign countries than other countries.  Two Yemens, YAR and PDRY are
rather minor entries here.  Since the population of each country is
different, the workers' remittances per person should also be examined.
Figure 2 shows the private unrequired transfers per capita in each
countries in the same year.  It can be said that each of the four Gulf
States has equal importance in receiving labor migration according to
population.  Egypt and Turkey become rather minor countries in the region,
and South Yemen (PDRY) appears as the third country receiving workers'
remittances per capita.  The situation of Israel and Jordan, occupying the
first and second position in this chart, may be explained by the
Palestinians living in both countries.  Because of the conflict between
Arab and Jewish people, Palestinian refugees had to find the way of
sustenance in foreign countries, and the number of migrant workers is huge
if compared to other countries.  In addition to the remittances from
Palestinians abroad, Israel's remittances might include the assistance
from Jewish people living in other countries.  In any case, it can be said
that the amount of private unrequired transfers reflect the situation of
each country to some extent.
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Table 1.  Private Unrequired Transfers,
Selected Middle Eastern Countries, 1973-93.
Figure 1.  Private Unrequired Transfers, Middle 
Eastern Countries, 1988.  Bar chart.
 
Figure 2.  Private Unrequired Transfers per
capita, Middle Eastern Countries, 1988.  Bar chart.
 
Number of Arab Migrant laborers in the Gulf States
        There are some estimations of the number of migrant laborers in
the Gulf States.  Table 2 and Figure 3 show the number and the percentage
of Arab migrant laborers in Saudi Arabia in early 1980's.  As the chart
says, Egypt sends the most migrant workers to Saudi Arabia.  The sum of
both Yemen is approximately 20% of total Arab migrant laborers working in
Saudi Arabia, the second most number among the Arab countries.  However,
it is necessary to know that not all emigrants from those countries head
to the Gulf States.  Substantial portion of them go to Europe and other
industrialized countries.  Moreover, the Arab migrant laborers are
minorities among the whole foreign workers in the Gulf States.  Figure 4
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shows the ratio of Arab migrant laborers to other foreign migrant workers
in the Gulf States.  In most of the country, the number of non-Arab
foreign migrant laborers exceeds that of Arabs.  Most of them come from
Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Philippines, and other Asia countries.
Table 2.  Estimates of the Numbers of Arab
Migrant Workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Early 1980s. 
Figure 3.  Estimates of the numbers of Arab
Migrant Labors in the Gulf States, early 1980s.  Pie chart.
Figure 4.  Estimates of Arab and Other Foreign
Migrant Workers, ca. 1980. Bar chart.
Transition of Workers' Remittances
        Transition of workers' remittances show the trend of labor migration in
Yemen.  Figure 5 and figure 6 are the amount of private unrequired
transfers and worker's remittances of Yemen, provided by IMF and the World
Bank, respectively.  The entry of private unrequired transfer may contain
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elements other than workers' remittances.  However, both charts show
similar trends.  The workers' remittances was minor in both countries in
the early 1970's.  The amount, however, dramatically increase in North
Yemen (YAR) through the decade and come to the peak in the late 1970's.
After that time, the amount is gradually going down, though it continues
to fluctuate.  As for South Yemen (PDRY), the amount of workers'
remittances is quite stable if compared to that of North Yemen.  The
amount of the remittances gradually increases through 1970's and
culminates in the middle of the 1980's.  After that time, it begins to
fall toward the end of the decade.
Figure 5.  Private Unrequired Transfers, Yemen
1973-92.  Graph.
Figure 6.  Workers' Remittances, Yemen,
1973-93.  Graph.
        The difference between the two countries can be explained by the
situation of each country.   For example, the government of South Yemen
restricted the number of emigrant laborers from 1973, because of the
shortage of labor force caused by extensive scale of migration.  It may be
true that the stability of the workers' remittances in the South reflects
file:///C|/545/1996/arai.html (11 of 34) [6/18/2008 10:51:58 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/arai.html
the restriction of the migration by the government.  The difference
between the character of migrant workers from the North and the South
might be one of the reasons for the difference of the transition of
workers' remittances.  It is said that the people of the South Yemen tend
to get into business for themselves in the receiving countries while North
Yemenis are employed by companies or working at construction sites.
Therefore the economic situation of the workers from South Yemen is more
stable in the receiving countries, and their number does not fluctuates,
though it has not been proved by statistical data.
Economic Transition
        One of the most important factors which decides the flow of labor
migration is the economic conditions of the receiving countries.  This is
categorized as "pull" of migrant labors.  The rise of oil price and
subsequent construction boom began in the early 1970's in the Gulf States.
Thus the labor market in the region expands, and many migrant laborers
came to those oil producing states.  Figure 7 shows the Saudi oil prices
and workers' remittances of Yemen.  The oil price begin to rise in the
early 1970's and culminates in 1981.  After that year, the price continues
to fall toward the 1990's, with some fluctuation in the end of the 1980's.
This trend roughly corresponds to that of the workers remittances of
Yemeni migrant laborers.
Who are the migrant laborers?
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        Although migrant laborers have various background in terms of age,
economic condition, and family condition, there are certain tendencies.
Usually it is said that a typical migrant is "a single man who stay abroad
two to five years (Stevenson, 1993)."  However, although the majority of
migrant laborers are living alone in their destination, substantial
portion of them are accompanied by their families.  For example, there is
a report that about one-third of Yemeni migrant laborers in Saudi Arabia
brought their families to live with them in 1990 (Stevenson, 1993).
Another report says that about ninety per cent of male migrant workers
left their wives in their home town (Colton, 1993).
Figure 7.  Saudi Crude Oil Prices and Workers'
Remittances of Yemen.  Graph and bar chart.
Destination
        Most of Yemeni migrant workers go to Saudi Arabia.  The result of
the interviews conducted in al-Hujariyya region in North Yemen is that
87.8% of the returnees used to work in Saudi Arabia.  Those who worked in
other Gulf States are 2.3% and those who worked in the rest of the
countries were just 9.9% of whole returnees (Colton, 1993).  There are
several reasons for this trend.  First one is the location of the country.
Since former North Yemen bordered on Saudi Arabia, prospective migrant
file:///C|/545/1996/arai.html (13 of 34) [6/18/2008 10:51:58 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/arai.html
workers can enter the country by public taxis.  This is appealing to many
people, as the families of the migrant laborers can save the cost of air
ticket which is necessary if their destination is Europe or other Gulf
States.  Besides, Yemenis used to have a special status which allows them
to enter the country without working permission (Stevenson, 1993).
Another reason for going to Saudi Arabia is that most of prospective
migrant workers have their relatives there.  With the help of the
relatives or acquaintances, one can easily find a job before leaving the
country.  Therefore most of the migrant workers found their jobs within
one week from their arrival date.  Supported by these merits, Saudi Arabia
became almost exclusive destination of Yemeni workers.
Types of Job
        The occupation of Yemeni workers in the Gulf States is mainly
construction workers or unskilled laborers.  Table 3 is the occupation of
returnees in al-Hujariyya region in North Yemen.  
Table 3.  Occupations of Returnees
Al-Hujariyya Region, North Yemen, 1989.
Although this chart does not represent the whole trend of labor migration
in Yemen, there can be seen certain tendencies which are commonly
maintained.  The largest portion of the people are engaged in agriculture,
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while the percentage decreases to almost half after the migration.  The
percentage of farmers among the migrant workers is much less than that
among general population.  Another study, however, says that 52% of
returnees from Saudi Arabia had been agricultural workers before migration
(Stevenson, 1993)  During the migration, the most popular occupation is
construction workers and unskilled laborers.  Other study also support
this fact, showing that about 40% of migrant workers are employed as
unskilled laborers (Serageldin, 1983).  After returning to the home land,
many of them start their own business such as running a small convenience
shop or doing commerce.  The returnees tend to work in the service sector
after returning to their home.  
Cause of the Migration
        There are various reasons why people decide to migrate to foreign
countries, and each migrant laborer has different reason.  Those reasons,
however, could be classified as two kinds of forces push and pull.  For
example, the shortage of labor forces and better wages in the Gulf States
can be considered as "pull."  On the other hand, surplus of labor force
and low wage in the sending countries are considered as "push."  The labor
migration happens in the balance of these two factors.
Limits of Natural Environment
        Historically, the limitation of land and water resource are major
factors which cause the flow of migration.  Yemen, especially the North,
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has been the most densely populated region in the Arabian Peninsula.  The
land is quite fertile compared to other regions, and rain fed agriculture
supported quite huge number of population.  However, the amount of arable
land is limited, and the country sometimes could not deal with the
increase of population.  The possible consequence of the demographic
pressure is the shortage of food.  The situation was more severe in the
South.  Therefore the community had to "expel" some of the members from
its territory to maintain the standard of living, tradition and the social
structure (Yajima, 1993).  Waves of emigration were usually preceded by
famines, floods, or other natural disasters.
Private Benefit
        Some of the scholars emphasis the private reason for the labor
migration.  The difference between foreign and local income is also the
main factor for the decision of migration.  Usually, there is considerable
gap of wages between the sending countries and the receiving countries of
migrant laborers.  In the personal level, what makes them decide to work
in foreign countries is huge gap of wages (Richards, 1990).
Impact of Labor Migration
        This labor migration influences many aspects of the life in their
local community.  First of all, the economy of both Yemen has been heavily
depending on the remittances from the foreign countries.  In the 1980's,
the sum of workers' remittances was as much as 20% of gross domestic
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product in the North and 50% in the South (Stevenson, 1993).  It can be
said that most of the households in Yemen rely on those migrant workers.
Some scholars discuss the migration activities in the light of destruction
of culture.  A peasant, living in the rural part of the countries, return
to home after several years of manual work in the Gulf States with
television and tape deck.  However, this kind of discussion does not
enlighten the reality of the emigration.
Age Structure
        Labor migration in the Middle East often affects the age structure
of both sending and receiving countries of migrant workers.  Figure 8, 9
and 10 shows the age structure of North and South Yemen and Saudi Arabia
in the middle of 1980's.  In North Yemen, male population in their
twentieth through fortieth is much less than the female population of the
same generation.  There are several possible reasons for this kind of
phenomenon.  One of the most common explanation is the influence of war,
though it is not the case here.  The most plausible explanation is the
result of extensive scale of labor migration, as migrant workers are
usually men in their twentieth and thirtieth, and the majority of them go
abroad alone.  South Yemen has the same tendency of age structure, though
the difference between male and female population is not as great as that
of the North.  On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, typical receiving country
of foreign workers, has an opposite tendency of the age structure.  The
"surplus" of young male population cannot be explained by other than the
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presence of a number of foreign migrant laborers.
Figure 8.  Age Structure:  YAR (North Yemen),
1985.  Graph.
Figure 9.  Age Structure:  PDRY (South Yemen), 
1985.  Graph.
Figure 10.  Age Structure:  Saudi Arabia, 1985.
Graph.
Decline of Agriculture
        The labor migration has negative effect on the agricultural
productivity in the sending countries.  Figure 11 and 12 shows the
relationship between workers' remittances and food production in both YAR
(Yemen Arab Republic) and PDRY (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen).
In both countries, the increase of remittances roughly corresponds to the
decrease of food production, and the other way round.  This does not
necessarily mean that the increase of labor emigrant results in the less
productivity of food.  However, there seems to be direct relationship
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between the two factors to some extent.  First of all, agriculture in
Yemen is still labor intensive industry.  In the North Yemen, for example,
I have not seen any tractors in the mountainous region.  It is rather
difficult to introduce tractors to terraced fields up to the mountain top.
Secondly the difference of wage is more appealing to rural population than
those living in cities.  As a result, more peasants in rural area migrate
to other countries for higher wage.   Finally, most of the emigrants are
in their twenties or thirties, who are the main workers in a field.  The
labor migration in Yemen used to be the result of the shortage of food
production.  However, the increase of emigrants result in less food
production in the current situation.
Figure 11.  Workers' Remittance and Food Production,
Yemen Arab Republic (North)
Figure 12.  Workers' Remittance and Food Production,
Peoples' Democratic Republic of Yemen. (South)
        As the number of labor migration increased, the type of
agriculture also changed.  Instead of absent male residents, women came to
work in the field, though they could not sufficiently compensate the loss
of men.  Moreover, as we see above, nearly half of farmers abandon
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agriculture after the return from foreign countries.  The crop grown in
the field has also changed.  Instead of labor-intensive coffee and grain,
qat trees increase.  Qat is a mild stimulant which most of Yemeni men chew
in the public settings.  The growing of qat require little labor and
produces much profit.  As the result of labor migration to the Gulf
States, agriculture came to be abandoned because it requires a hard work
and produces relatively low profit (Birks, 1980).  Even though the
returnees go back to occupation in agriculture, they prefer qat as their
main crop, and thus food production does not recover.
Development of the country
        Labor migration also affects the development of local industry.
The cities in the sending countries of migrant workers need manual labors
for the factory.  However, the potential workers, i.e. rural population,
prefer to go to foreign countries. Especially the wages in foreign
countries are more appealing to rural population than city dwellers, the
potential manual laborers needed for the development of a country.  Thus
the sending countries of migrant laborers stay behind from the
industrialization and modernization.  In former South Yemen, labor
migration caused the shortage of skilled workers and technocrats.  Thus
the country had to receive foreign workers from the East Africa to
compensate the loss of labor force (Richard, 1986).  The reason why former
South Yemen restricted the number of migrant workers leaving the country
is mainly this.
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        The remittances from the migrant laborers usually does not help
the development of the country.  That money generates a new demand for
luxury things such as VCR, camera and car.  However, most of those
commodities are imported from foreign countries because domestic products
do not meet the demand of quality, or even they do not exist at all.  Thus
only import section of the economy is benefited by workers' remittances
(Wenner, 1988).
Return Migration
        In 1990, Iraqi army suddenly crossed the border of Kuwait,
occupying the whole country and claimed the rights over the occupied
territory.  Saudi Arabia opposed Iraq and decided to invite US military
forces into its territory.  While most of the Arab countries supported the
decision of Saudi Arabia, Yemen took a neutral stance, refusing to support
the introduction of US military forces to solve the problem.  This
decision of Yemeni government caused the unprecedented scale of return
migration.  The Saudi government decided to deprive the special status of
Yemeni migrant laborers.  As a result, nearly a million of Yemenis had to
leave Saudi Arabia.   There were also approximately 45,000 Yemenis
returning from Kuwait and Iraq.  These phenomena meant the increase in the
population of Yemen by 8% (Stevenson, 1993).  The unemployment rate rose
from 15% to 30% (Feiler, 1993).  The country also lost the remittances
from those countries as well.  
        The large scale of return migration, however, did not began with
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the Gulf Crisis.  From the mid 1980's, return migration became one of the
issues in the Middle Eastern countries (Richards, 1996).  As the labor
market shrank, migrant laborers, especially unskilled workers, were forced
to return to their home countries.  The reason for this transition is the
fall of oil price and the completion of major construction programs in the
Gulf States.  Although Yemen lost a substantial amount of workers'
remittances at the time of Gulf Crisis, the amount of remittances had
fallen to about 400 millions of US$.  Considering that nearly 1.6 billions
of US$ were sent to Yemen in 1983, the loss of the Gulf Crisis cannot be
overestimated.
Policy of Yemeni Government and the suggestion for the future
        The Yemeni government has several projects for the development of
the country.  From the mid 1980's the government had already been aware of
increasing return migration and its potential negative effects on the
economy.  The government also noticed the relationship between workers'
remittances and the import of industrial products:
Most industrial products are imported.  The trade balance has a chronic
deficit, but it is held within manageable limits.  Between 1980 and 1988
it ranged between Y.D. 152 million (1987) and Y.D. 274 million (1984).
The service account had a surplus up to 1984.  This surplus has been
decreasing between 1981 and 1984.  In 1985 it involved a deficit of Y.D.
10 million which grew to about Y.D. 35 million in 1988.  However, the
deficit of goods and services has been partly covered by unrequired
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transfers, the most important of which are the remittances from Yemeni
workers working abroad, especially in the Arab Gulf countries. . . The
amounts have been decreasing since 1984, as a result of the contracting
economic activities - especially oil exports and prices - in the host
countries (UN 1990).  Thus Yemeni government tries to increase export
production to improve the balance of payments.  The government is also
trying to minimize the import of goods by restricting them to the level to
meet the country's needs for foodstuffs, raw materials, fertilizers,
machinery and spare parts. However, the latter does not seem to succeed,
as I saw a lot of Sony, Panasonic and other electric appliances in San'a
this summer.
        Yemeni government also lists several objectives for the 1990's.
Here, I show just some of them. 
(a) Development of natural resources
(b) Development of physical production sectors such as Agriculture,
Industry and Fisheries
(c) Encouragement of exports by all possible means
(d) Encouragement of tourism
(e) Improvement of human resources including education, health, and job
training
Among these objectives, the government gives priority to the development
of industry.  This is the right choice because most of the industrial
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products are imported from foreign countries.  The development of industry
also produces job opportunities which is strongly needed in the current
situation.  The development of natural resources also sounds feasible, as
oil and natural gas have been found in the country recently.  The growth
of the production of these two materials will be one of the solutions for
current problems of return migration.  Since this project requires
infrastructure, the construction of pipelines and other facilities produce
additional job opportunities.
        On the other hand, tourism is not recommended.  It is true that
the development of tourism leads to the increase of foreign currency into
the country.  However, it simultaneously causes the increase in imported
goods, as the tourists usually spend their money for imported goods, with
the exception of souvenirs.  For example, they use luxury hotels run by
foreign companies.  The service in the hotels is kept same as that of
developed countries.  This means that they use foreign products needed for
the guests.  The bus they use may be made in Japan or Germany.  Moreover,
the dependence on the tourism often results in avoidance of alternative
ways of development such as industrialization of the country.  Finally,
the tourism is as unstable as labor migration, as the number of tourists
usually fluctuates and cannot be controlled by a government.  Considering
these facts, it can be said that the development of tourism has little
contribution to the improvement of economic situation of Yemen, if not at
all.
        Since the objects listed above cannot be achieved overnight, the
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restoration of the position of the returnees to the original place is also
needed.  There was a talk between Yemen and Saudi Arabia after the Gulf
Crisis and the flow of return migration.  Some of the migrant laborers
were allowed to return to Saudi Arabia, though the number is quite small
if compared to number of those forced to leave the country.  Considering
that Saudi Government wants to reduce the number of foreign workers, the
complete return to the original situation cannot be expected.  Here,
again, the rapid growth of economy and development of physical production
section, i.e. industry, agriculture and fisheries, are needed.
        Political turmoil in the country is also a problem  Currently the
consolidation of the country and the maintenance of the unity are the most
important objectives of the government of Yemen.  Everyday there are TV
programs which spreads a lot of propaganda about the need for the
unification and the consolidation of the country.   Currently, it is said
that most of the people agree on the unification of the country, though
they differ in the opinion about the current government.  Large scale of
development will come only after the consolidation of the country.  
        The next step for the future is the industrialization and the
restoration of agriculture.  The decline of these sectors are partially
caused by the outflow of labor power.  Therefore now may be the chance to
establish the way of self development of the country.  Without achieving
these two goals, the country will continue to depend on imported products
and remittances from the migrant workers, and thus its economy are
continuously influenced by the policy of the receiving countries.  There
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are some feasible projects of the development.  Among them, newly found
oil is the most likely solution for the current economic problems.
Although the oil production of Yemen is not yet high enough (less than one
per cent of the world production), there is high possibility of the
improvement of current situation.
        The port of Aden is another source of revenue for the country.
The port has been known as one of the best natural port in the area for a
long time.  The position of the port is quite convenient, near to the Bab
al-Mandub, the strait which connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea.  The
port, however, has been almost abandoned since 1970's.  Yemeni government
is planning to renovate the facilities of the port and receive large
ships.  Since most of the ships using the Suez Canal stop at Hormuz, a
port in the Persian Gulf, the renovation of Aden may attract those who
want to shorten the route of voyage.
Conclusion
        Labor Migration is one of the common features in the Middle
Eastern Countries.  There is a clear distinction between the sending
countries and the receiving countries.  Usually, the receiving countries
are characterized by small population and rich natural resources, i.e.
oil.  On the other hand, the sending countries are usually poorer than the
receiving countries and have quite huge population.  Yemen is a typical
sending country with more than fourteen millions of population.  Most of
Yemenis headed to its neighbor, Saudi Arabia.  The remittances from the
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migrant laborers have been changing the household, neighborhood, and state
economy of the country.  The trend of migration is vulnerable to the
change of policies of the receiving countries.  The boom of labor
migration was accelerated in the early 1970's with the rise of oil price
and the construction boom in the Gulf States.
        There are two different opinions on the effect of labor migration.
Some scholar maintain that the labor migration functions as a safety valve
for the economy of the sending countries.  The surplus labor force in the
sending countries can be absorbed by the labor shortage of the receiving
countries.  Thus the sending countries can manage the ever increasing
population.  Those countries can also benefit from huge amount of
remittances from the migrant laborers.  However, other scholars claim that
it has also the negative effect on both current economy and the
industrialization of the sending countries.  In these days the latter
theory seems to be applied.  With the decrease in job opportunities for
migrant workers in the late 1980's the potential danger of the labor
migration emerged.
        The character of the migration activities in the Middle East has
changed from the past, especially after the emergence of oil producing
countries.  These countries give huge amount of job opportunities and
attract the people from the surrounding regions.  Now, the reason for
migration is "better wages" and higher social status, i.e. landowner, as
well as the solution for economic stagnancy in the sending countries.  The
governments of the sending countries should control the overflow of
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migrants.  One of the solutions is the rise of wages in their home
country.  Especially the revision of the state policy to keep the prices
of agricultural products relatively low.
        The Gulf Crisis was one of the turning points of Yemeni labor
migration.  About one million Yemenis were forced to return to the home
country, and Yemen suffered from economic stagnation.  It is true that the
return migration at that time was unprecedented scale.  However, the Gulf
Crisis was not the major reason for the trend of return migration.  The
migration to the Gulf States had already declined by the end of 1980's.
This trend was the result of the decline of oil price and the completion
of major construction programs.
        Yemen is currently suffering from economic stagnation and serious
unemployment, and the country is not yet politically stabilized.  However,
the possibility of development is high because of the presence of natural
resources such as oil and gas, and the potential usage of the port of
Aden.  In my opinion, although the government encourages tourism, it
should concentrate on the development projects based on its own industries
for the time being.
Maps:
Map of region.
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Private Unrequired Transfers, Middle Eastern
Countries, 1988.
GNP per capita, Middle Eastern Countries, ca.
1990.
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   See the attached map.
   The number includes Hadrami descents born in Indonesia.
   There are several conflicts over the borders between Saudi Arabia and
Yemen.
   International Financial Statistics Yearbook and IMF Country Tables
(line 77afd: Private Unrequired Transfers).  As for the World Bank, they
provide the data for the study of labor migration in their World Table
(Workers' Remittances).  These two publications, however, give only
insufficient information for certain countries.  For example, they have no
information on the United Arab Emirates, the country which seems to
provide quite large opportunities to foreign workers.  The data on Iraq
and Iran also cannot be found.  Therefore we can access the information on
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less than half of the Persian Gulf countries.
   The reason for this is that the banking system in Yemen is not yet
fully established, and the people are suspicious of the system.  Some
accidents during the process of remittances are reported (Stevenson,
1993).
   The result of an interview in al-Hujariyya region in North Yemen says
that more than ninety per cent of workers left their wives in the
hometown.  Since the interview is conducted in 1989 among returnees, the
data can be considered as the situation in the early and middle 1980's.
   As Table 3 shows, however, the percentage of farmers among the migrant
laborers is less than that among general population (Colton, 1993).
   UN Disaster Relief Organization, US Committee for Refugees, US State
Department, International Organization for Migration and the US Government
Accounting Office cite one million as the number of return migration from
Saudi Arabia to Yemen (Stevenson, 1993).
   I saw the programs almost everyday during my trip to Yemen.






        Last summer, I worked at United Nations Headquarters, belonging to
United Nations Center for Human Settlement, a Secretariat of the last UN
Conference "City Summit, Habitat II", held in Istanbul last June, and went
there to attend the conference as an assistant for UN staffs from the
beginning,  This opportunity made me realize what current urban problems
were and what we should do in the future.  After this internship, I made a
trip to Egypt for three weeks, and I saw a lot of urban problems in Cairo,
which were the same situation as what was discussed in Istanbul.  Although
I may have nothing to do with these problems in Cairo, I felt like my own
and would like to carry researches into why a lot of people gather this
large city and what kinds of urban problems will be brought about.  That
is the reason why I selected this topic in this course.
        First of all, I will introduce what urbanization is, including
future trend and current reality.  Second, I will mention about the City
Summit, Habitat II.  After showing the objections and goal, I will add
what I did there and what I thought regarding this conference.  Third, I
want to show you the itinerary of my Egypt trip, including some pictures.
I will report from the current situation in Cairo to some tourist spots
such as Luxor, Aswan and Alexandria, and show you what I saw and thought.
Fourth, I will introduce about Egypt, Geography, Population Maps and
Economy.  After that, I will show some graphs as a demographic transition.
Finally, I want to show my analysis by using STELLA II.  Recent data can
tell us the future trend of urbanism such as population growth; however,
few people knows why these things happen.  After promoting better
understanding about this country, I try to examine available data in
various fields as mush as possible, and will find possible relationships
among them.  These analysis will allow me to create the population
dynamics model in Egypt by using STELLA II.  This model will visibly show
the relationship among the population growth and others, and bring about
better understanding about the population dynamics in this country.   I
made a simple model taken into account population factors such as birth
and death rate from the data of World Resource Institute, and linked it to
GDP (Gross Domestic Products).  It was very difficult to link them,
because they cannot be represented by an equation.  
        For example, a fertility rate is supposed to be linked with Industrial
output per capita; however, each graph never tells any relationships.
Fortunately, I found a good relationship between them by multiple
regression analysis.  I could link between each distribution of GDP and
population growth factors by a liner equation.  This STELLA model tells us
to what extent each distribution of GDP will effect on the population
growth, which can be handled by the government.  In conclusion, I will
give some findings and possible further studies in the future, based on
file:///C|/545/1996/kuramitsu.html (1 of 21) [6/18/2008 10:52:04 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/kuramitsu.html
the results from the STELLA model.
Urbanization
        Urbanization is one of the critical global trends shaping the
future, reshaping the physical and social environment, as it fuels
economic growth and spurs environmental degradation.  Cities can serve as
centers of employment, growth and innovation; however, the rapid
population growth in large cities in developing counties will go beyond
its capacity.  On the table below, I show some future trend and current
reality in the world, which we are surely surprised at. 
Table 1 : Future Trend and Current Reality
Future Trend
By 2025, world population is expected to reach 8.3 billion, a 50 %
increase over the present.  Africa's population is expected to double,
Latin America's to grow nearly 50 %. and Asia's to grow 40 % during that
period.
Current Reality
        
Fertility rate in most developing countries are declining, but must fall
mush further if even the mid-range population growth projection (8.3
billion) is not to be exceeded.
Future Trend
By 2025, 2/3 of the world's people will live in cities.
Current Reality
        
Only one third of the world's population was urban 35 years ago.  More
than 150,000 people are being added to urban population in developing
countries every day.
Future Trend
By 2015, the world will have 33 "megacities" with population over 8
million and more than 500 cities with population of 1 million or more.
        
Current Reality
Greater Tokyo already has 27 million people; Sao Paulo, Brazil, 16.4
million; and Bombay, India, 15 million.
Future Trend
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In coming decades, most of the world's poor will be in urban, living under
conditions that can be worse than those of rural poor.  
Current Reality
Between 1970 and 1990, the number of urban poor in Latin America alone
increased from 44 to 115 million.
Future Trend
By 2000, the physical size of cities in developing countries is expected
to be double what it was in 1980, exerting phenomenal stress on local
environment.
        
Current Reality
More than 40 % of all cities with a population of 500,000 or more are in
tidal estuaries or on the open coast.  Half of the world's coastlines and
coastal ecosystems are already at risk from development.
Future Trend
By 2020, energy use will increase by 50 to 100 %.  Emissions of greenhouse
gases that contribute to the risk of climate change will increase by 45 to
90 %.   
Current Reality
In the past 20 years, global energy use has grown nearly 50 %.  The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has concluded that greenhouse
gas emissions have led to a "discernible human influence on global
climate.
Future Trend
By 2010, the number of motor vehicles could grow to more than 800 million,
exacerbating urban air pollution especially in rapidly industrializing
countries.      
Current Reality
In Bangkok, 300-400 more vehicles are added to traffic jams daily.  In the
United States, the number of miles driven in motor vehicles climbed 40 %,
largely offsetting increases in vehicle efficiency.
Future Trend
World food production is expected to keep up with population growth, but
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many people will still go hungry.  By 2010, the number of African's which
suffer from malnutrition is expected to increase 70 % to 300 million.
        
Current Reality
Nearly one billion people get most of their protein from fish.
Overfishing has already depleted more than one-fourth of the world's
marine fish stocks.
Future Trend
By 2050, as many as 2.4 billion people could live in countries facing
water scarcity.  This is nearly 1/5 of the world's projected population.
        
Current Reality
Withdrawals of fresh water from rivers and lakes have quadrupled in the
last 50 years.  In 1994, at least 220 million urban dwellers lacked steady
access to safe drinking water.  Fully 90 % of sewage in developing
countries go untreated. 
Source: World Resources 1996-97 Press Release
Habitat II
Goals and Objectives
        As can be seen on the table 1, such urban problems were the main
topics at the recent international conference, Habitat II, which was held
in Istanbul last June.  The overall objective of the Habitat II Conference
is twofold: one is to increase the world's awareness of the deteriorating
living environment, and the second is to awaken the planet to the
potentials of human settlement as catalysts for social progress and
economic growth -- and that can only happen if our cities, towns and
villages are healthy, safe, just and sustainable.  The fundamental goal is
to prepare the international community for life on an urbanized earth.
What I did
        I have worked as an intern in the United Nations Centre for Human
Settlement (Habitat), New York Office, from May 22 to July 26 1996.  I
assisted with various tasks in the preparation of the Habitat II
Conference which take place in Istanbul, Turkey.  I attended the
conference in Istanbul from 1 to 16 June, was to assist to the UN staff in
the organization of special events including hospitality services and
coordinated logistics for the Secretary-General's Advisory Group. Several
opportunities to attend conferences were given to me, such as main
conference, NGO Forum and other official conferences.  A lot of current
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urban problems were reported there, which made me realize what happened in
urbanizing world.
What I thought
        My main impression about the conference is that from now on our
efforts to improve the living environment must be focused on urban areas.
That is where most of the world's population will live and work, where
most economic activity will take place, where the most pollution will be
generated, and where most natural resources consumed.  In Istanbul, I had
an opportunity to know some keys to urban efficiency; such as
decentralization, employment generation, environmental infrastructure,
land regulations, municipal finance, and promoting good governance. These
might be the ways to reduce the urbanization; however, first of all, I
should understand why and how such movement of human population occurs and
what kinds of relationship with the global environment exists.
Trip to Egypt
        After the internship at United Nations, I made a trip to Egypt for
three weeks, visiting Cairo, Alexandria, Upper Egypt and Red Sea.  Since
various urban problems were discussed at the conference in Istanbul, this
trip was not just sight seeing.  I arrived at Cairo on the 5th of August.
The current situation of Cairo is just terrible; such as a lot of people
and auto-mobile, which bring about a lot of garages with sand in the
streets, smog in the air and even River Nile is far from clean.  The scene
is surely different from the image which I had.  Furthermore everything is
written in Arabic and people who can speak English tend to tell a lie to
travelers, so I think visitors cannot make a trip individually unless they
speak Arabic.  Next, I visited Alexandria, the second biggest city in
Egypt, which is one of the cities faced on the Mediterranean Sea.  I met a
French gentleman there, and he said that Alexandria was the most beautiful
in Mediterranean cities, even more than Nice or Monaco in France; however,
now it becomes one of the worst cities with floating garbage in the sea.
Then I headed for Aswan by a mini-bus, which took me about 15 hours to get
there.  I visited the Aswan High-Dam and found an interesting sign, saying
"This is an Egyptian challenge against nature".  In fact, this dam can
control the water flow and brings about steady water supply without flood;
however, it resulted in climate change around there.  It used to have
little rain before, but, because of the Lake Nasal, it sometimes has rain
due to the vapor from the lake, causing environmental change.  At Luxor, I
pedaled a bicycle to visit King of Valley under hot weather.  The direct
sunshine brought more than 44 C(degree), and I almost died.  Finally I
went to Hurghada, Red Sea to go scuba-diving.  Red Sea has one of the most
beautiful coral reefs, which attracts all divers in the world.  It is sure
that a lot of world heritage still exist in Egypt, and a lot of foreign
people want to see them once.  However, it seems to me that a lot of
people depend upon them too much.  That is the reason why service per
capita has been growing up recently.  Frauds and crimes for visitors have
increased, which makes the image of Egypt worse.  Under such a current
trend, nothing new will be produced.  If the government thinks much of
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service sector especially in travel, it should commit with a positive
attitude, which create repeat visitors to Egypt.
EGYPT
Geography and History
        Officially Arab Republic of Egypt, from 1958 to 1971 UNITED ARAB
REPUBLIC, republic, Northeast Africa and Sinai Peninsula, Southwest Asia.
It is bounded on the North by the Mediterranean Sea, on the East by Israel
and the Red Sea, on the South by the Sudan, and on the West by Libya.  The
country has a maximum length from North to South of about 1085 km (about
675 mi.) and a maximum width, near the South border, of about 1255 km
(about 780 mi).  It has a total area of approximately 1,001,450 sq.
km(approximately 386,660 sq. mi).  The land of the Nile River, Egypt is
the cradle of one of the world's greatest ancient civilizations and has a
recorded history that dates from about 3200 BC.  The descriptive material
that follows is pertinent to modern Egypt.  The History section covers
Egypt from ancient times, including the Dynastic Period (3200 BC-343 BC),
the Hellenistic Period (332 BC-30 BC), Roman and Byzantine Rule (30 BC-AD
638), the Caliphate and the Mamalukes (642-1517), Ottoman Domination
(1082-1882), and British colonialism (1882-1952) as well as modern,
independent Egypt (1952- ).
Land and Resources.
        Less than 10% of the land area of Egypt is settled or under
cultivation.  This territory consists of the valley and delta of the Nile
and a number of desert oases.  More than 90% of the country consists of
desert areas, including the Libyan Desert in the West, a part of the
Sahara, and the Arabian (or Eastern) Desert, which borders the Red Sea and
the Gulf of Suez, in the East.  The Libyan Desert (also known as the
Western Desert) includes a vast sandy expanse called the Great Sand Sea.
Located here are several depressions with elevations below sea level,
including the Qattarah (Qattara) Depression, which has an area of about
18,100 sq. km (about 6990 sq. mi) and reaches a depth of 133m (436 ft)
below sea level, the lowest point in Africa; also found here are the oases
of Siwah, Kharijah, Bahriyah, Farafirah, and Dakhilah.  Much of the
Arabian Desert occupies a plateau that rises gradually East from the Nile
Valley to elevations of about 610 m (about 2000 ft) in the East and is
broken along the Red Sea coast by jagged peaks as high as about 2135 m
(about 7000 ft) above sea level. In the extreme South, along the border
with the Sudan, is the Nubian Desert, an extensive region of dunes and
sandy plains.  The Sinai Peninsula consists of sandy desert in the North
and rugged mountains in the South, with summits looming more than 2135 m
(more than 7000 ft) above the Red Sea, and including Jabal Katrinah (2642
m/8668 ft), the highest elevation in Egypt. 
        The Nile enters Egypt from Sudan and flows North for about 1545 km
(about 960 mi) to the Mediterranean Sea.  For its entire length from the
South border to Cairo the Nile flows through a narrow valley lined by
cliffs.  At the Sudan border lies Lake Nasser, a huge reservoir formed by
the Aswan High Dam (q.v.) .  The lake is about 480 km (about 300 mi) long
and is about 16 km (10 mi) across at its widest point.
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Population Map in 1960.
Population Map in 1992.
Population Map in 2001.
Economy
        During the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the economy of Egypt
was radically socialized. Beginning in 1961, foreign trade, banking,
insurance, and most wholesale and industrial establishments were
nationalized.  Those sectors which remained in private hands were placed
under heavy regulatory restraints.  Industry was expanded and production
increased according to a five year plan. Inadequate foreign investment, a
sluggish bureaucracy and the disastrous 1967 Arab-Israeli War subverted
subsequent programmes until a process of economic reform was inaugurated
by Abdel Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, in the aftermath of the October
War of 1973.  By reversing many of Abdel Nasser's policies and opening
Egypt to foreign investment, Sadat began a gradual revival of the Egyptian
economy which was significantly enhanced by remittances from Egyptian
working in the surrounding oil producing countries.  The very slow but
sure relaxation of import, currency and trade restrictions stimulated
Egypt's foreign exchange economy. Tourism, which had fallen off
drastically during Abdel Nasser's time due to Egypt's anti-western stance
and poor tourist infrastructure, was restarted with the privatization of
many nationalized tourist facilities.  Sadat's dramatic peace initiative
and treaty with Israel transformed the western view of the Arab leader and
his country and further enhanced the country internationally, although the
gesture was motivated by more practical considerations: Egypt couldn't
afford another war with Israel.  Despite the many advances the country has
witnessed under President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt continues to suffer from
the vagaries of regional instability and its exploding population.
Government leaders openly admit that population growth is undermining all
efforts toward developing the country's economy. This situation is further
aggravated by consumerism.  Servicing a foreign debt over twice the size
of the national budget is another negative factor. Under pressure from the
IMF and World Bank, Egypt finally began to lift price controls, reduce
subsidies and begin to relax restrictions on trade and investment.
Tourism represents one of the most lucrative sectors of Egypt's economy
but is highly vulnerable to internal violence and regional politics. The
government remains hopeful that the oil and gas discoveries in the western
desert will produce significant revenues. 
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Figure 1.  Total Population.  Graph.
        According to the data from World Resource Institute, the total
population in Egypt will grow up as can be seen on the figure 1.  Although
it looks like a linear curve, I got a better result using logistic model.
Basically, logistic models represent that the curve will get close to the
limit, so the growth of the total population in Egypt will be declining
over time.   By 2050, it is expected that the total population in Egypt
will reach almost 12 million.
Figure 2.  Urban and Rural Population.
Figure 3.  Crude Birth and Death Rate.
        The graph of Urban & rural population in Egypt shows urbanization
clearly.  According to the data, the urban population will be doubled in
the next 30 years.  This is one of the typical cases of urbanization in
the developing countries.  Crude birth rate will be still higher than
death rate; however, the crude birth rate is expected to be declining over
time.  On the other hand, the death rate will be growing up again around




        About 20 years ago, Dr. Dennis L. Meadows, a professor at MIT,
represented the world model in his book, "The Limits To Grows". This model
was built specifically to investigate five major trends of global concern;
such as accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth,
widespread malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and a
deteriorating environment.  Since this model is a formal and mathematical
model, it has two important advantages over mental models. First, every
assumption is written in a precise form so that it is open to inspection
and criticism by all. Second, after the assumptions have been scrutinized,
discussed, and revised to agree with the best current knowledge, their
implications for the behavior of the world system can be traced without
error by a computer, no matter how complicated they become.  Referring to
the world model and using current available data, I will create the Egypt
model by STELLA II.
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Simple Modeling 
        First of all, I created a simple model, taking into account
population factors only, such as birth and death rate.  The generation was
divided by three, and each growth pattern can be seen in the graph.  As a
result of this simple model, I could got a similar growth patterns as can
be seen on the figure 1.  However, the range is a little higher than the
data from WRI.  Other factors such as Industry, Agriculture and Natural
Resource will effect on this growth pattern.  Since some of these other
factors would play a significant role to decrease the population growth
such as birth control, I would like to put GDP (Gross Domestic Products)
into the previous model.
Figure 4.  STELLA II model 1 (population
factors only)
Figure 5.  Population growth by generation.
Link to GDP
Figure 6.  Distribution of GDP (percent).
Figure 7.  Each category per capita.
        GDP is divided three outputs such as industry, service and
agriculture.  As can be seen, the service sector holds about 60 % of the
total GDP.  With the increase of service output, service per capita is
also growing up in spite of the rapid population growth.  Each output will
have some relationship with population growth factors such as fertility
and mortality.  For example, if the industrial per capita increases and
people obtain better life, the birth rate would be effected by that. The
service per capita also have an influence to this, because people would
have better education, which would bring about birth control.
Figure 8.  Relationship between industry per
capita and fertility rate.
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Figure 9.  Relationship between service per
capita and fertility rate.
        However, there is no equation to link between them.  To what
extent the increase industrial per capita effects on total fertility?  How
about service output?  In order to solve this problem, I created graphs in
the previous page, showing the relationship between each category of GDP
and fertility rate.  As can be seen, the fertility rate will be declining
over time, while each output changing randomly.  That means I cannot have
the relationship, because the fertility rate is not determined my them.
However, let me think like this.  The difference of the fertility rate
each year may be effected by the actual results of industry per capita or
service one.  So I summed it up year by year, and look into the
relationship by using Multiple Regression.
Multiple Regression
Fertility Rate
Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..   FERTIL
Block Number  1.  Method:  Stepwise     Criteria   PIN  .9800   POUT
.9900
   SUMIND   SUMSER   SUMAGRI
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   1..    SUMSER
Multiple R                 .99805
R Square                   .99610
Adjusted R Square    .99592
Standard Error          .03889
Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           1             8.50350          8.50350
Residual            22              .03328           .00151
F =    5621.96550       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
Variable              B                SE B                 Beta
T      Sig T
SUMSER     -3.41548E-04  4.5552E-06   -.998049   -74.980  .0000
(Constant)     5.506274          .012850                       428.511
.0000
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------------- Variables not in the Equation -------------
Variable             Beta In      Partial    Min Toler           T    Sig
T
SUMIND       -.126370   -.191485    .008950         -.894  .3814
SUMAGRI     -.145369   -.255322    .012025       -1.210  .2397
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   2..    SUMAGRI
Multiple R                .99818
R Square                  .99636
Adjusted R Square    .99601
Standard Error          .03849
Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           2             8.50567          4.25283
Residual            21              .03111           .00148
F =    2871.05761       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
Variable                B                 SE B              Beta
T      Sig T
SUMSER      -2.92100E-04  4.1109E-05   -.853557    -7.106  .0000
SUMAGRI    -1.18900E-04  9.8253E-05   -.145369    -1.210  .2397
(Constant)      5.527124          .021414                      258.108
.0000
------------- Variables not in the Equation -------------
Variable          Beta In    Partial     Min Toler         T  Sig T
SUMIND       .023096  .021745    .003230      .097  .9235
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   3..    SUMIND
Multiple R                .99818
R Square                  .99636
Adjusted R Square    .99581
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Standard Error          .03943
Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           3             8.50568          2.83523
Residual            20              .03109           .00155
F =    1823.75924       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
Variable              B                     SE B             Beta
T         Sig T
 
SUMIND       1.32982E-05   1.3671E-04    .023096       .097  .9235
SUMSER      -2.94550E-04  4.9072E-05   -.860716    -6.002  .0000
SUMAGRI    -1.31929E-04  1.6755E-04   -.161299     -.787   .4403
(Constant)      5.528470         .025937                      213.147
.0000
End Block Number   1   POUT =     .990 Limits reached.
        In this multiple regression, independent variables; such SUMSER as
sum of service per capita, were entered on step number, meaning that the
most relative independent variable to the dependent variable of "fertility
rate" was selected to be in the equation at first.  As can 
be seen in the R square, the fertility rate is totally effected by service
per capita (R Square = .99610).  The other two variables could not give
significant change in the R Square (R Square = .99636).   This seems to
mean that there is little link between the fertility rate and the
industrial or food per capita.  It is sure that this discovery will
decisively effect on the model, and I can put an equation into it based on
the result of the multiple regression as follows;
"Fertility rate" = .000013982 * SUM(industrial_per_capita) +  (-.00029455)
* SUM(service_per_ capita) + (-.000131929) * SUM(food_per_capita)  
Mortality Rate
Equation Number 1    Dependent Variable..   MORTAL
Block Number  1.  Method:  Stepwise     Criteria   PIN  .9800   POUT
.9900
   SUMIND   SUMSER   SUMAGRI
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   1..    SUMAGRI
Multiple R                .99574
R Square                  .99150
Adjusted R Square    .99111
Standard Error          .28094
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Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           1           202.48991        202.48991
Residual            22             1.73634           .07892
F =    2565.61570       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
Variable              B                  SE B              Beta
T      Sig T
SUMAGRI        -.003984    7.8645E-05   -.995740   -50.652  .0000
(Constant)       17.985729     .103648                        173.527
.0000
------------- Variables not in the Equation -------------
Variable            Beta In  Partial      Min Toler         T  Sig T
SUMIND       .993537  .713548    .004385     4.667  .0001
SUMSER       .406696  .483664    .012025     2.532  .0194
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   2..    SUMIND
Multiple R                .99791
R Square                  .99583
Adjusted R Square    .99543
Standard Error          .20146
Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           2           203.37397        101.68698
Residual            21                .85228               .04058
F =    2505.54368       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
 
Variable                    B             SE B             Beta
T      Sig T
SUMIND            .002798  5.9949E-04      .993537     4.667  .0001
SUMAGRI        -.007949   8.5162E-04  -1.987096    -9.335  .0000
(Constant)       18.469929     .127621                       144.724
.0000
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------------- Variables not in the Equation -------------
Variable          Beta In     Partial     Min Toler         T  Sig T
SUMSER       .134039  .195267    .003230      .890  .3838
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number
   3..    SUMSER
Multiple R                .99799
R Square                  .99599
Adjusted R Square    .99538
Standard Error          .20246
Analysis of Variance
                    DF      Sum of Squares      Mean Square
Regression           3           203.40647         67.80216
Residual            20                 .81978             .04099
F =    1654.14658       Signif F =  .0000
------------------ Variables in the Equation ------------------
Variable                  B                   SE B               Beta
T      Sig T
SUMIND           .002477          7.0200E-04     .879610     3.529   .0021
SUMSER         2.24357E-04    2.5197E-04     .134039       .890   .3838
SUMAGRI        -.008028         8.6035E-04  -2.006650    -9.331  .0000
(Constant)       18.501888           .133183                       138.920
.0000
End Block Number   1   POUT =     .990 Limits reached.
        In comparison with the fertility rate, the most relative
independent variable of SUMAGRI (food per capita) to the dependent
variable of "mortality rate" was selected to be in the equation at first.
As can  be seen in the R square, the mortality rate is totally effected by
food per capita (R Square = .99150).  The other two variables could not
give significant change in the R Square (R Square = .99599), either.
This seems to mean that there is little link between the mortality rate
and the industrial or service per capita.  I can also put an equation into
it based on the result of the multiple regression as follows;
"Mortality Rate" = .002477 * SUM(industrial_per_capita) + .000224357 *
SUM(service_per_capita)  + (-.008028) * SUM(food_per_capita)
Curvefit Analysis
        Since the multiple regression is used a liner model, there might
be another estimation such as logistic model in representing the
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relationship.  I found strong relationships between the fertility rate and
the service per capita, and the mortality rate and the food per capita as
I noted earlier.  In these two cases, I compared the linear model with the
logistic one below.  The results tells us that each of the linear models
has a slightly better R-Square than that of the logistic model.  It means
that I had better use a linear model in the multiple regression rather
than a logistic one. 
Curvefit fertility with service per capita
CURVEFIT /VARIABLES=fertil  WITH sumser
->   /CONSTANT
->   /MODEL=LINEAR LGSTIC
->   /PLOT FIT.
Independent:  SUMSER
Dependent  Mth   Rsq      d.f.       F             Sigf  bound      b0
b1
   FERTIL   LIN   .996     22     5621.97     .000              5.5063
-.0003
   FERTIL   LGS  .995     22     4021.98     .000       .        .1798
1.0001
Figure 10.  Curvefit fertility with service per
capita
CURVEFIT /VARIABLES=mortal  WITH sumagri
->   /CONSTANT
->   /MODEL=LINEAR LGSTIC
->   /PLOT FIT.
Independent:  SUMAGRI
  Dependent    Mth   Rsq    d.f.              F      Sigf   bound
b0      b1
   MORTAL   LIN   .991    22        2565.62  .000              17.9857
-.0040
   MORTAL   LGS  .989    22        1954.93  .000         .        .0537
1.0003
 
Figure 11.  Curvefit mortality with food per
capita.
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        Gross_Domestic_Products(t) = Gross_Domestic_Products(t - dt) +
(capital_investment - capital_depreciation) * dt
        Initial Gross_Domestic_Products = 40000000000
        INFLOWS:
        capital_investment =
(agricultural_output*.3+industrial_output*.7+service_output*.5)*(investment_rate/
        100)+official_development_assistance
        OUTFLOWS:
        capital_depreciation =
Gross_Domestic_Products/average_lifetime_of_capital/100
        population_1__#0_to_14#(t) = population_1__#0_to_14#(t - dt) +
(births -       deaths_0_to_14 - maturation_1_to_2) * dt
        Initial population_1__#0_to_14# = 23924000
        INFLOWS:
        births = population_2__#15_to_64# * 0.48 * fertility_rate -
total_population 
        * infant_mortality
OUTFLOWS:
        deaths_0_to_14 = population_1__#0_to_14#*mortality
        maturation_1_to_2 = population_1__#0_to_14#*(1-mortality)
Modeling linked with GDP 
Figure 12.  STELLA II model linked with GDP.
        population_2__#15_to_64#(t) = population_2__#15_to_64#(t - dt) +
(maturation_1_to_2 - maturation_2_to_3 - deaths_15_to_64) * dt
        Initial population_2__#15_to_64# = 36361000
        INFLOWS:
        maturation_1_to_2 = population_1__#0_to_14#*(1-mortality)
        OUTFLOWS:
        maturation_2_to_3 = population_2__#15_to_64#*(1-mortality)
        deaths_15_to_64 = population_2__#15_to_64#*mortality
        population_3__#65_and_over#(t) = population_3__#65_and_over#(t -
dt) +   (maturation_2_to_3 - deaths_65_and_over) * dt
        Initial population_3__#65_and_over# = 2646000
        INFLOWS:
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        maturation_2_to_3 = population_2__#15_to_64#*(1-mortality)
        OUTFLOWS:
        deaths_65_and_over =
population_3__#65_and_over#*mortality/mortality
        agricultural_output = Gross_Domestic_Products *
agricultural_capital _output _ratio                             /100
        birth_control = (.000013982*SUM(industrial_per_capita) -.00029455
*                               SUM(service_per_capita) - .000131929 *
SUM(food_per_capita)) * 5
        fertility_rate = perspective_birth_rate+birth_control
        food_per_capita = agricultural_output/total_population
        health_service = (.002477*SUM(industrial_per_capita) + .000224357
*                               SUM(service_per_capita) - .008028 *
SUM(food_per_capita)) * 5
        industrial_output =
Gross_Domestic_Products*industrial_capital_output_ratio/100
        industrial_per_capita = industrial_output/total_population
        mortality = (perspective_death_rate+health_service)/1000
        service_output =
Gross_Domestic_Products*service_capital_output_ratio/100
        service_per_capita = service_output/total_population
        total_death = deaths_0_to_14+deaths_15_to_64+deaths_65_and_over
        total_population = population_1__#0_to_14# +
population_2__#15_to_64#                        +
population_3__#65_and_over#
agricultural_capital_output_ratio = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 17.0), (1.00, 16.5), (2.00, 16.0), (3.00, 15.0), (4.00, 12.0),
(5.00, 11.0), (6.00, 9.50), (7.00, 8.50), (8.00, 8.50), (9.00, 6.50),
(10.0, 7.50), (11.0, 9.50), (12.0, 10.0)
average_lifetime_of_capital = GRAPH(TIME*5)
(0.00, 30.0), (1.00, 28.5), (2.00, 28.0), (3.00, 27.5), (4.00, 26.5),
(5.00, 26.5), (6.00, 25.0), (7.00, 24.5), (8.00, 22.5), (9.00, 22.5),
(10.0, 22.0), (11.0, 21.0), (12.0, 20.0)
industrial_capital_output_ratio = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 28.0), (1.00, 27.0), (2.00, 26.0), (3.00, 25.5), (4.00, 26.0),
(5.00, 26.0), (6.00, 27.5), (7.00, 30.5), (8.00, 33.5), (9.00, 36.5),
(10.0, 38.0), (11.0, 39.0), (12.0, 40.0)
infant_mortality = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 0.054), (1.00, 0.043), (2.00, 0.035), (3.00, 0.03), (4.00, 0.025),
(5.00, 0.02), (6.00, 0.017), (7.00, 0.014), (8.00, 0.012), (9.00, 0.009),
(10.0, 0.008), (11.0, 0.008), (12.0, 0.007)
investment_rate = GRAPH(TIME*5)
(0.00, 1.00), (1.00, 1.85), (2.00, 2.35), (3.00, 2.75), (4.00, 3.05),
(5.00, 3.45), (6.00, 3.70), (7.00, 3.95), (8.00, 4.35), (9.00, 4.60),
(10.0, 4.75), (11.0, 4.75), (12.0, 5.00)
official_development_assistance = GRAPH(TIME*1000000)
(0.00, 2000), (1.00, 1950), (2.00, 1785), (3.00, 1695), (4.00, 1635),
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(5.00, 1500), (6.00, 1365), (7.00, 1305), (8.00, 1185), (9.00, 1125),
(10.0, 1065), (11.0, 1035), (12.0, 1000)
perspective_birth_rate = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 3.00), (1.00, 2.95), (2.00, 2.90), (3.00, 2.85), (4.00, 2.85),
(5.00, 2.80), (6.00, 2.75), (7.00, 2.70), (8.00, 2.65), (9.00, 2.65),
(10.0, 2.55), (11.0, 2.50), (12.0, 2.45)
perspective_death_rate = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 8.00), (1.00, 7.20), (2.00, 6.80), (3.00, 6.65), (4.00, 6.20),
(5.00, 6.10), (6.00, 6.00), (7.00, 6.15), (8.00, 6.45), (9.00, 6.65),
(10.0, 7.20), (11.0, 7.50), (12.0, 8.00)
service_capital_output_ratio = GRAPH(TIME)
(0.00, 55.0), (1.00, 56.5), (2.00, 58.0), (3.00, 59.5), (4.00, 62.0),
(5.00, 63.0), (6.00, 63.0), (7.00, 61.0), (8.00, 58.0), (9.00, 57.0),
(10.0, 54.5), (11.0, 51.5), (12.0, 50.0)
Assumption
        Each initial number; such as GDP and population is based on the
data in 1995 from WRI.  In capital investment, an inflow of GDP,  it is on
the assumption that each distribution of current GDP would effect on that
of the next year by the following ratio; such as agriculture 30%, service
50% and industry 70%.  Deaths of each generation is based on mortality,
and the rest of them mature to the next generation.  Birth control and
health service, which effect on fertility and mortality rate, is the
results from the multiple regression analysis.  Some factors have (*5) at
the end of equation, because 1 time on graphs equals 5 years.  Each
distribution of GDP capital output ratio makes up to 100%, and it is on
the assumption of the prospective trend the government might think much of
the industrial output in comparison with the service one over time.
Average life time of capital would be improved 50% in the model.  Other
factors are overall based on the data of WRI, and added some reasonable
assumptions.
        Results (Graphs) 
        From the next page, some graphs are shown; such as Total
Population, Fertility, Mortality and the distribution of GDP, which were
brought about by running the STELLA II model.  In comparison with the
previous model, the total population became closer to the perspective of
WRI, which means that the distribution of GDP would surely effect on the
population growth, and the linear equations by the multiple regression
analysis brought about a better connection between the distribution of GDP
and the fertility or mortality rate in the model.  
Figure 13.  Total Population.
Figure 14.  Distribution of GDP.
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        The total population would increase over time, which looks like a
logistic growth.  It would reached about 13 million in 60 years.  Since
WRI expects about 12 million in 2050, this result is very close to it.  On
the other hand, GDP would gradually grow up, and the distribution clearly
reflects the assumptions which I gave.  Each of these output effects on
the fertility and mortality rate on the basis of the equations, resulted
by the multiple regression.       
Table 2.  Input Data of Each Sum of





Figure 15. Fertility Rate.
Figure 16. Mortality Rate.
The fertility rate would gradually be decreasing and reach around 2.10
children per women.  According to the equation from the multiple
regression, the sum of service per capita would strongly effect on it.
Since service per capita would be still high for a while, the fertility
rate would be surely influenced, and would be the same rate that WRI
estimated.  On the other hand, the mortality rate would be increasing in
about 30 years.  The sum of food per capita would have a significant role
for the mortality rate in the equation of multiple regression results.
Because of the low share of the agricultural output, the mortality rate
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might not depend upon the linear equation.
Conclusion
        In this research, I found very strong relationships between the
sum of service per capita and the fertility rate, and the sum of food per
capita and the mortality rate by multiple regression analysis.  Each R
Square is over .99, which means the dependent variable changes as the
almost same as the independent variable does.  By using these results, the
new STELLA II model would reflect the population dynamics more
realistically in comparison with the previous simple model.  However, it
is sure that a lot of factors; such as pollution, nonrenewable resources
and agriculture, should be included into this model in order to make it
more realistic. Furthermore, most of other students created maps and
graphs among countries in the world.  It is sure that such maps and graphs
make us easily understood to what extent of the category in the country is
situated in the world.  I could include other neighbor countries into the
STELLA model, too.  Actually, such a relationship is surely important for
the population dynamics, though the data might be difficult to obtain.  I
hope this research would provide further studies regarding the population
dynamics and that this STELLA model would be endlessly improved by adding
more factors.
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WATER SCARCITY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND RESOURCE DISPUTES-THE CASE OF
THE TIGRIS-EUPHRATES AND JORDAN BASIN RIVER SYSTEM
Introduction
        Fresh water is a fundamental resource, vital for an organism's
survival. There is probably no other resource on earth as vital as water
(except perhaps for air) for any extant species. Humans,  like any other
organism, must have access to water. Water is integral to all ecological
and social activities. It is required for food and energy production,
transportation, waste disposal, industrial development and public health.
However, fresh water is unevenly and patchily distributed across the
surface of the earth, with some regions having either ample supply or
unlimited access whilst other regions suffer from unpredictable rainfall
patterns and long periods of drought. As human populations grow and their
activities continue to alter environmental patterns, the demand for fresh
water will increase as the availability and quality of fresh water
decreases. These conditions make it more likely for water related
conflicts to occur between nation states that are forced to share a common
water resource under the strain of locally increasing populations. In the
semi arid and arid regions of the globe conflict over water seems a more
and more likely prospect. Indeed, the next great war might be fought over
water. The incompleteness of available data and uncertainties about the
role that environmental degradation will have on the water supply and
demand further complicate matters.
        Where water is scarce, competition for limited supplies can lead
nations to see access to water as a matter of national security (Gleik,
1993). As early as the mid-1980s, U.S. government intelligence services
estimated that there were at least 10 places in the world where war could
break out over dwindling shared water resources; the majority of these
locations are  in the Middle East (Starr, 1991). Jordan, Israel, Cyprus,
Malta and the countries of the Arabian Peninsula are sliding into the
perilous zone where all available fresh surface and ground water supplies
will be fully utilized (Starr, 1991).
        Across the globe many rivers, lakes and ground water aquifers are
shared by two or more nations. This geographical fact has led to the
geopolitical reality of disputes over shared waters where the situation in
the Middle East (Nile, Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates) is just one such
example. Other regions where water disputes have or are likely to arise
are: the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra in southern Asia and the Colorado,
Rio Grande and Parana in the Americas. 
Some examples of water related disputes: a global view
        The following examples were down loaded and adapted from the
following web site: http://inter.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/water.
The Water Dispute on the Ganges River 
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        The Ganges River originates in the People's Republic of China,
passing through Nepal and India. It forms a boundary of 128 km between
India and Bangladesh, then flows 112 km within Bangladesh taking the name
Badhma, before joining the Jamuna-Brahmaputra. Afterwards it joins the
Meghna River before the combined flows empty into the Bay of Bengal. 
        The allocation of the Ganges waters constitutes the most important
aspect of the dispute between India and Bangladesh. Pakistan protested the
construction of the Farakka Dam in 1951, when it was announced that India
had planned to build it. Pakistan, at the same time, offered that the
planning of the utilization of such shared water resources be made by a UN
body and that the subject matter must be examined by the experts of both
countries. These proposals were not accepted by India and the construction
of the Farakka Dam started ten years later in 1961 and was completed in
1970. The matter of the allocation of the transboundary waters was
negotiated between India and Pakistan until Bangladesh gained its
independence in 1971. 
        In negotiations conducted after 1971, Bangladesh authorities
stated that they would not favor any temporary arrangement in the
allocation of the Ganges waters and have instead requested that there
should be a permanent solution to the matter, which would include all of
the shared water resources between the two countries. India and Bangladesh
agreed in November 1977 that 63 % of the Ganges' waters be allocated to
Bangladesh in the dry season. Indian officials have expressed that this
agreement has been realized on the understanding that a channel should be
constructed between the Brahmaputra and the Ganges Rivers which would lead
to an increase in the flows of the Ganges. Indian officials have further
emphasized that the riparian countries should utilize the waters in
accordance with the principles of justice and equity, taking into account
the population, land and needs of the countries. 
        India, moreover, has stated that if a country alleged that its
interests were harmed due to a decline in the amount of water, it should
be asked to prove this allegation. It further stressed that Bangladesh's
opposition to the construction of the Farakka Dam is unfounded and that
the construction of a dam is a natural right of any country. Indian
authorities further argue that the water, gathered behind a dam, belongs
to the country which constructed it and that no international rules have
yet been established to resolve such a conflict. They also stress that
efforts by the UN to codify the international rules applicable in such
disputes are still far from sufficient. In conclusion, it may be said that
India, regarding its conflict with Bangladesh, follows a policy in
accordance with the principle of equitable utilization. 
The Water Dispute Between the USA and Mexico 
        The dispute over the Rio Grande River flared up at the end of the
19th. century between the United States of America and Mexico. The office
of the Secretary of State, which was responsible at that time for the Rio
Grande dispute, asked the opinion of the Attorney General Judson Harmon on
the problem.
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        Harmon was asked to comment in the light of international
practices, relating to the diversions made by the USA, on the part of the
Rio Grande River situated in its own territory. Harmon stated that the USA
has a legal right on the part of the Rio Grande River that flows within
its own territory (absolute sovereignty). By this he therefore indicated
that international law does not hold for the USA on the sharing of the
waters of the Rio Grande. Subsequently, these arguments regarding the
transboundary waters have been named the Harmon Doctrine. 
        The USA, after adopting a more flexible approach in recent years,
concluded its first agreement in 1906 with Mexico. A further agreement was
signed in 1944, whereby the USA undertook the obligation of allocating
certain amounts of water to Mexico from the Rio Grande, Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers (Knowlton, 1968). This agreement brought an end to the
disputes regarding the rivers between the USA and Mexico. The joint
utilization of the Colorado, Tijuana and Rio Grande Rivers was therefore
realized. Such an agreement guaranteed the rights of the upstream country
but at the same time allocation of the waters was regarded as if there
were no political boundary between the two countries. 
Disputes between Mexico and Guatemala 
        The Usumacinte, Suchiate and Grijalva Rivers originate in
Guatemala and flow into Mexican territory before emptying into the sea.
Mexico has proposed that the waters of these rivers be shared between the
two countries. It was only at the beginning of April 1990, that any
response was received from the Guatemalan government. 
        Guatemala accepted to negotiate on the sharing of the rivers, just
after Mexico started building a dam on the Suchiate River which has a
minimum flow of 20 mcm/s (mcm=million cubic meters) in the dry season and
a maximum flow of 200 mcm/s in the rainy season. According to the
information available, an agreement has not yet been reached, although the
negotiations are still continuing. It has been envisaged that the
agreement, intended to be signed sometime in the near future, will be
based on the principle of equitable, rational and optimum utilization. 
Environmental resources as international security threats
        As awareness for environmental problems increases so too does the
realization that environmental resources can become an issue of
international security. Where a resource occurs in limited supply and is
locally or regionally important for a number of peoples or countries such
a resource may become responsible for local instability. Such a situation
can escalate into open regional conflict becoming a threat to the
international community as a whole. Threats to security can include
resource and environmental problems that reduce the quality of life and
result in increased competition and tensions among sub national or
national groups (Gleik, 1993). Recent experience suggests that conflicts
are more likely to occur on the local and regional level and in developing
countries where common property resources may be both more critical to
survival and less easily replaced or supplemented (Lipshutz and Holdren,
1990). In addition, the economic, cultural and sociopolitical factors at
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work in any given country or region will also play a large role in a
region's overall stability and security. 
        Because water is essential to survival,  many hold the position
that access to clean and fresh water is every person's inalienable right.
However, when translating this into a national context, all too often
countries take this stand point to mean their inalienable right to water
as opposed to other nations. Complicating this issue is the sometime
frustrating geographical fact that water ignores political boundaries
forcing countries that border, or contain a part of a river course within
its borders, to share a water resource whether they like it or not. To
date all across the world such riparian states are battling with this
contentious issue. Perhaps no where else is this issue more volatile and
liable to erupt into open hostile conflict as the region of the Middle
East.
        Not only is water vital to survival it also provides a source of
economic and political strength. Under these conditions, ensuring access
to water provides a justification for going to war, and therefore water
supply systems can become a goal of military conquest (Falkenmark, 1986). 
        Gleik (1993) outlined the following characteristics that make
water likely to be a source of strategic rivalry:
        1)      the degree of scarcity
        2)      the extent to which the water supply is shared by more
than one region or state
        3)      the relative powers of the basin states
        4)      the ease of access to alternative fresh water sources.
The Middle East region with its many ideological, religious and
geographical disputes is an ideal candidate to match Gleik's (1993)
characteristics. However, disputes over the region's limited water
supplies is not a modern phenomenon. During the seventh century BC,
Ashurbanipal of Assyria (modern day Syria) seized control of water wells
as part of his strategy of desert warfare against Arabia (Drower, 1954).
In 689 BC Sennacherib of Assyria destroyed Babylon as retribution for the
death of his son by purposefully destroying the water supply canals of the
city (Drower, 1954). 
        The current water crisis plaguing the region can be traced back to
the arbitrary political division of the region into competing states by
the withdrawing  of the post-World War I colonial powers (Hillel, 1994).
The subsequent map of the region that arose disregarded the issue of water
as forming possible natural political boundaries. With the exception of
Lebanon, none of the states the colonial powers created was provided with
independent water resources, and no mechanisms were put in place for
coordination in the utilization of internationally shared water resources
(Hillel, 1994). The Tigris-Euphrates basin was sectioned irregularly and
placed in the domains of three competing states (Turkey, Syria and Iraq),
while the Jordan river was divided up among four states (Israel, Jordan,
the West Bank and Gaza and Syria) (Hillel, 1994). 
        One example should suffice to illustrate this crisis. In the 1950s
Syria tried to stop Israel from building its National Water Carrier, an
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aqueduct to provide water to the extremely arid areas of southern Israel,
fighting broke out across the demilitarized zone, and when Syria tried to
divert the head waters of the Jordan in the mid-1960s, Israel used force,
including air strikes against the diversion facilities to prevent their
construction and operation (Naff and Matson, 1984). It was these military
actions that contributed to the outbreak of the 1967 war. 
        The disputes over water within the region are many and varied.
This project will serve to concentrate on two of these disputes: the
Tigris-Euphrates dispute among Turkey, Syria and Iraq and the Jordan river
and ground water dispute between Israel, the West Bank and Occupied
Territories, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The levels of water
scarcity existing in these countries is graphically represented in figure
1. An area comparison of the countries involved is contained in the map
appendix.
Figure 1: A graphical visualization of the
water scarcity existing in the region. Adapted from: Falkenmark, M
and G. Lindh (1993). Water and Economic Development. In: Water In
Crisis. Gleik, P. H. Oxford University Press, New York.
 
Demographic and freshwater conditions for the region.
        Many factors contribute to the burgeoning water crisis in the
region. As the populations of the countries continue to grow the demand
for available fresh water is becoming perilously close to outstripping the
demand and in Israel's case, this has already occurred in some instances.
An exacerbating factor is the region's unpredictability in rainfall
patterns. For most of the region the rainy season is short, 4-5 months.
For Israel, Jordan and the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza
rainfall is less than 2 inches per year and the region is characterized by
dry cycles, 2-3 relatively rainy years followed by 2-3 years of drought
(Fishelson, 1995). 
        With populations predicted to increase, the stress on the average
sustainable yield for fresh water is going to increase and the amount of
water per capita will therefore decrease (Figures 2, 3 and 4).
Figure 2: The current and expected population
for the countries of the Middle East. Source: Fishelson, G. (1995). 
The value of freshwater in Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza.
International Conference on the Peace Process and the Environment.
Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Figure 3: Current and expected fresh water
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according to the average sustainable yield (ASY). Source:
Fishelson, G. (1995). The value of freshwater in Israel, Jordan,
the West Bank and Gaza. International Conference on the Peace
Process and the Environment. Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Figure 4: Current and expected water amount
per capita. Source: Fishelson, G. (1995). The value of freshwater
in Israel, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. International Conference 
on the Peace Process and the Environment. Tel Aviv University, Tel
Aviv, Israel.
        With more mouths to feed the allocation of fresh water becomes a
pressing problem. More mouths means more food and so more water needs to
be allocated to agricultural production. This issue is especially true for
Turkey, Syria and Iraq who have all independently embarked on ambitious
irrigation projects on the Tigris-Euphrates river system to increase their
agricultural capacity. For the riparian states along the Jordan river
water allocation has become a balancing act between agriculture and
domestic use as more of the population becomes urbanized (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Fresh water withdrawal by sector for 
the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Source: World
Resources Institute. (1992-93). A Guide to the Global Environment,
Oxford University, New York.
        In order to allocate sufficient water for each country's required
needs depends not only on the available internal water supply but also the
amount of water flowing into and from the countries. The allocation of
water can immediately lead to issues of conflict as upstream states, by
controlling the flow of a river course, inadvertently disadvantage those
downstream states dependent on the same flow. This is all to true for the
Middle East where the Tigris-Euphrates head waters originate in Turkey but
empty into the sea at the Persian Gulf in Iraq, flowing through Syria on
its way to the sea. Egypt is entirely dependent on the Nile River for
practically all of its water requirements but is at the sometime mercy of
the upstream states of Sudan and Ethiopia that contain within their
borders the head waters of the Nile, the Blue and White Nile. Israel,
Jordan and the Territories (the West Bank, Gaza Strip and the Golan
Heights) are in an even worse position. They possess few internal
renewable water resources and are all dependent on one river system, the
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Jordan which has its head waters originating outside of their territories
in Lebanon and Syria. Figure 6 serves to illustrate this point. 
        Demographically, economically and agriculturally all the countries
of the region are highly dependent on the water resources that they are
forced to share. In these countries, where the majority of their land mass
is arid, most of the population lives either on the coastal plains or
along the river courses. These areas have therefore seen the largest
economic and agricultural expansion. As most of these countries activities
are centered around shared water courses, they are vulnerable to
hostilities from their neighbors. Each vehemently insists on its
"rightful" share of the available water resources, therefore raising the
concern over international security. The maps in the map appendix show the
population distributions, economic activity and land use practices of the
countries of the region and of how they are centered along the river
courses found in each country. 
Figure 6: The origin of fresh water resources
for the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Source:
World Resources Institute (1992). World Resources 1992-93. A Guide
to the Global Environment, Oxford University Press, New York.
 
The dispute over
the Tigris-Euphrates River System Hydrology of the Tigris-Euphrates
        From source to sea the Euphrates is the longest river in the whole
region of West Asia (Shultz, 1995). It traverses a distance of 2 700
kilometers, of which some 40 percent are in the modern state of Turkey, 25
percent in Syria, and 35 percent in Iraq. Its twin, the Tigris, has a
total length of 1 900 kilometers, of which about 20 percent lie in Turkey,
78 percent in Iraq, and only 2 percent along the pointed northeastern
corner of Syria known as the "Duck's Beak" (Hillel, 1994). (refer to the
map of the Tigris-Euphrates River System in the map appendix for further
detail).
        A feature common to both rivers is the heavy concentration of
suspended sediment (silt) that they carry at flood-time: as much as 3
million tons of eroded soil from the highlands in a single day (Hillel,
1994). Most of this material settles en route and is responsible for the
great deposit of alluvium that fills the Mesopotamian Plain. The river
beds are raised above the alluvial plain and thus facilitate the diversion
of water for the purpose of irrigation, to which the region owes its
prodigious agricultural productivity.
        The mean natural flow of the Euphrates is about 30 billion cubic meters
per year (BCM/y) at its entrance into Syria from Turkey, and 32 BCM/y on
leaving Syria, after including the combined flows of two tributaries, the
Balikh and the Khabur. The remaining 1000 kilometers of its course is in
Iraq where it obtains no further increment of water such as tributaries
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(refer to map appendix). The Tigris is a less circuitous river than the
Euphrates, and it flows more directly toward Mesopotamia (Hillel, 1994).
After skirting the northeastern corner of Syria, at its junction with the
eastern Khabur, the Tigris enters Iraq. At this point its mean annual flow
is between 20 and 23 BCM/y. In Iraq it collects an additional 25-29 BCM/y
from its left-bank tributaries, for an average total of roughly 50 BCM/y
(Hillel, 1994).
Current development on the Tigris-Euphrates
        For Turkey, Syria and Iraq, dependence on the Tigris and Euphrates
is high. The rainfall in the region can vary from 250-400 millimeters per
annum and agriculture demands at least 400 mm per annum, hence the high
levels of dependence on the rivers (Shultz, 1995). All three states are
using water from the same sources, which may create a future situation of
overuse, implying a scarcity of water. Clearly a situation of cooperation
is needed to avert such a problem but all three states are going full
steam ahead, independently pursuing their own water development schemes.
        Probably the most ambitious of these projects is Turkey's South
East Anatolia Project known by the Turkish acronym GAP (for Guneydogu
Anadolu Projesi, in Turkish). The project aims at developing the regions
bordering Syria and Iraq, encompassing the headwaters of the Tigris and
Euphrates. The area is sparsely inhabited with a population of around 6
million, the majority being ethnic Kurds which claim the region as part of
their national homeland. Turkey hopes by transforming this semi-arid
region into the country's breadbasket it not only hopes to bring in and
promote the development of agriculture and industry but to also offset the
Kurdish majority by attracting Turks into the area and so diluting Kurdish
nationalistic claims.
        The Turkish government has promoted the GAP project as having
great eventual benefits for all, but recently, over 250 000 people were
displaced from their homes which were to be inundated by dams. A civil war
broke out between the Turkish government and the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK) which has repeatedly claimed its opposition to GAP, regarding it as
a Turkish theft of Kurdish waters (Hillel, 1994). 
        The GAP plan calls for the construction of 80 dams, 66
hydroelectric power stations with a total capacity of 7 700 megawatts, and
68 irrigation projects covering up to 2 million hectares. Among the
principal dams are the Keban, the Karakaya and the Ataturk, which is the
linchpin of the entire GAP complex (Hillel, 1994) (refer to the map in the
appendix for a representation of the GAP complex). 
        Despite its great agricultural potential, Iraq has in the last
decade become a net importer of grain to feed its population of 20 million
(expected to reach 26 million by the year 2000). Iraq's main irrigated
lands are the regions of lower Mesopotamia. However, this region is
plagued by water logging and salinization and therefore an imperative need
has arisen for a coordinated scheme of rehabilitation and sustainable
water management, especially for the provision of regional drainage.
(Hillel, 1994). 
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        In 1953 Iraq began work on a regional canal to provide
comprehensive drainage. This canal has been dubbed "The Third River" as it
flows midway between the Tigris and Euphrates. Ironically enough, creation
of the canal was created by American engineers to reclaim large tracts of
land that had become barren through salinization. During the Gulf War,
bombing caused great damage to Iraq's hydraulic works but it managed to
complete the project in December of 1992 (Figure 7). 
Figure 7: The "Third River", a recently
completed drainage canal in southern Iraq (Source: Hillel, 1994)
        The main canal is now 565 kilometers long and wide enough to allow
5000 ton barges carrying cargo from the Persian Gulf to Baghdad (Hillel,
1994). It was designed to drain 1.5 million hectares of land, allowing
Iraq to increase its domestic food output significantly and thus help
achieve its aims of economic dependence. However like Turkey's GAP
project, Iraq's third river has caused the displacement of the indigenous
Marsh Arabs and the canal has been criticized by the UN as an
environmental crime, threatening to destroy an entire ecosystem. An
ulterior motive to the draining of the region has been the possible
exposure of oil deposits that are though to underlie the marshes,
considered to be as great as those of Kuwait.
        More than Turkey and Iraq, Syria is nearly entirely dependent on
the flow of the Euphrates for the development of its economy (see map in
appendix). Apart from the Euphrates, Syria has access to a few underground
aquifers (Figure 8) from which, through the sinking of thousands of well,
has already caused the overdrawing and salinization of the ground water. 
        In 1974 Syria began its greatest engineering feat, the damming of
the Euphrates and the creation of Lake Assad (see map in appendix). The
dam, built with Soviet engineering and financial aid was supposed to
irrigate some 400 000 hectares, generate electricity and make the region
prosperous (Hillel, 1994). In this project, as for the latter projects 70
000 indigenous Bedouin were displaced. However, so far the project has
turned out to be a disappointment, the imported Soviet water generators
proved to be faulty and the land originally designated for irrigation
proved to be unsuitable due to the soil containing large amounts of gypsum
(Hillel, 1994). Gypsum dissolves in water causing the soil to become lumpy
and uneven making it difficult to distribute water over the soil surface.
Disputes over the Tigris-Euphrates River System
        According to Shultz (1995) the real problems the three states are
currently facing are the problems of management, apportionment and
development planning, which has led to disagreements between them. This
joint dependency on the river waters clearly indicates that the national
security of all the states is linked. Turkey, Syria and Iraq may be
considered to form a hydropolitical security complex. A hydrosecurity
complex is defined as those states that are geographically part owners and
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technically users of the rivers and as a consequence consider the rivers
as a major security issue (Shultz, 1995).
        Disputes over the Tigris-Euphrates waters consists of conflicts
between upstream and downstream neighbors, but also between the state and
ethno-religious groups, such as the Kurds of Turkey, the Marsh Arabs of
Iraq and the Bedouin of Syria. Both Syria and Iraq are dependent on Turkey
for the continual flow of the Euphrates. The intensification of the
utilization of the Euphrates for Turkey's GAP project has caused sporadic
decreases in the flow for both Syria and Iraq. Such a decrease in the flow
is especially important for Syria, as unlike Iraq it cannot rely on the
flow of the Tigris. The issues of an amicable apportionment of the river's
flows could probably be easily met as there is enough water for all three
states (Shultz, 1995). Surprisingly enough though, as yet no tripartate
agreement has been signed by the three riparians on flow regulation, dams
and sustainable water management. The writing is on the wall for an
impending crisis but the parties seem to be to self involved in their own
projects to notice.
        According to a web site issued by the Turkish government, Turkey
is not a country rich in water resources and that for per capita annual
water availability Iraq is actually richer in water than Turkey and Syria
is not far behind (http://inter.mfa.gov.tr/GRUPF/water). According to
Table 1, issued from Turkey's Investigation and Planning Department of the
General Directorate of the State Hydraulic Works serves to illustrate
Turkey's point. 
Country              cm/y/p
Canada, USA          10,000
Iraq                  2,110
Turkey                1,830
Syria                 1,420
Israel                  300
Jordan                  250
Occupied Territories    100
Table 1: Water quantities per capita in some water rich and Middle Easter
countries for the year 1993. cm/y/p=cubic meters per year per capita.
        Such data must be treated with caution however as most of the
water feeding both rivers originates from within Turkey, with Iraq
contributing around 20 percent and Syria less than 10 percent. It is also
Turkey's official view (not mentioned on the web site) that the Tigris and
Euphrates are its sovereign resources, to be exploited as Turkey sees fit
(Hillel, 1994). To quote Suleiman Demirel, a Turkish official: "Water is
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an upstream resource and downstream users cannot tell us how to use our
resource."
        Iraq claims long-standing historical rights to utilize the waters
of the twin rivers, a viewpoint that is mentioned on the web site. Both
Syria and Iraq suffered water deprivation during the filling of the
Ataturk Dam when in early 1990, Turkey blocked the flow of the entire
Euphrates for one month. According to Turkey, all the necessary steps were
taken to prevent significant harm to the downstream riparians and it
maintains that this practice is a necessary technicality when building a
dam and that Syria was timely informed that the flow would be interrupted.
However, no agreement was ever signed between Turkey and her neighbors on
the construction of the dam and its possible consequences. 
        The issue in contention then is how to weigh historical rights
against proportionate contributions to flow, taking into consideration the
real needs of each country. These being, the availability of energy, the
need for hydroelectricity, the feasibility of developing economic
alternatives to irrigation based farming, the efficiency of water use and
the size of each country's population. Thus far the levels of mistrust
between the countries, and their self involved development projects, that
disregards the concerns of their neighbors, makes any serious settled
negotiation in the near future unlikely.
The Jordan River System
Hydrology of the Jordan river and the region's underground aquifers
        The Jordan Basin is an elongated valley in the central Middle
East. Draining some 18 300 square kilometers, it extends form Mount Hermon
in the north to the Dead Sea in the south, and lies within the pre-June
1967 boundaries of Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (refer to map
appendix for further detail). Its waters, which originate in rainfall and
in rivers and streams of Lebanon, Syria and the Golan heights, drain the
lands to the east and to the west of the Jordan Valley. Precipitation in
the basin ranges from over 1000 mm/y in the north to less than 50 mm/y in
the south, but averages less than 200 mm/y on both sides of the Jordan
river (Inbar and Maos, 1984). Much of the basin is arid or semi-arid and
requires irrigation water for agricultural development (Table 2). Table 2
also shows the many times the various sources of the river have changed
political hands indicating the importance of the river for those states
dependent on it. 
River           Source  Political Control       Discharge(mcm/y)
Hasbani         Lebanon Lebanon                 138
                        Israel post-82  
Banias          Syria   Syria pre-67            121
                        Israel post-67  
Dan             Israel  Israel                  245
Upper Jordan    Israel  Israel                  650
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Lower Jordan    Israel  Israel/Jordan          1200
Yarmouk         Syria   Syria/Jordan/           450
                        Israel  
Table 2: The principal surface waters of the Jordan basin and their
political control (source: Lowi, 1993).
        As can be seen the basin extends into four states, but about 80
percent of it is located within present-day Israel, Jordan and the West
Bank (refer to map in appendix for further details). It is these lands
that are most dependent on the waters, and since the beginning of the
political conflict of the region, has been intertwined with a dispute over
access to the water resources of the Jordan Basin:
        "It appears equally clear that along with other outstanding issues
of the Palestine dispute-compensation, repatriation, Jerusalem,
boundaries-there is a fifth element, water, which must be considered as we
approach a final settlement."-U.S. Department of State Position Paper, May
4, 1953.
        Critical to the region's water supply is not only access to the
water resources of the Jordan but also access to the underground water
aquifers of the region. Such access is especially crucial for Israel as 60
percent of its total potential supplies of water are found in the
country's two largest aquifers, the coastal plain aquifer and the mountain
aquifer (see map in appendix for further details). An aquifer (literally,
"water carrier") is a water-saturated geological stratum, occurring at
some depth, that can accumulate and transmit water in sufficient amounts
to serve as a water source for human use (Hillel, 1994). 
        The coastal aquifer underlies Israel's central and southern
coastal plain, from Mount Carmel in the north to the Gaza Strip in the
south. From north to south the aquifer covers an area of some 1 800 square
kilometers, it derives its waters primarily from the seepage of excess
rainfall and floodwaters generated by runoff from the mountains to the sea
(see map in appendix for further details). The mean natural recharge
estimate is about 300 MCM/y with a safe annual withdrawal rate of 240-300
MCM/y. The pumps withdrawing water from the coastal aquifer have actually
been overdrawing this rate for some time now due to the heavy demand for
irrigation. Israel grows citrus along the coastal plain. This overdrawing
of water prevents a sufficient amount of water to pass through the system
to flush out salts and other minerals and over time the water has become
steadily more saline and brackish. The Gaza Strip is also dependent on
this aquifer where it is estimated that 65 MCM/y is available. Rapid
population growth however, has severely taxed the system causing the
lowering of the water table and severe intrusion of sea water into the
well. Consequently most of the local drinking water in Gaza exceeds the
salinity level of 500 ppm, considered the upper threshold of safe drinking
water and in some areas this has reached 1500 ppm, making the drinking of
water next to intolerable (Hillel, 1994). 
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        The mountain aquifer or Yarkon-Taninim aquifer extends beyond the
Green Line (Israel's pre-1967 borders) into the mountainous regions of the
West Bank (refer to map in appendix for further details).The aquifer
extends about 150 kilometers from north to south. The aquifer's
sustainable yield of fresh water is estimated to be about 300 MCM/y. It is
tapped by over 300 wells, whose total annual pumpage averages 375 MCM.
Like the coastal aquifer, the mountain aquifer is suffering from
overpumping. 
        Figure 8 shows the available groundwater for the countries of the
Middle East.
Figure 8: Available groundwater sources for
the Arab region. Sources: Shahin, N. (1989). Review and assessment
of water resources in the Arab region. Water International, 14 (4): 
206-219.; Shelef, G. (1995). The coming era of intensive wastewater 
reuse in the Mediterranean Region. International Conference on the
Peace Process and the Environment, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv,
Israel.
 The water and political tangle of the Jordan River Valley
        Israel's water resources are unfavorably located in relation to
its main areas of demand. Water is most plentiful in the north and north
east, but the densest concentrations of populations, industry and
irrigable land are in the center of the country and along the coastal
plain (refer to maps in appendix for more detail). The critical point for
contention amongst the Jordan River states is that the water resources,
especially the groundwater resources, upon which Israel is dependent are
predominantly located within occupied territory. For example, about 475
MCM, or 40 percent of Israel's sustainable annual supply of groundwater,
and one-quarter of its total renewable fresh water supply, originate in
occupied territory (Lowi, 1993). 
        Israel's attitude to the availability of water has always been one
of national survival. Unrestricted access to water resources was perceived
as a non-negotiable prerequisite  for the survival of a Jewish national
home (Lowi, 1993). The idea of water equal to national survival and
aspirations have governed Israel's water policies, especially since the
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 
        Israel's Arab riparian neighbors have also found it difficult to
deal with the water issues of the region as they have been in opposition
to the very fact of Israel's existence. They therefore refused to enter
into negotiations with Israel on all matters, including water, as Israel
was an affront to their ideas of a Pan-Arabian Middle East. Due to this
lack of dialogue, no measures have yet been instituted to limit the
overuse of the regions highly limited and sensitive water resources. 
        The area of the West Bank plays a significant role in this
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scenario. Israel views it as a solution to its geographic vulnerability as
it offers strategic depth and a defensible natural frontier, the Jordan
River. More importantly, the West Bank provides Israel control over vital
water supplies contained within the mountain aquifer. In the Arab-Israeli
conflict therefore, water resources and national security are intimately
linked. 
        Since the 1967 Six Day War the water resources of the Occupied
Territories have become under Israeli economic control and the Arab
population has been limited to access over the local water sources such as
wells. This has caused many Arabs to abandon agriculture and join the
increasing day labor force that works across the Green Line in Israel.
Complicating this issue is the allocation of water to Israeli settlers in
the West Bank which is subsidized by the state, unlike water allocated to
the Arabs. According to recent statistics, West Bank Palestinians which
make up more than 80 percent of the population were receiving only 16-17
percent of the water originating from their territory (Kolars, 1990).
        There is no escape for an eventual agreement on sharing the
resources of the Jordan River (crucial for Jordan) and the underground
aquifers (crucial for Israel and any future Palestinian home land),
current levels of mismanagement, coupled with increasing demand from
growing populations and demographic shifts make a negotiated settlement
crucial to avoid the predicted water shortages. The alternative war,
unfortunately likely, can leave no true winners.
Some developmental plans to solve the region's water crisis
        The recent International Conference on the Peace Process and the
Environment held during the summer of 1995 at Tel Aviv University in Tel
Aviv Israel was heralded as a truly international Middle East conference.
To be included for the first time at a conference of this sort in Israel,
were the Jordanian and Egyptian ambassadors to Israel and a representative
of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza. Unfortunately, for undisclosed
reasons, the Palestinian representative did not attend and so too did the
then Prime Minister the late Yitzhak Rabin who in the end had prior
engagements. The absence of such important figures from a conference of
such importance for the region does not bode well for the future.
        In Israel sheer necessity has led to new ways of dealing with the
water crisis. Wastewater reuse schemes for agricultural irrigation is a
scheme currently in operation (Shelef, 1995). According to Shelef (1995)
Israel has devoted more effort to wastewater reuse than probably any other
country in the form of investment, research and professional and
scientific manpower. Figure 8 shows how groundwater utilization will
decrease in the future due to the over-exploitation of this resource,
while the source of surface water will remain relatively constant To make
up the shortfall, reusable wastewater will by the year 2010 constitute one
fifth of the total supply and about one third of all the demand of the
agricultural sector (mainly used for irrigation) (Figure 9). Israel's
heavy investment in wastewater as an alternative water resource is an
admiral one but nowhere during this international conference was mention
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made of sharing Israel's know-how with her neighbors. Jordan could
substantially benefit from such knowledge as it has constantly been
plagued by chronic water shortages since the breakdown of negotiations
with Israel and Syria on the construction of the Maqarin dam on the
Yarmouk river (Lowi, 1993).
Figure 9: Current and expected water resources 
for Israel. Source: Shelef, G. (1995). The coming era of intensive
wastewater reuse in the Mediterranean region. International
Conference on the Peace Process and the Environment, Tel Aviv
University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
        One of the significant projects which have been considered to date
has been the Intersea Canal (Segev, 1995). This project has the desire in
mind for the cooperation and mutual benefit between Jordan and Israel
since the signing of the peace treaty. The 400 meter difference in
elevation between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea is considered to hold
considerable potential for the generation of hydro-energy and the
desalination of up to 800 MCM/y for Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians,
with the energy required for desalination being obtained directly as a
result from the differences in sea level (Hamberg, 1995). Three main
routes for the canal have been proposed: the Red Sea-Dead Sea route (the
Red-Dead project), the Mediterranean Sea-Dead Sea southern route (Med-Dead
project) and the Mediterranean Sea-Dead Sea northern route (Figure 10).
This ambitious project, although to be admired for its aims, will require
massive construction of tunnels and pumping stations to connect the
Mediterranean or Red Sea with the Dead Sea. Although this project has
prospects for international cooperation, the environmental consequences
could be far reaching. One would have to be naive to think that by linking
two ecosystems long term environmental costs won't be incurred. In
addition, the creation of underground canals could disrupt the natural
flow of groundwater and provide havoc for wildlife by constructing
artificial barriers. One needs to just look at the Aswan dam of Egypt and
its long ranging effects along the Mediterranean coast line. Proponents of
the project envisage the creation of tourist and recreation facilities
(creation of lakes), aquaculture and generation of energy (Hamberg, 1995).
Figure 10: The "Med-Dead" and the "Red-Dead"
canals of the proposed Intersea canal project (Source: Hillel,
1994).
        Finally, an imaginative project put forward by a Canadian company
is the transfer of as much as 250 MCM of water from Turkey to Israel in
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enormous containers referred to as 'Medussa bags", that would be floated
across the Mediterranean (Lowi, 1993).
Policy implications
        For the riparian states of both river systems, the issues to be
resolved are shared. As these countries become more developed their urban
populations are increasing at a phenomenal rate, whereas their rural
populations, are in most cases, remaining stable. This urbanization
transition is going to up the demand for more water to be allocated for
domestic consumption as opposed to agriculture. Indeed, in most instances,
permanent cropland is shown to remain stable as the agricultural
production indexes decreases. This is especially serious for Jordan. This
alarming trend alludes to the current inefficiency and mismanagement of
water use in agriculture. Interestingly, population growth rates are shown
to actually decrease in the future but this will not help to alleviate the
problem (Figures 21-22) as caution must be taken when interpreting these
graphs. The data used is not age specific and does not take into account
current trends such as fertility patterns. Also, in addition to population
pressures, consumptive patterns must be factored in to any policy decision
based solely on population trends.  From the data at hand it does seem
however,  that it is the urban transition that is actually going to
increase the immediate pressure on available water resources, as
consumption per capita will increase even as agricultural production
decreases. These trends are graphically represented in the following
figures (Figures 11-20).
Figure 11: The agricultural transition for
Israel (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 12: The agricultural transition for
Jordan (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 13: The agricultural transition for
Syria (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 14: The agricultural transition for
Iraq (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 15: The agricultural transition for
Turkey (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
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Figure 16: The urbanization transition for
Israel (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 17: The urbanization transition for
Jordan (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 18: The urbanization transition for
Syria (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 19: The urbanization transition for
Iraq (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 20: The urbanization transition for
Turkey (Source: World Resource Database Diskette, 1996).
Figure 21: The mean rate of population growth 
for Israel, Jordan and Lebanon (Source: World Resource Database
Diskette, 1996).
 
Figure 22: The mean rate of population growth 
for Iraq, Syria and Turkey (Source: World Resource Database
Diskette, 1996).
        The countries of the region need to come to the realization that
the river basins, river systems and underground aquifers that they utilize
are not sovereign units that can be independently exploited without
incurring repercussions to neighboring countries equally dependent on the
same unit. Rather, the utilization of such units should be irrespective of
political boundaries. Such a policy has been advocated as optimal by
planners, politicians, and jurists, and has been adopted as policy in
multi-national agreements in several river basins, including the Mekong in
1957, Columbia in 1961 and Senegal in 1963 (Lepawsky, 1963). 
        The conflicts in the Middle East are probably unique in the world
and are many faceted and complex. As the birthplace of modern western
civilization and three of the world's largest religions, conflicts,
whether political, racial or religious, have been a part of the system
since civilization first began between the twin rivers of the
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Tigris-Euphrates. The on-going conflicts taking place on today's political
stage can be traced back to biblical times and beyond. In the face of such
a historic record of conflict, solving the disputes over shared water
resources automatically involves cultural and political connotations.
Perhaps this is why, where in other parts of the world common property
issues have been resolved, in the Middle East they have not. 
        The existence of modern independent states in the region has
served to strengthen nationalistic ideals exacerbating common property
issues that transcend their borders. The international community has been
quick to realize the delicate power balance in the region and how
precarious and volatile it can be. Therefore it is in their best interests
to succor cooperation between the states. 
        Such a goal is obtainable. For example, Israel possesses few
internal renewable resources but has high technological expertise. By
exporting its expertise on such things as drip irrigation and wastewater
management to countries like Jordan and Egypt it could import products
from those countries that it cannot produce itself such as oil. A trade
agreement where expertise is traded for goods and services is a
possibility if both sides can perceive how the benefits would outweigh the
costs. Such an agreement could be worked out among Turkey, Syria and Iraq
along the lines of proportional flow of the Tigris-Euphrates for the needs
of each country controlled by trade agreements between them. Elsewhere in
this volume, the water crisis for the Nile River riparians parallels those
of the riparians mentioned in this chapter (refer to the chapter by Julie
Smith). For the states of Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia an effective policy
would be similar to the one proposed here, that of a regional trade
agreement that involves not only water but the expertise to manage it
effectively. Regional development programs have been considered by some as
a regional stepping stone to regional peace. Projects that require
on-going multilateral cooperation in the use of water resources are being
advocated. Each country has something to offer its neighbor that its
neighbor lacks and visa versa. The realization, that by sharing
information, expertise and goods can help in transcending the political
divide that currently exists. Only when each country can directly gauge
the benefit to itself from cooperating with its neighbors can regional
stability be attained.
Dynamic modeling as a tool for predicting the outcome of policy
implications
        A recent useful tool to understand the complexities of a system
such as that of a shared water resource is the use of modeling programs.
STELLA II is one such program that allows a particular situation to be
augmented, elaborated and most importantly, allows us to run the situation
in order to yield predictions based on inputs incorporated in the model
(Hannon and Ruth, 1994). The model that follows is a theoretical model
that takes into account the interactions of population growth, water
resources, consumption and the need for a political settlement based on
the above parameters.
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        Population, water in the system (total available water, rainfall
and groundwater) are all stocks with arbitrarily chosen figures.
Population is controlled by the number of births and deaths, which in turn
depend on the birth and death rates (as the population increases, birth
and death rates are said to decrease). Per capita consumption (consume per
head) is dependent on how much water is available per capita and this in
turn will effect the death rate of the population. The relationship is: as
the amount of water available per capita increases then so to will the
amount consumed per capita. Water in the system depends on how much comes
in (water source) and how much goes out (water sink). The two main sources
of water are rainfall and groundwater. The amount of water that is lost to
the system depends on the amount consumed per capita (factors such as
evapotranspiration were not considered). Finally, a political settlement
is driven by how much water is consumed and by how much water is
available. The assumed relationship was, as the amount of available water
(water sink) increases the need for a political settlement, defined as
multilateral negotiations decreases (Figure 23). 
Figure 23: A theoretical model to describe
the interactions between population growth, water consumption and
the need for a political settlement.
        The change in population growth, water sink and political
settlement were run over a period of 160 years. From figure 24, the
population grows exponentially but then levels off and stabilizes
according to some environmental constraint. With a rise in population,
there is a concomitant drop in the amount of water at the sink. As the
population increases and the water decreases, the need for a political
settlement on the allocation of water increases. At that point in time
where the population begins to stabilize, the water in the sink is allowed
to gradually recover and so the pressure for a political settlement
decreases. Eventually, water in the sink and some form of settlement will
stabilize and will be maintained as long as the population remains stable
and water does not begin to decrease further. Such a settlement could be
considered to be based on equitable shared resource policies and efficient
management of the resource. The model serves to illustrate how a policy
decision must be based on international agreements and on demographic and
consumptive trends.
Figure 24: A graphical outcome of the above
model for the parameters: population, water sink and political
settlement.
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        Multilateral agreements can go a long way in resolving the
political disputes. But in addition, the region needs to review its water
management practices and be prepared to take bold steps for change. With
the predicted rise in consumption, particularly in the domestic sector,
the level of mismanagement and wasteful agricultural practices must be
reviewed. This means that the countries must reconsider the size and
importance of agriculture in their economies, revise the choice of crops
grown, and phase out the production of water intensive crops such as
cotton, tomatoes, lettuce, bananas and rice (Lowi, 1993). Such a radical
shift will not be easy as cultural attitudes and consumptive patterns will
need to be modified. However, if governments are bold enough to take these
steps they may be in time to install them before the need for them reaches
crisis levels. Instigating such patterns in an atmosphere of regional
peace and development will only make the job easier. It should be plain to
realize that resource security and political security are not mutually
exclusive. One cannot exist without the other. The alternative may very
well be increasing scarcity and war.
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APPENDIX:  MAPS
Map Set 1:  Area comparisons, selected Middle 
Eastern countries.
Map Set 2:  Land Use maps, selected Middle
Eastern countries.
Map Set 3:  Land Use maps, continued from Map 
Set 2 above.
Map Set 4:  Economic Activity maps, selected
Middle Eastern countries.
Map Set 5:  Economic Activity maps, continued 
from Map Set 4 above.
Map Set 6:  Population Density maps, selected 
Middle Eastern countries.
Map Set 7:  Population Density maps,
continued from Map Set 6 above.
Map:  The Tigris-Euphrates River System.
Map:  The Jordan River Basin.
Map:  Aquifers Underlying Israel and the West 
Bank.
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ORGANIC PRODUCE CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES:  
INDICATIONS OF TRANSITIONS
        Over recent years, the concept of sustainable agriculture as an
alternative to conventional, commercialized agriculture has become a
popular topic among some environmentalists and small sectors of the
agricultural community. Definitions of sustainable agriculture vary, from
the National Research Council's (1989) definition as "food or fiber
production which employs ecological production strategies to reduce inputs
and environmental damage while promoting profitable, efficient, long-term
production," to the University of California at Santa Cruz's Agroecology
Program's definition as "a system which is environmentally sound,
economically viable, socially responsible, non-exploitative, and which
serves as the foundation for future generations" (Allen, 1995).  Both
definitions promote agricultural systems that are responsive to the
environment and human health, as well as reduce inputs, or consumption of
industrialized products such as chemical pesticides and fertilizers.
        According to William Drake (1993), one way to view the
population-environment dynamic is to visualize relationships between these
sectors as a family of transitions.  This definition of transition
describes a specific period of time which spans the shift from slow to
rapid change in a particular sector (e.g. agriculture) and then usually a
return again to relative stability.  Although a typical agricultural
transition includes a dramatic increase in productivity due to new grain
varieties and heavy application of fertilizers and pesticides, Vernon
Ruttan (1994) suggests that future gains in production will be through
improvements in land productivity.
        Organic agriculture employs farming methods that do not use
industrialized pesticides, chemical fertilizers or herbicides.  It
therefore uses fewer inputs and reduces consumption on the production
side.  By definition, organic agriculture therefore appears to be a
reasonable candidate for promoting sustainable agriculture, and a more
sustainable economy.  Since it also typically involves more biointensive
production (as a result of intercropping and integrated pest management),
it typically increases improvements in land productivity.
        It appears that an agricultural transition currently is taking
place in the United States.  This transition consists of an increase in
organic farm acreage as well as an increase in consumer demand for organic
foods.  This paper seeks to chart this sharp rise in organic produce
production and consumption in the United States.  Additionally, it seeks
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to identify particular factors affecting this transition, specifically:
increased environmental degradation; increased consumer concerns over
pesticide use; and increased consumer concerns over environmental
degradation.
Review of Data:  Organics Market
        Although organic food captures only a small share of the total
food market in most industrialized countries-typically 2 percent or
less-substantial growth in this market over the past five years indicates
a more than fleeting interest in organic foods (Gardner, 1996).  In the
past, spurts in organic sales were primarily a result of passing concerns
about food safety (Gardner, 1996; Sachs 1987).  A review of current data
on the organic foods market is significant for showing this substantial
growth, and hence for displaying the move towards an agricultural
transition.
Prevalence of Organic Farming
        The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has historically
neglected the organic agriculture industry, as it lacks a formal tracking
system for organic farm production as well as for direct farmer to
consumer sales (Mergentime, 1996).  The USDA has, however, managed to
informally track the increase in organic cropland acreage (see Chart 1.1),
as well as the increase in organic farmers (see Chart 1.2).  
Chart 1.1.  U.S. Organic Cropland.
Chart 1.2.  U.S. Organic Farmers
Both of these charts indicate an overwhelming increase in organic farming,
as organic cropland acreage more than doubled from 1991 to 1994, and the
number of organic farmers increased by 43 percent.  It is significant that
even with such a large increase in organic cropland acreage as well as in
the number of organic farmers, organic agriculture still constitutes only
2 percent of total U.S. agricultural production, according to USDA
estimates (Gardener, 1996).  Due to the lack of a formal tracking system,
however, this data is likely an under-representation of the actual
prevalence of organic farming in the U.S..  This data likely does not
include hundreds, if not thousands, of small-scale, organic farms
throughout the country.
Organic Industry Sales
        Recent evidence points to a sharp increase in organic product
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sales over the last decade (Mergentime, 1995; Gardner, 1996).  For
example, organic industry sales have increased more than ten-fold since
1980, representing an exponential increase  (Chart 1.3).  Produce
constitutes more than one-fourth of all organic sales at natural product
stores (Chart 1.4), which in 1994 was the equivalent of $333 million.  If
this growth continues at such an exponential increase, it will result in
the capture of a large percentage of the entire food market.   
Chart 1.3.  Organic Industry Sales.
Chart 1.4.  Organic Sales by Sector.
Figure 1.  Availability of Organic Produce.
Map.
According to a survey conducted by The Packer (1996), 54 percent said
their supermarket sells organic produce.  Additionally, 23 percent of the
consumers polled had purchased organic produce within the last six months.
This data can also be broken down regionally (Figure 1).  It is
significant to note that while 62 to 63 percent of respondents in the
Western and North Eastern regions report availability of organic produce,
only 45 and 50 percent of respondents in the Southern and North Central
regions report such availability.  This inequality in distribution may be
explained for a number of reasons.  The West grows the largest percentage
of organic produce in the country, thus accounting for its highly reported
availability in this region.  There is also a large percentage of organic
produce grown in the East.  In addition, the East is heavily populated,
thus making distribution of organic produce to markets in this region more
efficient.  Lower percentages of organic cropland in the South and North
Central regions may explain the lower levels of availability in these
regions. 
Linkages to Other Transitions
        Since organic agriculture employs farming methods that do not use
petro-chemically derived fertilizers, herbicides or pesticides, an
expected correlation to an increase in organic farming would be a decrease
in overall chemically-derived fertilizer and pesticide use.  Although the
present level of organic agriculture in the U.S.-about 2 percent of total
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agricultural production-is not large enough to result in significant
changes in such use, transitions towards a decline in fertilizer,
herbicide and pesticide use are currently underway.  Such transitions may
not be directly caused by the rise in organic agriculture, however the
transitions are connected.  In addition, as organic production continues
to increase-perhaps reaching 10 to 20 percent of total agricultural
production in the next decade-it will have a significant impact on these
transitions.  In a broader sense, the organic agricultural transition can
also be linked with an epidemiological transition as well as a toxicity
transition.     
Fertilizer, Herbicide and Pesticide Use
        As evidenced in Chart 1.5. (Brown, 1995 p. 41), fertilizer
consumption in the United States has been decreasing since 1980.
Chart 1.5.  Fertilizer Use in the US:
1950-1990.
Although use was up slightly in 1994, from 18.3 million tons in 1993 to
19.0 million tons in 1994, this level of fertilizer use is still one tenth
below that during the early eighties (Brown, 1995).  Such a decrease may
be caused by various factors, such as an increase in cover and
inter-cropping to replenish soil nutrients and a decrease in overall
active farmland.  As organic produce production continues to increase,
this level of fertilizer use is likely to decline even more.
        According to Zilberman (1991), herbicide use in the U.S. is also
on the decrease.  This steady decline since 1980 is due partly to a
reduction in conventional farmed land and to an increase in herbicide
cost.  Once again, as organic production and acreage increase, ideally
conventional practices and use of chemical herbicides will decrease.
        Farmers in the U.S. currently use an estimated 700 million pounds
of pesticides annually (Pimentel, 1993).  The use of pesticides in the
U.S. increased dramatically from 1945 to 1973-since 1973, however, this
use has significantly declined (see Chart 1.6).  
Chart 1.6.  Pesticides Produced in the US.
This decline is linked with increasing evidence linking detrimental health
and environmental effects from pesticide use and exposure; the
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introduction of more potent materials; and the adoption of integrated pest
management (IPM) (Zilberman, 1991).  In particular, increasing evidence of
detrimental health effects and increasing use of IPM are factors which
will lead to increased organic production.  These factors actually serve
to feed the trend toward organic farming practices, which in turn lead to
decreases in pesticide use.  
Epidemiological Transition
This project also proposes that the organic produce consumption transition
is both influenced and will influence a 'good' epidemiological transition
(Drake, 1993).  As you can see from diagram 1.1 (taken from Drake, 1995) a
'good' epidemiological transition will have a decline in the infectious
disease rate and a corresponding increase in the degenerative disease rate
(chronic diseases such as cancer).  For a 'good' transition the overall
disease rate must also be decreasing.  
The second diagram (1.2) shows that mortality rates for infants is
declining and for those that are older than fifty it is increasing.  The
importance of these trends- - rise in life expectancy and an increase in
degenerative diseases- - is that they change societies focus to behaviors
that reduce the risk from chronic diseases (cancer).  Diet is an essential
tool in combating chronic disease such as cancer.  As society becomes more
aware of the causes of cancer (pesticides, additives, etc.) the more they
will be inclined to look for alternatives such as organics.  As society
buys more organics the more likely the epidemiological transition will be
'good', meaning an overall decrease in disease rate.  Thus there is a
reinforcing relationship between the organics and epidemiological
transitions. 
Diagram 1.1.  Epidemiological Transition.
Diagram 1.2.  Mortality Ratios.
Toxicological Transition
        The toxicological transition is another transition that has an
impact on and is impacted by the organics transition.  Diagram 1.3 and 1.4
(from Drake, 1993) are representations of the toxicological transition.
Diagram 1.3 shows the relationship between the percentage of the
environment polluted and time.  Diagram 1.4 is a representation of the
number of toxins emitted per unit of production over time.  In both cases
after an initial increase there is a reduction in the increase until
eventually a decline occurs.  The assumption in this transition is that
eventually the toxins we emit into the environment will cause severe
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enough pollution problems that we will find ways to reduce emissions.  The
emission reductions will then reduce the percentage of the environment
that is polluted.  In the United States the increase in percentage of the
environment that is polluted has declined (still increasing but not as
sharply).  It has been argued above that organics are a good candidate for
sustainable agriculture, with reduced toxic emissions (see the pesticide
and fertilizer transition shown above).  Because of the 'low impact'
nature of organics we propose that increasing the use of organic
agriculture will lead the United States down the backslope of the




Review of Data:  Consumer Attitudes
        Since the organic agriculture and pesticide transitions are
influenced by consumer attitudes and demand, it is important to relate
these transitions with transitions in consumer attitudes.  In other words,
the transitions will be analyzed as existing within a family of
transitions (Drake, 1993).
        Since consumers generally drive the produce market, their
attitudes towards foods, produce, and agricultural methods have the power
to affect the agricultural transition in this country.  The following,
therefore, is a collection of existing data on consumer attitudes toward
produce and agriculture.
Profile of the Organic Produce Consumer
        While demand for organics can rise and fall based on waves of
media attention, organic produce is steadily making its way into the
mainstream (The Packer, 1996).  A recent survey conducted by The Packer
(1996) measured a number of factors concerning consumer attitudes about
organic produce (see Chart 2.1).  According to the survey, 24 percent of
respondents purchased organic produce because they liked its appearance;
17 percent responded that organic produce looked fresher or riper; 16
percent purchased it because they perceived it to be healthier; and 12
percent purchased organic produce because it was produced without
pesticides or fertilizers.  
Chart 2.1.  Reasons Why Consumers Purchased Organic
Produce
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These results are significant since these factors are by-products of
organic production.  Namely, (1) organic produce looks riper because it
generally is:  since organic produce tends to be distributed locally, it
can remain in the fields until ripe (as opposed to most conventional
produce which is shipped long distances and has to be ripened in the store
rather than the field); (2) organic produce tends to be healthier than
conventional produce since it does not use pesticides and since it tends
to be more nutrient rich; and (3) organics are produced without chemical
pesticides or fertilizers. 
        In addition, results from The Packer (1996) survey suggest that
consumers are overwhelmingly satisfied with their organic produce
purchases.  As Figure 2 indicates, in every region in the U.S. but the
South, 80 to 85 percent of consumers were extremely or very satisfied with
their organic produce purchases.  Such satisfaction will clearly lead to
more consistent purchasing of organic produce, and hence a more steady,
and increasing overall demand for such produce.  It is also significant to
note that most organic produce sold in the southern region of the U.S. is
shipped from other regions, primarily the West.  Such shipping and storage
may result in produce that is bruised or cosmetically displeasing and that
is less ripe or fresh.  These factors may contribute to the lower level of
satisfaction of organic consumers in the South.
Figure 2.  Satisfaction with Organic Produce.
Consumer Attitudes Toward Pesticides
        Public concern over pesticide residues in the environment was
first highly publicized after the release of Rachel Carson's popular book
Silent Spring in 1962.  The emergence of consumer and environmental groups
during this time had a direct impact on pesticide use, as they were
largely responsible for the ban on the use of DDT in 1972.  Since the
1960's, the public's exposure to pesticide issues through the media has
greatly increased (Sachs et. al. 1987).  Although consumer attitudes
towards pesticide residues has waxed and waned, overall their concern has
steadily increased (see Chart 2.2).
Chart 2.2.  Consumer Pesticide Concerns.
Sachs' (1987) comparison of consumer concerns over pesticide use from 1965
- 1984 reveals an increase in consumer concern of the health of farmers,
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wildlife, and humans from exposure to pesticides or pesticide residue.
This concern may be intensifying as the number and accounts of chemicals
in the environment increase, as do episodes of specific pesticide
problems, such as local water contamination, breast milk contamination,
and the banning of certain pesticides.
        A 1994 study by Buzby and Skees also cites increasing consumer
concern over pesticide residues on food.  According to this survey,
concern over pesticide residues on food ranks among the top three concerns
over food safety (see Chart 2.3).
Chart 2.3.  Top Food-Safety Concerns.
Age and Income
        The Packer data also revealed some important relationships between
age and income with organic consumption.  Chart 2.4 indicates that for
those that purchased organics in the last six months age was a determining
factor.  Younger people and middle aged 40-49, are more likely to purchase
organics than other age groups.  We have speculated that increased
education and knowledge in the younger age group and an increased income
for those age groups could be the cause (younger age group tends to not
have families and more money to spend and 40-49 year olds are probably the
wealthiest age group).  Chart  2.5 represents both availability and the
purchase of organics in the last six months by income level.  There are
two important trends found in this chart.  First as income increases the
availability of organics increases linearly.  A second trend is that the
middle income range shows a significantly decreased purchasing trend.
This drop may have occurred because the middle income range may be made up
of young families that have little flexibility in their budget for the
'luxury' of organics.
Chart 2.4.  Purchased Organics in the last 6
months.
Chart 2.5.  Purchasing and Availability by
Income.
Trends in the data also show relationships between age and the reasons why
people buy organics.  Charts 2.6 shows that older age groups buy organics
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because of nutrition.  This corresponds to both the epidemiological
transition talked about above (increased awareness and concern over
degenerative diseases) and data that shows nutrition to be the number one
food safety concern (Chart 2.3). 
Chart 2.6.  Consumers Who Purchased Organics Based
on Nutrition by Income.
Modeling Behavior
        One of the goals of this project is to develop a comprehensive
model for green consumer behavior, and lay out a conceptual base for
future research on green consumer behavior.  Specifically we have used
Stella modeling and GIS Mapping as representational tools to help better
understand the determinants of consumption behavior. 
        As stated above, we have picked organic produce consumption as a
behavior that is environmentally and human health 'friendly'.  We have
argued that organic agriculture is a likely candidate for sustainability
in food production and beneficial to environmental and human health.
Thus, understanding both the attitudes and profiles of consumers and how
they relate to 'organic' behavior is an important tool in advancing
sustainable organic agriculture.  
Conceptual Model
        To research and understand the factors that affect consumer
behavior related to organic food products it is important to conceptualize
the decision making process of the individual and model the determinants
of behavior.  Presently there is little academic literature on
environmental consumer behavior, while there has been extensive attention
paid to consumer behavior in disciplines such as, psychology, sociology,
public health, and business (marketing).  
        To enhance our research in environmental consumption behavior we
are attempting to conceptualize and model the determinants of behavior.  A
model for environmental consumption behavior can be created drawing from
the disciplines mentioned above.  
        The ultimate success of programs and regulations that attempt to
reduce or change consumption behavior is dependent upon the individuals
willingness to undertake and/or maintain the required behaviors.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to decrease mis-consumption when the
pressures of society call for increased consumption environmentally
'unfriendly' products.  
        The determinants of behavior can be categorized into three areas;
predisposition, ability; and need (Becker 1986).  Each of these areas
includes several sub-components that provide the theoretical and
operational definitions of the model.  Predisposition includes
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socio-demographic characteristics, social structure variables (interaction
and support), and beliefs.  The predisposing variables are not directly
responsible for the final consumption behavior but are determinants of
variation in inclination towards a behavior (Becker 1986).
        Ability, the second component of the model, are the conditions
that hinder or allow the consumer to take on a behavior.  Even though an
individual may be predisposed to buy organic products, the individual must
have the means and access.  The two most important determinants of ability
are price and distance from the product.  Other sources of ability include
individual and family resources, community resources (infrastructure,
etc.), and the skills to use them.
        When appropriate predisposing and ability conditions are present,
the individuals perception of need becomes the deciding factor for
behavioral change.   The individual must perceive a need for the behavior
in order to take it.  A premise of this model is that the behavior of the
individual is a function of the predisposing and enabling characteristics
of the individual and the individuals perceived need for the behavior,
such as changing to 'green' agricultural products.  Knowledge and
experience are important determinants of perceived need and efficacy of a
behavior.
Stella Model
        Attached to this paper is the Stella map for the model we have
created.  It was created to simulate a community or region and is designed
to take aggregate data as inputs.  Not all of the determinants listed
above are present in the model but the major factors have been included.
The model was also designed to incorporate the trends and relationships
shown in The Packer data (discussed above).
    
Predisposition:  As you can see from the map Social Interaction,
Socio-Demographic, and Beliefs are present as predisposition determinants.
Social Interaction is calculated by inputting values for an areas social
networks and support.  Sliding scale input tools in the model ranging on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest, for both
networking and support have been provided.  We have assumed that the
greater the networking and support the more likely the community will take
on progressive behaviors such as organic produce consumption.    
Socio-Demographic stock is determined from factors such as age, income,
and education.  These demographics can also be inputted using the sliders.
A graphing interaction to approximate the relationships that we found in
the Packer data to the converter's for age and income has been used.
There was no data for education levels in the data but we have assumed
that with greater income is greater education.  Chart's 2.4 and 2.5 show
the relationship of both age and income respectively to purchasing organic
produce in the last six months.  The graphs used in Stella follow this
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trend with middle class and middle aged communities having a lower
tendency to buy organic produce than the other groups.  
Beliefs are determined from concerns about health and the environment and
the experience and knowledge of the community (part of the perception of
need section of the model).  Again, sliding scales to allow variable
inputs ranging between 1 and 5 have been used.  By giving a value to these
determinants it is possible to quantify predisposition.
        Ability is calculated from measurements of the average distance to
the product in the community in question and the price difference from
organic to conventional agricultural products.  It is assumed that the
less the distance the greater the probability of taking on the behavior.
It was also assumed that the less the price difference the more likely the
'organic' behavior will occur.  
Perceived Need:  Perceived need is determined in the model by quantifying
experience and knowledge about organic production, health effects, and
environmental effects related to agriculture.  Again all of the perceived
need variables are on a sliding 1 to 5 scale and can be inputted into the
simulation.  It was assumed that the greater the knowledge and experience
the community has with organic agriculture production, health and
environmental benefits the greater the likelihood that the community will
take on the 'organic' behavior.    
        Beliefs (which in this model represents both predisposition and
perceived need) and ability interact and lead to behavior.  This behavior
in turn creates an outcome (either reduced or no change in adverse health
and environmental impacts.  The impacts are then reintroduced to the model
as experience and knowledge creating a feedback loop that allows the
community to reinforce its 'organic' behavior. 
Strategies/Policies for Change
        Traditionally social programs have centered around two areas,
information dissemination or transfer to a targeted group and economic
policies.  The information programs target the experience and knowledge
sector of our model.  The theory follows that if you can increase the
knowledge of the group they will be more inclined to take on the wanted
behavior.  The economic policies target the ability sector of the model
with the goal of increasing the capability of the consumers to take on the
behavior, either by decreasing the cost of the product, increasing the
resources of the consumer or making the product available.  The model has
been designed to allow variations in these sectors to enable the simulator
to make a series of runs with changes in the variables. 
        The expected outcomes of the model are that knowledge programs
will have a reduced effect on lower income, less educated communities as
compared to wealthier, more highly educated communities.  Conversely it is
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expected that ability programs will have a greater impact in lower income,
less educated communities than those programs would have in wealthier
areas.    
Outcomes
Attached to this paper is are the graphical results of model runs.  Stella
graph 1 are representations of the model run at the extremes.  Graph 1 is
a comparative graph for the behavior and environmental outcomes.  As you
can see the 'worst' case scenario has an increase in organic behavior that
is much less than the 'best' case scenario.  This is also true for
environmental and health outcomes.  The 'worst' case has a rise that is
much less than the 'best' case.
        Stella graphs 2 and 5 show the relationship between income,
education, and age on organic behavior.  These results are not as easily
deciphered but a trend follows that contradicts that predicted above (that
knowledge strategies work better in wealthier communities and ability
programs work better in lower income communities).  Graph 2 is represents
lower sociodemographic communities with changes in experience and
knowledge.  Line 1 is 'lower income' with little knowledge and line 2 is
'lower income' with knowledge.  Adding knowledge shows a marked increase
in behavior change (not exactly what was predicted; that there would be
little effect from knowledge for lower income communities).  Graph 3 shows
the relationship between experience and knowledge with 'wealthier'
communities.  Line 1 shows the relationship with little experience and
knowledge and line 2 is with increased experience and knowledge.  The
results show that there is little impact from experience and knowledge
increases for wealthier communities (again contradicting the predicted
outcomes).
        Graphs 4 and 5 show the relationships between ability and the
sociodemographic sector and follow the outcomes predicted above.  Graph 4
represents 'lower income' communities.  As ability increases the
corresponding increase in organic behavior is apparent.  Graph 5,
'wealthier' communities, also has an increase in organic behavior with
increased ability but it is not as drastic as the shift for 'lower income'
communities.    
Implications of Transitions
Consumer Attitudes and USDA Labeling Requirements
        Although this recent trend toward organic produce still
constitutes only a small segment of the U.S. agricultural industry, it is
significant for a number of reasons.  Primarily this trend displays a
change in consumer attitudes towards organics-a change which does not
appear fleeting.  This growing awareness of food safety will undoubtedly
lead to USDA standards for organic produce (currently under development)
as well as standards for pesticide residue labeling on conventional
produce (Frazao, 1992).  Such federal regulations would establish a
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standard allowing consumers to judge between organic and non-organic
produce, to make assumptions about the benefits and drawbacks of each, and
choose between the two types of produce.  And with increasing publicity
about the environmental and human health effects of pesticide use, it is
likely that these consumers will choose organic if within a reasonable
price.  It appears, therefore, that USDA standards and labeling for
produce are likely to have an even greater effect on the rise of organic
produce production and consumption.
Environmental Effects
        Although organic farm acreage is currently relatively small in the
U.S. compared to total agriculture acreage, it still serves to reduce
environmental degradation.  As of 1994, well over one million acres of
land were being used for organic agriculture, while conventional farm
acreage decreased.  Since the Environmental Protection Agency considers
conventional agriculture the largest non-point source of water pollution
in the country (Lustgarden, 1994), the transition toward organic
agriculture is a welcomed one, even if seemingly small.  Farming without
the use of chemical pesticides and fertilizers can significantly reduce
pesticide run-off and water pollution, the result being safer water for
humans and wildlife.  Additionally, it can result in decreased
environmental and public health costs, which, according to Pimentel
(1993), total about $8 billion every year in the U.S..  As previously
stated, the organic produce transition has the potential to effect the
overall toxicity transition.
Decline and Resurgence of the Family Farm
        The family farm as an institution has been continuously eroding
since the late 1970's.  A transformation in American agriculture from
small-scale, broad-cropped based farming to large-scale, industrial and
monocultural farming occurred from the 1940's up until the 1970's
(Strange, 1988).  The reasons for this are many, but most are based on the
theory that "bigger is better."  This idea has been reflected in U.S.
agricultural policy since the 1940's.  Such policies have encouraged
large-scale, monocultural farming practices through programs such as
commodity price and income support subsidies, tax credits, research
programs, and pesticide subsidies (National Research Council, 1989).
Under these policies, farmers faced economic penalties for maintaining
small scale, broad-based farms, and were therefore nearly forced to either
get out of business or change to large-scale, commercialized production
practices.
        An increase in organic farming correlates with an increase in
small family farms.  For organic production practices favor small farms
that grow a variety of crops.  The 1996 Farm Bill also provides farmers
with greater planting flexibility, allowing them to plant a variety of
crops, and using organic practices if desired (Hosansky, 1996).  Hopefully
this policy with result in further conversions to organic and small-scale




        Under traditional agricultural policy in the U.S., farmers are not
rewarded for practicing sustainable farming methods.  In fact,
agricultural policies serve to deter the emergence of such methods.
Although the 1996 Farm Bill may serve to promote crop diversification, and
hence alternative methods such as organic farming, the policy still does
not reward those farmers who have been practicing sustainable methods for
years.  
        The U.S. government needs to re-evaluate its agricultural support
system, so that equal rewards and incentives are provided for farmers
managing large as well as small tracts of land.  The following are
recommendations intended to guide agricultural policy makes toward
promoting alternative agricultural practices such as organic farming, and
hence promote agricultural sustainability.  The policies are not intended
to be comprehensive in scope, but rather address a few key areas where
current policy is lacking.
USDA Management Information System  
        As mentioned, the USDA has historically neglected the organic
agriculture industry, and currently lacks a formal tracking system for
organic farm production and sales.  State and national agencies therefore
typically do not consider such small-scale and organic farms when
agricultural policies are established.  
        Given increasing public awareness and concern over health issues,
and in turn an increasing rise in the organic industry, it is time for the
USDA to acknowledge this rise and get updated on these transitions.  For
starters, the USDA must implement a management information system (MIS)
that will gather information on organic production and distribution.
Information such as average farm size; specific production practices such
as inter-cropping and folier feeding techniques; and distribution methods
could be collected through surveys distributed through regional
Sustainable Agriculture Working Groups (SAWG).  Presently, SAWG networks
are present in a number of regions in the country, and are typically in
contact with most small-scale, family, and organic farms in their region.
Such data could be used by the USDA as well as other sustainable
agriculture organizations to more accurately represent current
agricultural and consumption trends over time, which could then be
compared with other trends and considered when state and national
agricultural policies are established.
Institute Government Policy-Led Sustainable Agriculture Programs 
        As suggested by Buttel (1993), government policy led-sustainable
agriculture is an approach to sustainability that seeks to implement
public policies that give producers strong incentives to achieve sound
environmental performance.  Research in this area would consist of an
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assessment of the social and ecological costs and benefits of various
approaches to sustainable agriculture.  
        One example would be applying polluter-costs for environmental
damage, such as water quality.  Such a policy might be similar to existing
environmental policies which require industries to pay polluter-costs for
environmental degradation such as decreased air or water quality.  Another
example would be applying taxes (as opposed to subsidies) for extensive
use of chemical pesticides.  Research by Zilberman (1991) suggests that
pesticide taxes would encourage farmers to become more selective in their
chemical choices and switch to other options that would be more
cost-effective.  
        A final example would be implementing subsidy programs which
reward farmers for implementing organic and/or sustainable agriculture
production methods.  The implementation of such subsidy programs, however,
would need to be based on specific data on such production methods, which
currently the USDA lacks.  Such programs would therefore need to be
established with the aid of sustainable agricultural organizations across
the country, such as the network of Sustainable Agriculture Working
Groups, the Community Alliance with Family Farmers, and American Farmland
Trust.
Protect Small-Scale and Family Farms
        As mentioned, one consequence of traditional U.S. agricultural
policy as been the decline of small-scale and family operated farms.  Such
policies have encouraged large-scale, monocultural farming practices and
imposed economic penalties for maintaining small scale, broad-based farms.
        The 1996 Farm Bill does include farmland conservation programs,
such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP), which provide
financial, technical, and educational support for farms practicing
conservation methods.  Historically, many small farms have participated in
these voluntary programs, and have even come to depend on annual financial
support for their participation in these programs (Thorpe, 1996).
Proposed rules under EQIP-which are currently undergoing a public comment
period-include provisions such as the establishment of "conservation
priority areas" which would prioritize large tracts of lands for receiving
EQIP support, and essentially make small farms ineligible for receiving
EQIP funds.  Sustainable agriculture and rural conservation organizations
across the country are concerned over such proposed rules, and are
currently taking efforts so that such rules will not be adopted in the
final EQIP guidelines.  
        Such proposed rules clearly reflect that the USDA does not
recognize the importance of maintaining small-scale farms for
environmental, economic, or social reasons.  Once again, if the agency
collected and tracked information on such small-scale farms and their
practices, it would be better equipped for implementing more accurate and
progressive agricultural policies.   
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Develop Bioregional Communities to Localize Food Consumption  
        Moving toward more localized food distribution may be a way to
further promote more equal distribution of food in the United States.
Additionally, it can provide farmers with greater financial and social
stability.  Community-Supported Agriculture (CSA) programs are one way of
localizing food consumption.  CSA's are a form of mutual cooperation
between farmers and consumers who come together in order to produce
healthy food in a sustainable way (Donahue, 1994).  In a typical CSA,
community members purchase a share in the farm's operations at the start
of each growing season.  CSA members provide capital for the agricultural
season, and receive fresh produce (produced locally) on a weekly basis.
In addition to providing community members with fresh produce, the CSA
strengthens the farm by providing farmers with guaranteed income, no
matter how successful or disastrous the harvest.  Programs such as the CSA
promote crop diversification and often alternative agricultural practices.
Additionally, such a program replaces the need for government subsidies
through guaranteed income.
        Presently, such efforts to promote such localized food
distribution are small and regional in scope.  Organizations such as the
Community Alliance with Family Farmers in California (CAFF) are making
tremendous efforts at promoting bioregional communities and supporting
small-scale farms.  Although they are recognized as a leader in promoting
sustainable agriculture, the reality is that organizations such as CAFF
are under-funded, under-staffed, and at times their efforts are thwarted
by conventional and outdated agricultural policies.  Agencies such as the
USDA have the power to aid such organizations through funding mechanisms
and grant programs.  
Conclusion
        The trend toward large-scale commercial farms, which was
encouraged through traditional domestic agricultural policies, has
deterred the growth of alternative agricultural practices in the United
States.  The result has been increased environmental degradation,
increased health and safety concerns, unequal food distribution, a decline
of the family farm, and decreased agricultural sustainability.  
        It appears that a move away from that trend in underway, as a
transition toward organic agriculture becomes increasingly evident.
Organic cropland acreage and number of organic farmers are up
significantly, as is organic produce sales.  Consumer attitudes also are
steadily increasing in favor of foods produced without the use of chemical
pesticides and fertilizers.
        In order to maintain this transition, domestic agricultural policy
must be re-directed to greater promote and reward organic agricultural
practices and consumption .  Until that time, the transition will be
maintained by increasing consumer demand, and the vision of individual
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farmers who believe in promoting sustainable agricultural practices.
STELLA MODELS AND GRAPHS
Stella Model Map.
Stella Model Inputs.
Stella Graph 1: 'worst' and 'best' case
scenarios.
Stella Graph 2: 'low' sociodemographics and changes
in knowledge/experience.
Stella Graph 3: 'wealthy' sociodemographics and
changes in knowledge/experience.
Stella Graph 4: 'low income' and changes in
ability.
Stella Graph 5:  'wealthy' and changes in
ability.
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THE  IMPACT  OF POLICY ON  AGRICULTURAL  TRANSFORMATION  IN BURMA
-APPROACH FROM AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT-          
Introduction  
                   Burma is located on the western edge of mainland
Southeast Asia. A surface area of about twenty six thousand square miles,
makes it the largest country in that region. The population, estimated at
about 43 million (1994/95), is composed of as many as 135 ethnic
nationalities. From the southern Himalayas, the Ayeyarwady river runs
through the country for 1350 miles, flowing into the vast Delta stretched
150 miles wide and 180 miles long. The  Ayeyarwady Delta, the center of
rice culture, shows us a significant view of the rice paddy. 
                   One of the Least Developed Countries (LDC), Burma has
recently showed political, social and economic change. Historically, the
key sector in Burmese economy is agriculture, which provides employment
for 60-70 percent of total labor force, and accounts for the country's
major export earnings. The people, of whom about seventy-five percent live
in rural areas, engage in subsistence agriculture. In 1988 when the
military took power, economic policies shifted from centralization to
market-oriented system. As a result, Burmese economy showed dynamic
performance. However, the people in rural area tend to be bypassed by
whatever economic progress has been attained. In order for Burma to become
economically self-sustaining, the government's development strategy must
take the rural area into consideration, particularly the  agricultural
sector. Without integrated rural development, industrialization in Burma
either would be stultified or, if successful, create severe internal
problems such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment. A focus on impact
of policy on agricultural development will make clear to which extent
Burmese agriculture has been developed, and how it has the potential to
cause structural change for further national economic development. An
understanding of these concepts will contribute to discovering an
effective strategy for development in Burma.
              My approach in this paper starts with an brief account of
agricultural development and  its transition. I will also discuss a
desirable policy setting in each transition. With its characteristics, I
will describe and analyze the feature of Burmese agriculture, leading to
an examination of future development strategies.                    
Agricultural Development 
Historical Perspective
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                   Agriculture has been the main component of the economy
in the Third World, which implicates that, for the vast majority of the
world's poorest people living in rural areas, agriculture has been not
only an economic activity for survival, but also a way of life. In spite
of this fact, the role of agriculture in most country's economies was
historically considered as passive and supportive. Empirical experience
reveals that the growth spectrum of agricultural sector in general spans
from 2 to 3 percent to 4 to 6 percent even in case of accelerating
condition. In the short term, however, agricultural growth occasionally
shows beyond that level in some areas, due to the sudden implementation of
the modern technology on a broad scale. On the contrary, nonagricultural
sectors demonstrate a high growth rate at the rate of 8 to 10 percent and
higher. Therefore, under the promotion of economic development,
governments in developing countries were inclined to give priority to the
faster-growing nonagricultural sectors to a slower-growing agricultural
sector. However, the changing view of agriculture has emerged since 1950.
During the period called the economic-growth-and-modernization era  of
which has formulated 1950s and 1960s, many developing countries had
launched a development strategy along the guidelines emphasized in  rapid
industrialization. Although the economy of many countries in the Third
World demonstrated a respectable performance in the manufacturing and
commerce sectors, it became obvious that rapid economic growth in some
countries caused a country's socioeconomic structure to be deleterious and
disastrous rather than improved. As a result, the disappointing experience
through 1950s and 1960s forced many the governments to recognize the
important role of agriculture in the early stage of development and, in
addition, caused to a remarkable shift of the development strategy and
policy-making. Taiwan and Thailand are two of the countries where the
shift to an agricultural-oriented strategy since the early 1970s has
resulted in the achievement of structural change favorable to pursuing
further industrialization. This suggests that agricultural development is
an important element in the early stages of economic development and a
driving force leading to structural transformation. 
                   Despite of the growth pattern of nonagricultural
sectors, why does a set of strategies, which emphasize such
industrialization at the expense of the agricultural sector, end up in
failure, causing such serious problems as widespread poverty, inequity and
unemployment? Moreover, why do the countries which promoted both sectors
equally attain success? John W. Mellor (1995)  offers us one of the
answers; "Agriculture plays an important role in structural transformation
because of its preeminent size, not its preeminent growth rate."
Figure 1.  Output and Employment in Third World
Agriculture, 1990.
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                   FIGURE #2 shows that in the Third countries the portion
of agricultural employment in the total labor force has, as a whole,
doubled the output of agriculture as a percentage of the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP). In spite of a much lower share of the output in the GDP,
agriculture has been the major sector which absorbs in large numbers of
the labor force in the developing countries. This indicates that the
agricultural sector owns a large labor force of low productivity,
comparing to other sectors such as manufacturing and commerce. In the
early stages of development, dominance of agriculture is reflected the
most in the land, labor and capital of  one's developing countries.
Therefore, the development of agriculture has great potential in terms of
socio-economic structural change. In order to achieve further economic
development, the government of the Third World countries need to
comprehend the role of agriculture in their economic structure, while
their development strategies should strive to create an appropriate policy
for the transition stage between economic development and an agrarian
system. 
Transition of Agricultural Development and Policy Setting 
                   The  experience of some developing countries during
1970s and 1980s witnessed that  agriculture played an important role and
had a great potential to achieve structural change in the  process of
development. The agricultural transformation can be divided into four
stages, requiring desirable policy setting for each stage.   In the early
stage of development, agricultural sector is composed of a high percentage
(70-90 percent) of labor force, and creates a lower agricultural output
which has no reflection of the proportion of labor input. The increase of
labor productivity in agricultural sector, caused by external or internal
factors, creates a significant surplus, because the rest of the economy is
so small. In this stage, policy must be concerned with "getting
agriculture moving," or creating a better environment in the agricultural
sector. Thus, surplus needs to be allocated in public investment such as
infrastructure, and in favorable price incentives for farmers to adopt new
technologies. Agricultural surplus, which was created in the first stage,
is absorbed directly or indirectly in both public and private sectors and
mobilized for development of nonagricultural sectors in the second stage.
The agricultural sector then becomes a key contributor to the overall
growth process. But as the nonagricultural sector, in particular the
industrial sector, develops, the disequilibrium between agriculture and
industry comes to light. When this gap in labor productivity and measured
income( not psychic incomes) between rural and urban sectors starts to
narrow, agriculture takes a step to the third stage. Policy during the
second stage should strive to link the agricultural sector with the
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industrial sector, and to improve factor markets to mobilize the rural
resources. Sufficient input and output in the agricultural sector will
help to integrate rural markets, creating a linkage between rural and
urban economy. As result, integration of rural and urban economy
accelerates the process of extracting labor and capital from agricultural
sector, and mobilizing them into industrial and service sectors with high
productivity in the third stage. Due to the integration into macro
economy, policy should consider the environment surrounding the
agricultural sector, such as the fluctuation of macro prices, level of
aggregate activity, and trade. Agriculture receives pressure to change the
traditional  management, and move into industrialized economies in the
forth stage. Although agriculture has the small share of the labor force,
it gains the influence on political issues. The countries which have
attained success in the transition face to serious problems, such as
resource allocation and competition in the world economy. Agricultural
protection and its impact on the world economy become essential elements
in the process of agricultural policy making.  
Transition of Agrarian System
                   Agrarian systems tend to evolve from predominately
subsistence and small-scale peasant farming, to more diversified and
larger extended family farming, and finally to specialized and commercial
farming, which dominates in total production. Although subsistence farming
tends to dominate in developing countries and specialized farming does so
in industrialized countries,  these stages can be seen in every country at
any point in time.
                   The purpose of subsistence farming is to produce
outputs for family consumption and a few staple food crops for the local
market to obtain necessities. Productivity of land and labor are at a low
level, and capital investment has no expectation. In general, for
peasants, land and labor are the principal factor and they use traditional
methods and tools for cultivation, which is vulnerable to weather shifts.
The laws and policies, such as taxation systems, place burdens on peasants
and restrict incentives. The failure to collect sufficient outputs causes
farmers to create outstanding debt from moneylenders, leading to a
critical condition in their lives. Most subsistence-farming peasants in
the Third World are confronted with difficulties due to technological
limitations, rigid social institutions, and the lack of communication
systems connecting rural to urban areas. It is obvious that the
environment surrounding peasants is static and uncertain. Since the nature
of subsistence agriculture is highly risky and uncertain, farmers in that
level are reluctant to adopt new technologies and crop patterns, even
though they promise to attain higher productivity. This is because the
motivation of small-scale peasants is based on the maximization of their
chance of survival and they tend to avoid risks which will endanger their
lives. Moreover, environment surrounding peasants, for example, the
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restrict land tenure condition, inadequate credit facilities, and immature
local market, can be the major stumbling block in preventing the farmers
from responding to proposed technical change. Without an effort to reduce
risk and remove social and commercial impediment, there is little
possibility for small-farmers to accept innovation which raises
agricultural productivity and affects structural change in society.
Peasants begin to act economically and rationally when given alternative
opportunities and provided adequate insurance. The increase of
productivity per worker under desirable social, commercial, and
institutional condition causes to a shift from subsistence farming to
mixed and diversified farming.
                   In mixed and diversified farming, new cash crops such
as fruits, vegetable, coffee and tea take the place of staple crops. Along
with diffusion of cash crops, simple labor-saving devices like small
tractor can be introduced, freeing the labor force for other farming
activities. In addition, the introduction of better seeds, fertilizers and
irrigation help to increase the productivity of the land, creating a
surplus to invest for improvements of agricultural input, while adequate
supply enable farmers to use their land for cash crop cultivation. In this
stage, a reasonable and reliable access to credit, fertilizer, water, the
information network and marketing facilities become essential
requirements. 
                   Specialized and modern commercialized farming is the
dominant form the agricultural sectors in advanced industrial countries.
Its goal is to produce commercial profit, not take into provide food for
family. Adopting the economic concepts which will be referred to costs,
saving and investment, price fluctuations in market and proper resources
utilization, the  farming system is mobilized effectively with
quantitative and qualitative significance. A particular cultivation method
becomes the prominent feature of all specialized farms, in which
capital-intensive labor-saving technology allows a single family to
cultivate a large land. In some cases, it can be seen in both developing
and industrialized countries that specializes farming operates similarly
to large agribusiness multinational corporate enterprises. 
                   
Agricultural and Rural Development Strategy 
                   In developing countries, we see that most people live
in rural areas and engage in subsistence agriculture for survival. Despite
the fact that these countries showed dynamic economic growth, such people
were overlooked. Recent serious problems, such as widespread poverty,
inequity and unemployment, has developed as a result of the severe
imbalance between rural and urban areas caused by rapid industrialization.
While the transformation of the agricultural function occurred in the
economic development, the agrarian system also shows the morphological
transition  from subsistence farming to specialized and commercial
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farming. As far as the traditional society in rural area is concerned,
agriculture is no longer an economic activity, but a way of life,
therefore, it is necessary for any government to recognize and to
understand the structure of farm economy in terms of the process of
agricultural modernization. Policy should involve not only meeting the
demands for increased production, but also causing profound changes which
affect the whole social, political, and institutional structure of rural
society. 
                   The major objective of agricultural and rural
development should focus on the improvement of living standards in rural
areas through increases in small-farm incomes, output, and productivity.
To achieve these basic conditions, development strategy must comprise the
essential and fundamental elements in terms of small-scale agricultural
progress and rural integration.  The main requirements is as follows:
Small-Scale Agricultural Progress
1.  Application of technological change and innovation
2.  Appropriate government economic policies
3.  Creation of supportive social institutions
 
Rural Integration           
4.  Modernization of farm structure to meet demands of increasing food 
5.  Creation of effective supporting system 
6.  Social and physical change of the rural environment 
                   There are two major sources of technological
innovation, which enable farmers to increase their yield. However, new
technology, in some aspects,  possesses problematic elements. The
introduction of labor-saving technology such as mechanization has drastic
effects on the increase of output per worker. In reference to the land,
most farmers in the developing countries own small plots of land without
sufficient capital. Thus, this can not be suitable for the
small-landholders. On the other hand, land-saving technology such as
improved-seeds, irrigation and chemical fertilizers raises land
productivity by improving quality. Theoretically, many economists agree
that this has a positive effect on small scale agriculture because of it
does not require a large capital input. To promote this measure, of
course, adequate government policies and supportive social institutions
will be needed. Otherwise, this will turn out to be a failure and cause
the further impoverishment of the masses of rural peasants. 
                   Green Revolution fortifies this proposition. Following
the recognition of the role of agriculture in the world, the new
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high-yielding varieties (HIV), called "miracle seed," of rice, wheat and
corn have been introduced to many countries in the Third World, starting
the early 1970s. Some countries achieved success, but the others did not.
This is because this new HIV requires access to related resources such as
irrigation, fertilizer, insecticides, credit, and agricultural extension
services. Large landowners, with their disproportionate access to these
resources and support services, have the opportunity to take advantage of
HIVs over smallholders and eventually drive them out of market. The
inevitable result is that an innovation with great potential for
alleviating rural poverty and raising agricultural output can be
antidevelopmental if government policies and social institutions militate
against the active participation of the small farmers in the evolving
agrarian structure. Pricing policies of agricultural commodities can be
one of the critical areas for major improvements. 
                   It is obvious that small-scale agricultural development
with full benefits is critical to the role of government. In many parts of
Asia and Latin America, land reform is essential through a joint effort of
the government and all farmers. The most important determinant in the
existing highly inequitable distribution of rural income and wealth
originates from the unequal structure of land ownership. Although there
are many forms, land reform as a  whole entails a redistribution of the
rights of ownership in favor of cultivators with limited or no land
holdings. The transfer of acreage from the land owner to the people who
actually work the land can be encouraged under the overall protection of
government. In addition to social structural reforms, rural development
needs substantial support of public sectors in the form of, for example,
transportation, a communication network, research and education, leading
to the development of small- and medium-scale industry and upgrading of
consumption pattern for rural modernization. 
Burmese Agriculture: Its Structure 
                   Historically, the Burmese economy was supported by
agriculture, which provides sixty to seventy percent of employment and
occupies over one-third of the Gross Domestic Products (GDP). 
Figure 2.  Total Labor Force and Employment in
Agricultural Sector, Burma.
                   FIGURE #2 shows Burma's total labor force and
employment in the agricultural sector. 
Obviously, the majority of the labor force is absorbed by the agricultural
sector. However, the lack of significant change in employment of
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agricultural sector implies that fluctuations in the economy (Asian
Development Bank) have no effect on the mobilization of the agricultural
labor force to nonagricultural sectors.
Figure 3.  Output and Employment in Burma.
                  Unlike the other developing countries, Burma's
agricultural employment from 1985 is in relatively close proportion to the
agricultural output. The growth of GDP percentage of agricultural output
reveals that the agricultural reforms of 1974 were successful. Moreover,
this recent trend indicates that Burma appears to be in the higher level
of labor productivity in the Third World. However, it should be noted
that, in terms of the agricultural production index per capita, this
presumption is not supported by the evidence.
Figure 4.  Output and Employment in Thailand.
                   Thailand is a typical country in the Third World where
the agricultural sector shares much less percentage in total than
agricultural employment does in terms of the economic structure (Fig.4).
By one set of criteria of "output and employment," Burma has done better
than Thailand. However, when we evaluate Burma's growth according to the
agricultural production index per capita in FIGURE #5, Burma's development
has been at the same level as Thailand. 
Figure 5.  Agriculture:  Production Index Per
Capita, Burma and Thailand.
                   Map #1-3 (Shares of Major Sectors in GDP )
give us a visible feature of the economic structure in the Southeast Asian
region. According to this, Burma is referred to as one of the agricultural
countries in the Southeast region because of a large portion of
agricultural output in the GDP. Its history as an agricultural country
dates back to the nineteenth century as a British colony. Its main rice
field, Ayeyawady Delta, which contains about 3.5 million acres,
experienced dramatic increased cultivation after the British arrived.
Promotion of agriculture under British rule made Burma the "rice bowl" in
Asia. This legacy has left paddy/rice as the main agricultural product
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which has shared over seventy percent of the total agricultural output in
Burma today. 
                   Needless to say, the agricultural sector, because of
its size, has played an important role in Burma. The rise and fall of this
sector is a decisive factor in the performance of the national economy and
the life of the majority of the populace. Since agriculture has affected
the economy, government has attempted to have an impact on it through its
policies. 
Historical Perspective of Agricultural Development in Burma
        The history of agricultural development in Burma has been similar
to that of many other countries of the Third World. The military
government, which established the "Burmese Way to Socialism" in 1962, gave
priority to industrialization. The objectives of this new concept was
self-reliance, nationalization and strict neutrality in line with
'socialism,' which was adopted for Burmese tradition and its natural
features.  Rapid nationalization and the neglect of the role of
agriculture resulted in a disappointing growth in both the agricultural
and the nonagricultural sectors, which caused stagnation in the whole
economy. The lesson from this disappointing experience during 1960s turned
the governments attention to the agricultural development. To overcome the
stagnating economy, the government was forced to reform some of its
economic policies, practice, and institutional structure with an emphasis
on improving  the agricultural sector. In 1971, the government carried out
the "Twenty Year Plan," which was composed of the four terms of the Four
Year Plan (FYP). In fact, it was launched from the Second FYP in 1974,
which was adopted for the new policies under the 'modification' of Burmese
Way to Socialism. A prominent landmark  in this plan was the emphasis on
exploitation and efficient utilization of natural resources such as
agriculture, forestry and mining. In addition, the introduction of the
Official Financial Aid (ODA) as well as other international inflows helped
Burma pursue radical and further economic development. The authority's
recognition of the importance of the agricultural role in the economy
brought the highest priority to agriculture for economic development in
the future. However, modification of the policies implied a slight change
from strict nationalization toward liberalization, and the fundamental
concepts remained unchanged; self-reliance, centralization, and regulation
of domestic investment. During the Forth FYP, no measures were carried out
in the agricultural sector, and economic growth started to 
wane in accordance with the decline of agricultural production. The global
price-down in primary goods in the mid-1980s caused serious damage not
only to agriculture, but also to the overall Burmese economy. In 1988,
when the military took power through a coup, the economy in Burma was in a
critical condition. The economic policies under the present
administration, showed drastic change : the movement from inward-looking,
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nationalized policy to outward-looking, market-oriented. In order to
promote this radical policy, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) has formulated the Short Term Plan (STP) (1992/93-1995/96), in
which the first and the second year were designed as "Economic Years", the
third year as "All Round Development Year" and the last year as "Visiting
Myanmar Year." In the name of economic liberalization, the current
agricultural sector is considered as one of the three leading economic
growth sectors: the other two, being tourism, and natural gas and mining. 
Land Policy
                   Land reform is an essential condition for agricultural
development. In Burma, land distribution from large landowners to small
farmers moved smoothly. This was because the state was the ultimate
landlord and considered that farmers should have the right to work on the
land as individuals. The Tenancy Law of 1965, which abolished the tenancy
system , contributed to the accumulation of about five million acres, or a
quarter of the total cultivated area. Although lands were prohibited from
sale, purchase or mortgage, lands allocation had taken place in accordance
with this law. But the land reform emphasized equity rather than
productivity, which caused further land fragmentation. 
TABLE #1 Size Distribution of Farms, 1985/86                            
                                
 Size of Holding        Farm Families   Farm Families   Area    Area
     (acres)              ('000)          (Percent) ('000 acres)  %
    Less than 5         2661            61.6            6078    25.11
     5 to < 10          1058            24.49           7540    31.14
    10 to < 20          491             11.38           6853    28.3
    20 to < 50          107             2.47            3010    12.43
    50 to < 100         2               0.04            129     0.53
   100 and above        0.9             0.02            603     2.49
      Total             4320            100             24213   100
Source: Mya Than, "Agricultural Policy Reforms and Agricultural
Development," in MYANMAR  DILEMMAS AND OPTIONS, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, edited by Mya Than & Joseph L. H. Tan, 1990.
                   TABLE #1 shows that over fifty-six percent of lands was
occupied by eighty-five percent of the families whose farm size are ten
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acres or less, whereas 15.3 percent of lands belongs to about 2.5 percent
of families whose farm size are over twenty acres. This indicates that the
majority of farmers in Burma were small land holders and a more equitable
land distribution had been attained compared with neighboring countries,
as a result of the emphasis on equity. In addition, farmers were protected
by the Farmers' Rights Production Law, which was introduced along with the
land reform. The land reforms emphasized on equity and strengthened
government control over farmers, causing a strong relationship between the
government, the owner and the  cultivators.
Credit Policy 
                   Credit is an advanced purchase which enables farmers to
access agricultural inputs in advance. In the beginning of the Second FYP
(1974-77), the government made more credit available to farmers. Although
credit had been existed even during the previous government, about 85-90
percent of government agricultural loan was spent for the paddy crops. On
the other hand, industrial crops, such as jute, sugar-cane and tobacco,
were supported by lower interest rates. However, the farmers tended to
depend on more expensive private sources of credit to meet their demand
than official credit, whose lending rate covered only about eleven percent
of the total cost of cultivation in 1972/73. These reasons sprang from the
government purchasing system, where farmers, who took credit from the
government, were obliged to sell their crops to it. In addition, credit
distribution on a per acre basis allowed larger land holders to enjoy the
benefits of this system. The objective is not the elimination of the
private money lender, but administrative control over farmers. Therefore,
the credit system, like the land reform, emphasized equity rather than
productivity and efficiency. 
Marketing Policy
                   The features of Burmese agriculture under the Burmese
Way to Socialism accounted  for the government procurement of rice and
control over major exported agricultural products. The procurement system,
though it had existed since 1946, aimed at providing stable prices for
producers and consumers, obtaining sufficient capital to employ for the
development plan, and stabilizing the economy. These tasks were assumed by
the Union of Burma Agricultural and Marketing Board (UBAMB), which bought
rice and "controlled" products  at fixed price set by government directly
from farmers, distributing them along both producers and consumers with
lower prices, and exporting them with value added. Although the objectives
of this system was to restrain the inflation to low rates, the government
control in domestic markets coincided with the spreading of the black
market, which was responsive to the actual demand. 
                   Along with the Second FYP (1974-77) the authorities
modified the previous procurement system to the compulsory delivery
system, which took into account land size, land productivity, and family
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size. This system was  "actually a form of progressive taxation which
favored the small farmers with poor performance."  However, rice, as
usual, emptied into the black market. Large farmers in particular tended
to sell their products in the free market, whose price was higher than
government price. This flow was  because of the widened price gap between
the official and free markets. Therefore, farmers responded to this price
gap which is shown in FIGURE #4. Since 1974, the government had raised the
official price twice to adjust by the widened price gap. This pragmatic
price adjustment contributed to, to some extent, increasing the amount of
procurement rice along with exaltation of incentives among farmers.
Although the government continued to maintain the adjustment prices, the
price in the free market far exceeded the official price. As a result, the
amount of procurement started declining after 1978.
Figure 6(4).  Prices of Paddy/Rice.
                   In 1987, the government inaugurated the most radical
reforms: the liberalization of agricultural trade. According to this
announcement, once restricted agricultural products, rice, maize and seven
varieties of beans and pulses, were allowed to be handled by the
privately. After a short time, people enjoyed free trade, and
demonetization was carried out. This was aimed at absorbing the black
money to prevent the dominance of non Burmese People, most of whom were
engaged in the commercial sectors. However, the government efforts
resulted in economic chaos  rather than economic recovery. SLORC, which
took power through the political upheavals in 1988, replaced it with the
former centralized procurement systems.  
                 In spite of the shift to the marketing liberalization in
the national economic policy, farmers have remained obliged to deliver at
controlled prices a certain pertain proportion of output in return for
inputs. Since delivery of paddy still has been based on land acreage
rather than production, without respect to the number of crops of paddy
sown per year, its burden has fallen on farmers who have relatively
low-yielding land unfavorable for new multiple cropping. Although official
paddy price rises yearly, the authorities require additional quotas. The
failure to deliver tends to cause farmers to loose their access to the
land.
 
Agricultural Reform -Green Revolution-
                   The highlight of agricultural history in Burma could be
a consequence of the introduction of High-Yield Varieties of paddy rice
(HYV) through the "Green Revolution." The introduction of new technology,
which started in 1974, had gained more momentum under "Whole Township
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Special Production Programme," spreading throughout countries, especially,
Lower Burma. Since HYVs required more fertilizer, the government promoted
the utilization of this new technology combined with fertilizer. FIGURE #5
gives the amount of 8466 thousand tons of paddy production in 1974, and
34.19 baskets paddy yield per acre. By 1982 in FIGURE #6 and #7 show that
over 10000 thousand acres, half of the paddy land was covered, while four
times of fertilizers were consumed, compared to in 1974 Along with these
trends, paddy production per yield increased twice as much as before 1974,
causing rise of total production to 13923 thousand tons. 
                   The increase of paddy production during the period
between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s resulted from neither little or
no extension of cropped area, nor introduction of agricultural machines,
but did resulted in yield increase. Added to these new technologies, good
weather, more available credit and incentive, which led to the rising
price of official procurement, contributed to the increase of productivity
per yield and consequent total paddy product.   
Figure 7(5).  Paddy Production and Paddy Yield in
Burma.
Figure 8(6).  Paddy Production and HYV Area during
1974-85.
Figure 9(7).  Paddy Production and Fertilizer
Consumption.
Burmese Agriculture: Position
Through the "Green Revolution," Burmese agriculture made a great progress.
The introduction of land-saving technology was suitable, as long as
concerned the feature of Burmese agriculture: land fragmentation, low
land-man ratio, and scarce capital. The policy reforms, which gave the
higher priority over agricultural sector during this period, seemed to
bring benefits to farmers through rising productivity. however, despite of
increase of gross income, high inflation, which caused by dual economy,
had no effect on their real income. This was in favor of large-land
holders. Even in 1993, most farmers used simple implements such as plows,
harrows, and spades. TABLE #2 suggested that the Burmese agriculture have
not given away to subsistence level. 
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TABLE # 2  Agricultural Equipment,1993          
                
                                        Thousand Numbers
Implements              Plows           2674
                        Harrows         2792
                        Spades          3600
Machinery               Seed Drills     84
                        Rotary Harrows  409
                        Water Pump      46
                        Tractors        11
Vehicles                Carts           1659
Source: Central Statistical Organization, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1993,
Yangon, Myanmar, 1993.  
         
                   The growth of agricultural sector, however, had slowed
down when the effects of Green Revolution reached the 'saturation point.'
This is largely because of the inappropriate allocation of surplus
springing up from the agricultural sector, and the policies emphasizing on
'equity' rather than 'efficiency.' Thus, surplus coming from the
agricultural sector was allocated to neither sufficient infrastructure,
nor favorable price incentives. The progress of Burmese agriculture had no
link to the next stage of  transformation of agricultural development as
well as to the agrarian system, keeping it to a subsistence level. 
Agricultural Potential and Strategy Suggestion through the Recent 
Policy             
The recent agricultural strategy under the ruling military junta, the
SLORC, aims at the comprehensive progress of productive sectors including
agriculture, livestock and fisheries.  As for the agricultural sector, its
feature can be described as the encouragement of production through
small-scale irrigation and new multiple cropping.
Multiple Cropping
                   Rapid diffusion of multiple cropping, in particular,
contributed to recovery of the agricultural output during 1991-1995. This
seemed to result from the great efforts of the government, which
extensively publicized nationwide instructions to farmers of when and what
to cultivate on paddy land through all the state media organs. In
addition, government formed 7000 "agricultural supervisors,"  and placed
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them throughout countryside mainly to communicate these instructions for
reliable compliance in the process of the paddy procurement. The
application of multiple-cropping brought about, to some extent, success,
owing to farmers' voluntary response in some regions. The salinity
problem, high flood risk and seasonal pest problem are major concerns in
Delta region (Ayeyarwady Delta and coastal area), which occupies fifty
percent of  country's cultivated area. Flooding in this region which is
caused by constant heavy rain during the monsoon season, in particularly,
destroyed ten to fifteen percent of cultivated area in the Delta region.
Flood protection will be badly needed.
Irrigation
                   On the other hand, this multiple-cropping technology
required expansion of irrigation systems. Historically, irrigation had
played a fairly limited role in Burma's agricultural development. As a
whole, due to the need of capital input, the scarce budget of the
government seemed unmanageable for the need. In spite of the large land
possession of mainland Southeast Asia, only 12.69 percent of the total
area of 67.6 million hectares is under cultivation in 1994. TABLE #3
reveals that Burma has  a vast room available to cultivate.  
TABLE #3  Land Use, 1994                
                
Type of Land            Hectare         Percentage
                        (Thousands)
        
Net Sown Acreage        8587            12.69
Current Fallow          1489            2.2
Cultivable Waste        8191            12.11
Reserved Forest         10260           15.16
Other Forests           22130           32.71
Others                  17001           25.13
Total                   67658           100
Source: Ministry of National Planning & Economic Development, Economic
Development of Myanmar, Government of the Union of Myanmar, 
1995                   
                   As for both the Dry zone region in the center of Burma
and the Hill region along the boarder, paddy, as well as other crops which
is share about forty percent of the total agricultural products, are
available only in the area where the irrigation is provided, or conditions
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are relatively favorable. It is necessary that irrigation development
which based on the construction of dams and diversion water, pump
irrigation of both surface and ground, and the establishment of
village-level irrigation schemes. Recently, under government pressure,
total irrigated areas have increased from 2.5 to 4.1 million acres, and
irrigated paddy cultivation from 2.1 to 4.3 million acres during
1989/90-1994/95.  This is because the state irrigation construction
projects were accomplished by a large number of people with little or no
compensation in the name of "people's contributions." Thus, without a
large amount of capital input, irrigation had and has been undertaken.
Since Burma has a vast potential of land resources, land expansion will
lead Burma to the next stage. 
Small-Scale Machinery and Diversified Farming
                   Considering different land conditions, the diversified
farming and the shift to producing cash crops, will be desirable in the
Dry zone and the Hill region, where its soil does not retain moisture long
enough. On the other hand, the Delta region, although this is true for
other regions as well, will be need the introduction of small-scale
machinery. As we noted above, Burmese agriculture still mainly depends on
simple devices whereas agricultural machinery is insufficient. However,
the numbers of tractors and harvesters in 1961 was three times greater in
1974, and has grown further to five times greater. FIGURE #8 provides
visually the demonstration of its rapid growth. 
Figure 10(8).  Tractor and Harvester in Use,
Burma.
                   The recent trends of tractors and harvesters basically
demonstrates upward growth. It is largely because the utilization of both
machines is under the promotion by the present government through
encouragement of private sector suppliers. Even though, agricultural
mechanization in Burma continued to lag behind in Asian countries and
North and Central America, as provided in FIGUREs #9 and #10. 
Figure 11(9).  Tractor in Use, Burma, Asia, North
and Central America
                   Owing to land fragmentation and the different condition
of the region in Burma, it will be more efficient in Burmese agriculture
to introduce diversified farming to suitable areas and to  encourage
small-scale labor-saving technologies with knowledge of management.
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However, recent strategy without proper guidelines possesses a room to
discuss the utilization of human resources and the impact on the
environment. 
Other Recommendation
                  As long as government procurement exists in marketing
policy, there will be little hope to expect efficiency and productivity.
Furthermore, it is obvious that the link between the agricultural input
supplies and the delivery of output in return has had an adverse effect on
farming efficiency. The government needs to relinquish its monopoly in
respect to actual demand. The legalization of border trade has
strengthened price incentives in agriculture and will call forth a strong
supply response. It is important to offer opportunities opened up for
export demand.
                   Achievement of the structural change for further
development in the agricultural sector must follow rural development.
Infrastructure, particularly transportation, which had been mostly intact
since World War II, is critical to Burma. Toward "Myanmar Visiting Year of
1997," the ruling military junta devotes itself to invest in the tourism
infrastructure. Although transportation is under renovation or
construction by numerous uncompensated workers, its objective is
convenience for tourists, having little relation to the rural areas.
Future strategy must have a direct impact on the integration of the rural
development. 
                   Burma has suffered from a lack of priority for rural
development in national policies and donor-country assistance. There will
be many constraints and obstacles that still have to be  eliminated.
However, without such efforts, sustainable growth can not be expected in
the future.    
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DEFORESTATION: THE CASE OF MADAGASCAR
INTRODUCTION: The Problem of Deforestation
        The destruction and degradation of forests is now recognized as
one of the greatest environmental threats - and tragedies - of all time,
and the continuing loss of the world's forests has become a global
emergency. Both temperate and tropical forests are an integral part of the
life support systems of the planet, performing different ecological and
social functions essential for the continuation of life as we know it on
Earth. These forests contribute in regulating the climate at both the
regional and global level, provide a habitat for the majority of species,
provide a homeland for million of forest peoples, maintain and conserve
the soils, also regulate hydrological cycles and ensure water supplies.
        In many temperate regions, an important part of the broad-leaved
forests have been depleted since the dawn of agriculture. Continental
Europe  was still 90% forested during Roman times; today, the loss is
estimated at around 80% to almost 100% in many countries, and as a whole
Western Europe forest cover is down as to about 30%. On an other hand, in
North America, only an estimated 7% of what existed when the first
European settlers arrived can be nowadays retrieved; the figure was
already at 12.5% by the 1930s. And still, most of temperate forests in
Europe and North America are "managed" ones: we have 65% of closed forests
in the US, and 58% in Europe. Few virgin forests also remain outside
Canada, Alaska, and the former USSR, and in many instances even these are
under threat. Historically, agricultural and urban development has been
the  prime cause of forest destruction in temperate areas. Today, what
remains is being lost to logging, acid rain, and other pollution-related
diseases - a syndrome generically known as "Waldsterben" or "Forest Death"
-.
        Worldwide, all tropical countries have experienced a massive
increase in the rate of deforestation since the Second World War. Many
countries which are now virtually stripped of their forests were once
heavily forested. By the end of the 1980s, the UN Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) performed an assessment and then estimated that, for
the period 1980-1985, some 58 million hectares (0.58 million km2) of
"productive closed broad-leaved forests" were cleared, along with 13
million hectares (0.13 million km2) of "commercially unproductive
forests", making a total of 71 million hectares (0.71 million km2) of
loss. These figures translate into an annual rate of 11.6 million hectares
for "productive broad-leaved forests" alone. At such rate, all the world's
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primary lowland forests will have been destroyed by the end of the
century, except in inaccessible sites and in a few biological reserves.
        In 1987, satellite pictures for a study by the National Institute
for Research in the Amazon (INPA) indicated that 204 000 km2 of Brazilian
Amazon were burned, of which 48 000 km2 were proper rainforest and the
rest being savannah or previously cleared forest. The INPA gave an
estimate for the brazilian Amazon according to which some 10% of  the
total area had already been cleared. However,  the World Bank puts the
figure at 12%. In one way or the another, the rate of destruction is
always alarming, allowing this unique world's specimen  less than 30 years
to be completely lost. This tragedy will  happen even faster if we
consider the possibility that regional climatic change may disrupt the
evapotranspiration mechanisms, accelerating die-back of the remaining
forests (WRM, 1990).
        The major factors that have led to rainforest destruction have not
been systematically and adequately pointed. The common prejudice tends to
assume that forests are being destroyed by poor people who burn them for
agriculture or who use the trees for firewood. More recently,
environmental groups and scientists have drawn the attention on many other
possible causes. These include commercial logging, large road
construction, dam and mining projects, conversion of forests into cattle
ranches and plantations, transmigration and colonization schemes. Thus,
"modernization" and commercial interests are also involved in the
expansion of the tragedy on the global scale.
        Nethertheless, in the case of Madagascar, the phenomenon has a
much more complex origin which can be traced back in the country's early
History. And because of coexisting circumstances, the plague has been
carried over unto the modern era, challenging successive authorities and
governments.
        
THE CASE OF MADAGASCAR
Background
        Madagascar is an island nation in the Indian Ocean, located about
400 km (250 mi) across the Mozambique Channel to the southeastern coast of
Africa. Because of its location and unique settlement history, Madagascar
has remained fairly isolated from nearby East Africa. Approximately the
same size as Texas, Madagascar is the fourth-largest island in the world,
including its five small off-shore island dependencies. The Malagasy
people consider their country as a continental expanse rather than as a
maritime spot surrounded by ocean.
        Madagascar's dominant topographic feature is a high upland region
in the center of the island called the central plateau. Its average
elevation is about 1,400 m (4,500 ft), but it is characterized by hills,
deep gorges, and volcanic outcroppings that hinder transportation. The
highest point, Mount Maromokotro, rises to 2,876 m (9,436 ft) in the
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northern part of the country. Between the plateau and the Indian Ocean, to
the east, a plain about 50 km (30 mi) wide occurs. In the sparsely
populated west, a 160 km-wide (100 mi) region of hills descends from the
plateau to the Mozambique Channel. Madagascar's  major rivers, the
Betsiboka, Tsiribihina, and Mangoky, descend from the plateau to the west
coast, creating fertile and intensively cultivated valleys.
        The east and southeast experience the greatest rainfall, with
trade winds bringing about 3,710 mm (146 in) of precipitation annually.
The climate of the central plateau is modified by the elevation; it is the
coolest part of the country with an average annual temperature of 18oC
(65oF) at Antananarivo. The plateau receives about 1,360 mm (53 in) of
rain annually. The west and southwestern areas are the driest regions,
with only about 350 mm (14 in) of rain at Tul
ar. However, rainfall is irregular and unpredictable throughout the
country, and severe cyclones usually strike about twice a year.
Deforestation: Extent of the Phenomenon
        Madagascar is classified among the most deforested nations of the
globe and is reported for having lost 73% of its original forest; the
actual total forest extent of about 160,000 km2 covers only 28% of the
territory (WRD, 1996). However, the trees growing on a quarter of that
wooded area are so dispersed or so stunted that they can no longer be said
to represent genuine forests. The nickname, The Red Island, has been given
because the predominating lateritic soil is uncovered and revealed to the
sight in many regions of the country after a progressive deforestation.
        Figure1 indicates the distribution of forest extent as for the
year 1990, and Figure2 shows the rates of change varying from 0.6% to 1%
per year according to the type of forest.  
Figure 1. Distribution of Forest Extent (1990) 
Dry and moist forests represent a major proportion of the natural habitat,
to which we also add savannah and grass, and to a much lesser extent
wetlands and mangrove. Such diversified natural habitat is home for an
inimitable and worldwide recognized biological diversity. The tropical
forests of the coastal zone and the lowland valleys produce the most
valuable and useful trees, such as ebony, rosewood(palissandre), the
raffia palm, and mangroves, as well as wild rubber vines. The valuable
species become less fewer and less accessible on the mountainous regions
of the high plateau which today are almost bare of trees.
Figure 2. Annual Change of Forest Extent (%)
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The loss in forest extent, which is by itself an environmental threat, is
accompanied by an irremediable and tragic loss in biological diversity
that could cost Madagascar its fame for being a natural museum for the
entire planet. In fact, only 1 out of 20 species identified in the spiny
desert of the Malagasy south can be found anywhere else on earth. 80% of
the flora, more than half of the birds, and 95% of Madagascar's reptiles
survived only on this land. Many species had already expired - the
monster-bird aepyornis, pygmy hippos, giant lemurs, and others -, wiped
out by climatic change or by humankind (Mittermeier, 1988). Actually,
Madagascar is listed by the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature as one of the few areas for priority action in terms of genetic
resource preservation (WRM, 1990).
THROUGH  A  FAMILY  OF  TRANSITIONS
POLITICAL  TRANSITION
        Madagascar knew different forms of political regimes throughout
its history, which might have played a significant role in the local
population's worldview (among all, the relation with the "land" and its
uses). These different political regimes may as well have their own impact
on the deforestation process by introducing technological and/or policy
changes in the land exploitation. Distinct landmarks can be considered:
(I) the Pre-colonial period , until 1896; (ii) the Colonial period , from
1896 to 1960; (iii) the Io Republique, from 1960 to 1972; (iv) the IIo
Republique, from 1975 to 1992; (v) the IIIo Republique, since 1992.
        On an other hand, this section also aims to set the historical
background necessary to understand the actual socio-economic situation.
The Pre-Colonial Period:
        The different regions of Madagascar were previously covered by a
mosaic of small kingdoms. In addition to hunting and gathering, the
original population cleared land for cultivation of yam, taro, and
arrowroot, by practicing the slash-and-burn agriculture locally called
tavy. Inundated rice (paddy) and banana cultivation came later, brought by
other flows of immigrants from the far-eastern countries.
        By the 17th century, a monarch issued from the Afro-Indonesian
"Merina" of the central plateau started an unification of the country
under one central leadership. His conquests came along with a surge of
population and a corresponding expansion of rice fields. Increased
agricultural production was one of the King's major goals. Public labor
was used for the building of roads, bridges, and dikes (Thompson & Adloff,
1965). Tavy technology spread throughout Madagascar, aggravating the
deforestation that already at that time marked the central plateau, and
threatening the east and west regions. On areas that were burned over and
then abandoned after several years of producing crops, a secondary forest
called savoka had grown up. Since now, cattle are still pastured on the
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periodically burnt prairies of lean grass. For all practical purposes,
land was owned by those who cultivated it and forests were held to be
communal property.
        The 18th and the 19th centuries in Madagascar were characterized
by different attempts to build a state, by an ascent of different
political units in the island, and by growing contact with the European
dominated international system (Covell, 1987). The foreign parties, mostly
British and French, looked for influences over the country. New technology
was introduced with the ambitions of the settlers to launch various
industrial plantations, which would change further more the island's
natural profile. Madagascar was then playing a role in the international
slaves trade and also shipped beef, rice, corn, and even salt for the
survival of neighbor islands. 
        The latter half of the 19th century saw the development of more
intense interactions within the island, when the Merina Empire tried to
extend its boundaries and when the other groups either resisted or were
absorbed. Also, the first Franco-Malagasy war broke in 1883 principally
because of conflicts over lands property. It ended with important Malagasy
concessions in 1885. In 1896, after another war of conquest, the French
abolished the Merina monarchy and declared a protectorate. The reigning
Queen was exiled, and a formal law of annexation added Madagascar to
France's African colonies.
The Colonial Period:
        Soon after the conquest, effective protection of Madagascar's
forests was conducted by the French rulers by creating a Forestry Service
and by training local people to staff it. At the same time, however, they
indirectly promoted the devastation of wooded land by granting to French
settlers and to companies many concessions containing some of the most
valuable tree species for exploitation. Moreover, lands were appropriated
by settlers for the production of cash crops. Large, medium and
small-scale plantations were created but were mostly profitable for large
commercial companies and foreign settlers.
        The supposedly French's civilizing mission was not entirely
justified since the Malagasy monarchy had been, after all, recognized
internationally and had conducted its diplomatic concourse with dignity
(Allen, 1995). But, Madagascar was then removed from international
intercourse and could maintain only the connections established under
French authority.
        Internally, this period was punctuated by patriotic revolts and a
relative anarchy. The local population's mobilization under any strategy
for rural development set up by the colonial rulers was never entirely
gained. Peasant resistance to the colonial system took many forms, overt
or not. The role of inertia as passive resistance, the role of maintaining
newly illegal practices such as cattle-raiding and hills-slope culture,
and the retreat into indigenous cultural values all had an element of
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resistance to them (Feeley-Harnick, 1984). To involve an unwilling
population, forced labor was instituted in 1897 and retained until 1946.
The First Republic:
        After the previous period of unsuccessful revolts, Madagascar knew
a peaceful access to independence in June, 1960. However, the First
Republic is also a neo-colonial regime in which the power was just turned
to a selected elite prepared by the departing colonial power. Continued
dependence on France in economic affairs and external policy were traded
for the rewards of local political office (Covell, 1987).
        The agricultural policy was as well deficient. Production, both of
rice and of cash crops, stagnated. The same forms of coercion and
exhortation were employed to produce coffee, vanilla, cloves, or cotton
for the national economy, and taxes for the state. Nethertheless, an
attempt was made to contain the threatening natural erosion by
implementing a program of reforestation. A new Forestry Code was drafted,
which would penalize more severely than before those practicing tavy. But
once more, the expected success did not take place due to a missing
adhesion of the population to the established program.
The Second Republic:
        The events that led to the birth of the Second Republic were a
mixture of regime collapse, popular uprising involving different groups
and social classes, and military coup. Both foreign and domestic policy
options were established after the state structure and ideological
principles were synthesized. 
        Democratic Madagascar was to adopt central planning,
indoctrination of the institutions for the progressist movement, and
external alignment with anticapitalist countries. But this was without
considering two main obstacles: the need for external capital and the
profound Malagasy distrust of the central state authority. The real
economic battle is once more taken over by fruitless ideological slogans.
Precisely, the Department of Agriculture had been held responsible for
virtually systematic disincentives to rural production (Allen, 1995).
Rural aspirations beyond subsistence were not even considered by a
self-serving corps of untrained local administrators. Such situation
provoked an abandonment of the already overexploited  piece of land to
progressive degradation. 
        On the international level, Madagascar is showing a clear will to
remedy the tragedy. In early 1990, in developing countries, Madagascar was
among the first respondents to the World Bank's call for action to
preserve the environment (Ravel, 1989). A public association was created
to manage 50 protected areas. Besides, a tourist program implemented by
the UNESCO and incorporated into a five-year plan includes the selection
of 50 other "discovery" sites and 3 coastal resorts.
The Third Republic:
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        Under a new constitution adopted in August 1992, Madagascar is
converted from a socialist to a liberal democratic state with guarantees
for free enterprise and private property, as well as the security of
foreign investment and protection of the environment. The "decentralized
administrations" are allowed part of the power and have also to designate
the two-thirds of participants at the Senate. The constitution also gives
them participation in ensuring local security and administration,
environmental protection, social welfare, and the overall development of
their respective territories. They will have taxing powers (Allen, 1995).
SOCIAL TRANSITION
        Nationwide, each one of the different  "historical  eras" gives
birth to a typical form of  society, characterized by different value(s).
It seems to be possible to assess, for each period, a predominant culture
and form of education which affect somehow the social behavior. The
changes in the population settlements also affect the land uses, as well
as their management.
The Pre-Independence Period:
        The settlement of the primitive population in Madagascar still
remains enigmatic. Tribal distinctions are inevitable between peoples of
different origins and from multiple crossbreedings. Nowhere in Madagascar
does there exist a pure racial type, and even the broad  classification of
the coastal peoples as Negroid and of the inhabitants of the high plateau
as Asian is misleading.         This pre-independence period can be
characterized by a mobility of most of the tribes, which is responsible to
a large extent for their social and economical evolution. A theoretical
model is proposed, according to which the earliest migrants were first
wandering along the coastal  lands before reaching the central plateau,
where they soon started cutting down the existing forest to grow rice
(Thompson & Adloff, 1965). After subsequent wars, and by the 14th century,
the different groups crystallized into tribes and formed kingdoms. But the
population continued to be mobile, depending on the outcomes of internal
war. Later, with the expansion of the Merina (central plateau tribe)
kingdom, colonization of "empty" lands were encouraged. The wrong
agricultural practice of tavy was also spreading.
        During the middle of late 19th  century, a number of
French-speaking settlers came to Madagascar, where they installed
themselves as planters or traders. These settlers, mostly from the
Mascarene Islands, in turn cleared the wooded areas to develop export
crops (vanilla, cloves, coffee, pepper) and a money economy which further
stimulated Malagasy migrations. In fact, with the institution of forced
labor and the payment of taxes in money, the local population was
compelled either to grow cash crops or to earn wages as laborers out of
their regions in colonial concessions. But also, some other people
migrated in some remote places in order to escape from these institutional
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obligations.
        Such mobility as a way of living had induced both advantages and
disadvantages for the country. On the credit side, we can cite the
development of many previously neglected or uninhabited regions, the
lifestyle improvement of tribes previously isolated from outside world,
and the help for famine areas to solve an overpopulation. On the debit
side, the consequences are deeper. Internal migration had displaced the
traditional attachment to the land, which in turn had undermined
subsequent official programs for rural development because of lack of
involvement from the population. In fact, those who were staying to plant
their own lots earned obviously less than those who migrated. For the
local peasant, it seemed to be out of reach to experiment  bigger area
than that he was used to. The great majority of the local population still
practiced an agriculture of subsistence, without benefiting from any new
technology introduced by the settlers. In the worst case, there was an
abandonment of any agricultural activity in favor of non-lasting pecuniary
trades, leaving the land and exposing it to natural erosion.
The Post-Independence Period:
        The most significant changes result from the development of
education. The first educational system was installed by the British
missionaries during the pre-colonial period; they developed the written
form of the native language, using the Latin alphabet,  and introduced the
printing press. The linguistic unity was then reinforced. But, despite
many advantages, efforts were concentrated only on privileged classes -
royal Court and upper-class children -.  During the colonial period,
education was mostly used to train the assistants for the Administration
and to maintain a different status between rulers and population.
        Figure 3 shows the percentage in gross primary school enrolllment
between 1960 and 1993.
Figure 3.  Gross Primary School Enrollment
(%)
        As can be seen, although the access to education was promoted at
the independence, the difference between gender in 1960 was still
noticeable. This difference is essentially due to the inherited
conception. Males are more likely to occupy an administrative position to
replace the colonizer, while females are viewed to help in the agriculture
of subsistence or into domestic work. Education is associated to a source
of wealth and prestige, fitting more to a "head of the family", whereas
manual work is socially demeaning and financially unrewarding.  
        The educational policy during the 2nd Republic(after 1975) has
shifted to promote democratization. An appreciable increase of the primary
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school enrollment can be observed in both sexes. On an other hand, adult
literacy is promoted to vehicle easily ideological messages. Figure 4
shows the development of adult literacy  starting with an average of 50%
for both sexes in 1970 to 80% in 1990.
Figure 4.  Adult Literacy (%).
        Such relative improvement in education level has both advantages
and disadvantages. It has primarily facilitated the vulgarizing of public
health services, thus allowing a rise of the life standings.
Nethertheless, it has also induced for both parents and children an
attraction towards the urban areas, where most of the time they survive
hardly, rather swelling the proportion of urban proletariat. This results
into a decrease in available agricultural labor, and into a disinterest in
any farming-related activities.
ECONOMIC TRANSITION
         This section does not intend to present a detailed analysis of
the national economy for each considered period. Instead, only those facts
and situations relating to or influencing the deforestation will be
emphasized. 
The Pre-Independence Period:
        Madagascar's economy was damaged by the French impositions
requested after the conquest, and by the inability to pay for its imports
during the world depression of the 1870s. But it had structural weaknesses
as well. Roads construction were neglected for fear of facilitating
foreign invasion. Maritime industry, coast guard, or merchant marine never
developed. 
        During the Colonial Period, French economic policy was mostly
profitable for the two groups promoting the colonization of the island:
the large commercial companies and prospective creole settlers from
Mascarene Islands. This period was characterized by a shift to a money
economy. The profits then came mostly from trade rather than production.
The economic was all but monopolized by French wholesale traders and
navigation companies, whereas retail commerce was taken over by Asians
alien. 
The Post-Independence Period:
        Since 1960, the national leaders have then been trying to lay the
bases for a genuinely malagasy economy without destroying the existing
economic structure or abruptly ending Madagascar's financial and
commercial dependence on France. Following the examples of newly
independent countries throughout Africa, the Malagasy state initiated
infrastructure development, civic service to replace the forced labor
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system, rural animation, and limited import substitution. However,
Madagascar's economy has always been relying on agriculture but
opportunities for sustained economical growth still remain limited, since
the country is poorly linked by roads or other communications and poorly
served by its institutions of education, health, and law enforcement.
Agriculture itself is dominated by rice which is the main food crop and
which, with cattle, is the only agricultural product traded within the
island. The other important agricultural products are all export crops
(coffee, vanilla, sugar, cloves). Figure 5 indicates the distribution of
the Gross Domestic Product per sector for the period between 1970 and
1993: (Data source: WRD, 1996)
Figure 5.  Distribution of GDP per Sector (in
%).
        As shown by the figure, an increase in the allocation for
agriculture can be registered after the fall of the 1st Republic, in 1974.
Such governmental decision is reflected in the increase  of irrigated and
arable lands, as well as that of permanent cropland. However, the effects
of such changes do not reach the rural population composed mostly of small
farmers and a large gap can still be noticed between modern and
subsistence economics. About 1.5 million widely scattered farms occupy
some 80% of the active population but create only 43% of the country's
wealth. Most of these farms are smallholds, 2 ha in average size, with
limited adaptability. The following figure 6 shows the variation of GNP
per Capita for the period between 1970 and 1993: 
Figure 6.  GNP per Capita (current US$).
        The graph indicates that a peak was reached in 1980 before the GNP
per capita began to decrease until the early 1990s. An erroneous
economical strategy applied during the 2nd Republic could also have
contributed to this unexpected situation. In fact, considering direct
foreign investment as a threat to independence, the country started
borrowing to implement many "investments without constraint". This already
costly capital in turn allowed an expanding bureaucracy to launch and
manage large but ultimately failing parastatal projects. Agricultural
output was neglected in favor of capital-intensive agro-industrial
projects that did not produce and social programs that did not improve
life standing. By the early 1980s, an overvalued currency depressed
exports dramatically, and the external debt had soared to crisis level
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(Allen 1995).
        The 3rd Republic thus inherited a condition of political
uncertainty, administrative inefficiency, and export stagnation that
continue to hinder new investments and commercial transactions.
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
        Speculations are made to trace the original population of
Madagascar as early as AD 400 and no later than AD 900. Of course, the
most important changes can only be noticed for the recent history, due to
the lack of valuable data. However, the considerable change in population
density is one of the principal factor of deforestation as considered
later within this section. Figure 7 shows the trends in crude birth and
death rates for each period of five years starting from 1950 to 2050:
Figure 7.  Curde Birth and Death Rates.
A sudden increase of the population was registered from the late 1940s. As
revealed by this figure, such phenomenon can be ascribed more to a decline
in death rate rather than to a rise in birthrate. It was due to a relative
rise in local living standards but also, primarily, to the larger funds
allocated to the public health service. An epidemiological transition
occurred. Endemic diseases such as Malaria which had been devastating in
effect was then mitigated. Family planning, vulgarized during the 2nd
Republic, is probably the main cause of the drop in birth rate from the
year 1985.
        The steady increase of the population has indirectly imposed a
burden on the country's  natural environment. As cited by an analyst, "The
system of environmental exploitation typical of Malagasy societies...
engendered a vicious cycle of self-destruction of the ecosystem. In fact,
the poorer the soil, the rarer the vegetation will be; this entails weaker
protection against erosion from water run-off.... The peasants, choosing
to live on the productive surfaces which decrease permanently and fail to
insure the subsistence of a growing population, thus tend to leave the
rural area to join the urban proletariat." (Ramahatra, 1989).
The Pre-Independence Period:
        The possible origins of the Malagasy population are still greatly
debated among scholars, whether  Asian or African sources are the most
important. The answer seems to favor a synthesis of the two. For a
millennium, Madagascar has been a demographic melting pot in the Indian
Ocean, with the interpenetrating of migrant people from Southeast and
South Asia, East Africans, and subsequently Arabs and Europeans. Nowadays,
physical and linguistic evidence verify both the Indonesian and African
origins of the Malagasy population. 
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        Attempts were made to estimate Madagascar's population. In 1900,
the first census based on the number of taxpayers gave a figure of 2.5
million. During the last decade of the Colonial era, from 1950 to 1960,
the island's population increased at the rate of 2.3% per year and the
total attaining 5.3 million at the end of this period. Figure 8 shows the
trends of the total population, along with the distribution into rural vs
urban areas, for the period starting in 1950 to the year 2025.
Figure 8.  Total Population Distribution (x
1000).
        As shown by Figure 8, the great majority of the population has
always occupied the rural country where they lived as farmers and herders
in scattered villages situated mostly in the fertile, well-watered
lowlands and valleys. Towns were either administrative centers or markets.
The Post-Independence Period:
        We can notice an early stage of urban transition, starting from
the 1980s Not revealed by this graph however, the growth has not been
spread evenly throughout the country; some areas are still uninhabited,
whereas some regions are overpopulated to the extent that their
inhabitants are reduced to very low living standards. On the island as a
whole, 60% of the population are concentrated in 20% of the total area.
The existence of the uninhabited areas, along with the migratory habits of
the Malagasy tribes, has favored the practice of shifting agriculture.
Herders as well as farmers burn over vast areas of woodlands and
grasslands every year to fertilize the soil. After a few seasons, the soil
is exhausted and they move on to other regions, where the same process is
repeated. The resulting destruction of trees and vegetation cover has led
to widespread erosion.
CONCLUSION & PROPOSITIONS
        In the case of Madagascar, the phenomenon of deforestation does
not follow the classical process in which modernization is incriminated
with all its backslides. In fact, since the early times in the country's
history, the practice of tavy technology - the local form of
slash-and-burn agriculture - has always been worsening the plague. Fires
are set systematically to a million hectares of land each year in order to
provide pasture for cattle, ashen topsoil for rice, charcoal for urban
kitchens, wastelands for hunters and poachers, and scorched fields of
protest for angry peasants. Also, among the wrong practices are
sharecropping and the system of land tenure. Demographic density has
forced an extension of farming to marginally fertile land. On the other
hand, the less mobile groups prefer to grow rice perilously on familiar
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mountaintops rather than move to distant valleys. Thus, in addition to
risk of erosion, these pressures have reduced the time allotted to the
soil to naturally regenerate (Jolly, 1980).
        Different attempts were made to at least mitigate this real
tragedy. Recently, by the end of the 2nd Republic, environmental
protection started to be institutionalized. First, however, the permanent
problem inherited by the successive governments after the independence has
rather been deeply psychological. The Malagasy farmers have most of the
time been reticent to accept new technology or other innovative
techniques. Such attitude results from the passive resistance inherited
from the colonial period, and appears as an intuitive defense against any
regulation which is always felt as oppressive. Any directive emanating
from the government is viewed as a privation of freedom, or as a tool for
"minority rulers" to take advantage of the population. The officials are
always considered to disregard the real interests. How then to adopt a
policy which will gain the population's adhesion ? Second, a search for
identity can be noticed, which is expressed in the different forms of
resistance, overt or not. The national identity has for a long time been
blocked at a stage prior to its full expression, and the public opinion
was manipulated by the colonization towards a self-rejection. Third, any
social and individual initiative have been inhibited by a permanent
frustration.
        The remedy to this particular situation was not and will not be
found in the implementation of any kind of regulations. In fact, different
policies had been "tried" since the pre-colonial period until recently in
the agreement signed concurrently with the World Bank and The World Wild
Fund. But, the adopted solutions should imply the needed social
involvement through a complete adhesion, as well as a strong social
education and information of the local population. In this very
perspective, my proposition consists of involving the private sector into
a national program of "integrated patrimony management", run with foreign
investments and comprising the safeguard of  natural environment, local
arts and crafts, and cultural legacy. Foreign investments are fundamental,
due to the weakness of the national economy and its inability to sustain
any large and extended program. The private sector will bring the
necessary rigor and discipline. Practically, a private and apolitical
association will be legalized to conduct the project. Membership will be
accepted by paying an adequately small annual fee and a massive
participation will be encouraged by providing incentives such as the
following for instance: reduced entrance fees to the managed parks and
monuments, or to cultural festivities; reduced fees for organized trips;
returned funds to the involved local communities to finance local projects
of health and sanitation. Regulations reinforced within the freely
enrolled members of such private association are more easily accepted. The
government will only have the limited role of "ray aman-dreny"(local term
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for natural parents) perceived as advisers and providers rather than
directing body. Corruption will be more easily contained than through the
regular and heavy bureaucracy inherited from the colonial system.
Furthermore, to explore rationally the great diversity of natural and
human resources of the country, Madagascar will be divided into three
zones - North, Center, and South - about the same size and different from
any actual administrative boundaries. Each zone will develop three
departments respectively in charge of the natural environment, arts and
crafts, and culture. The regional department will in turn have to report
to a centralized organ responsible for any foreign relations and
coordinating the different activities at the national level.
        For more efficient management, the project will be installed
progressively according to the following steps: organization and staffing,
down to the regional level; assessment and inventory of each regional
"patrimony"; communication, sensitizing, and information of the
population; initiation and recruiting of membership; development of the
entire project. It is expected, through the management of cultural
patrimony, to reinforce the national unification under a linguistic unity,
to re-establish the lost identity resulting from the colonization, to
build the sense of unity which is needed to reach any subsequent common
goal formulated into a national program. Also, the promotion of the
artistic patrimony will help to rebuilt the self-esteem, or the
self-confidence of the population in its values and own efforts, and to
give the population the meaning of a rewarding work which will develop its
initiatives. Finally, these two other departments will support that in
charge of the natural environment in sensitizing the population about the
particularity of the country's natural diversity, in conserving the
remaining forest ecosystems, in promoting agroforestry and reforestation.
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ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSITION IN ECUADOR:
DEALING WITH THE GROWING PAINS
"It takes a special kind of arrogance for a citizen of as rich and
oil-greedy a country as the United States to decide that an impoverished
nation like Ecuador should not use its principal natural resource[--oil]."
Jan Reid, Texas Monthly, November 1995.
Introduction
        Ecuador, like many developing countries, faces the challenge of
providing for its people while preserving its precious natural resources
to the greatest extent possible.  At the same time, outsiders tug at the
tiny country from every direction-environmentalists, creditors,
multinational oil companies-everyone wants a piece.  For better or for
worse, development of Ecuador moves forward.  This paper analyzes the
environmental transitions that are occurring in the wake of Ecuador's
development.  The primary factors addressed are oil exploration,
agricultural development, and deforestation in the Ecuadorian Amazon.  
        Throughout this paper the reader will note some common themes seen
in other chapters of this monograph.   For example, many of the countries
discussed in these chapters are driven to provide for growing populations
under the strict constraints of limited resources such as water and arable
land.  Ecuador and other countries discussed in this monograph, such as
Vietnam and Thailand, struggle to alleviate the population pressure in
urban centers by redistributing the populations to less populated areas.
Several of the countries also redistribute their populations to assert
sovereignty or political control over a region; this can be seen in
Ecuador as well as in the Israel and Iraq.  (See, e.g., Lipchin Chapter).
Such redistribution efforts often foster more problems because the
transplantations lack adequate planning, investment in infrastructure,
investment in education, and protection for the environment.  Thus, a
broad view of the countries discussed in this monograph reveals some
common opportunities and challenges.  Ecuador illustrates many of 
these.   
Setting
        Although Ecuador is not a large country, roughly the size of
Colorado, it is more geographically and biologically rich than most
countries in the world, large or small.  Much of this richness is probably
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attributable to its location on the northwestern side of the South
American continent where it straddles the equator and borders the Pacific
Ocean.  (See Map 1).  This location produces a tropical climate along the
coast that becomes cooler as one moves inland.  Its biological richness
also reflects its diverse topography.  In the west, coastal plains shape
the horizon.  The Andes form a sharp boundary to this region, running
parallel north-south through the middle of the country.  Several active
volcanoes checker this region.  The east is dominated by the jewel of
South America, the Amazon rain forest, which is drained by the scenic Napo
River and other Amazon tributaries.  (Reid, 1995).  Ecuador's topography
divides the country into three distinct regions:  the Costa (coastal
plains), the Sierra (inter-Andean central highlands), and the Oriente
(flat to rolling eastern tropical rain forest).  (CIA, 1995).  (See Map
2).  
        Aside from the Amazon, Ecuador also claims another biological gem
-- the Galapagos Islands.  Off the north-eastern coast of South America,
these islands contain an oasis of biodiversity, including giant sea
turtles and blue-footed boobies.  Like the Amazon, the Galapagos are
threatened by human encroachment.  However, the primary threat to the
Galapagos is over-enthusiastic tourism.   This presents a serious problem
that could compose an entire paper on its own.  The challenges facing the
Galapagos are beyond the scope of this paper.
The Ecuadorians
        Composed of Indians (25%), Mestizo (mixed European and Indian
ancestry -- 55%), Spanish (10%) and African (10%), Ecuador has a rich
ethnic component as well.  (Lonely Planet, 1996).  Its population
currently lingers around 11.5 million with an estimated growth rate of
2.4%.  (Lonely Planet, 1996).  Ecuador's mean population growth has
continued to decrease in the last few decades, as have the mean growth
rates of neighboring Brazil, Colombia, and Peru.  (See Figure 2).
Reflecting this transition, Ecuador's population is relatively young with
36% of the population below the age of fifteen.  (See Figure 1).
Consequently, although fertility is moderate (currently between 2 and 3),
the population is still expected to double by the year 2030 (Pichon,
1992),  because of the demographic transition that is expected as the
population comes of age.  Thus, much needs to be done at these earlier
stages to provide for the expanding population of the future.  
Map of Ecuador showing rivers.
        Increasing exploitation of Ecuador's precious natural resources,
such as the Amazon Rain forest, is largely a result of rural transition
and urban population density rather than excessive overall population
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growth.  Ecuadorians are moving eastward to the Oriente region to settle.
(See Table 1).  The rural population in the Oriente increased 37% in less
than ten years.  The primary causes of this migration are increased access
due to road building for oil exploration and favorable land tenure
practices because of the government's inability and unwillingness to
police the forest area.  (See Land Clearing discussion below).  Thus,
three transitions in the Oriente region are closely intertwined:  the
energy transition, that is the move to oil development and use that began
in the 1970's; the forestry transition as forests were cleared for the oil
development and rural farming; and the ultimate agricultural transition.  
Map of South America.
Figure 1.  Age Structure of Population.  Pie
chart.
Figure 2.  Mean Population Growth Rate.
TABLE 1
Trends in Ecuador's Rural Population, By Region
Province        1974            1982            Relative Change (%)
Sierra          1,943,769       2,078,767       6.9
Costa           1,708,855       1,719,671       0.6
Oriente         150,492         206,246         37.0
Source:  Instituto Nacional de Estadistica y Censos (INEC), Encuesta
Nacional de Fecundiad (Quidto:  INEC, 1982) cited in Douglas Southgate and
Morris Whitaker.  "Promoting Resource Degradation in Latin America:
Tropical Deforestation, Soil Erosion, and Coastal Ecosystem Disturbance in
Ecuador", Economic Development and Cultural Change, July 1992, p.796. 
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Economy
        Ecuador enjoys one of the most stable republics in Latin America.
(Reid, 1995).  However, this free government is held captive by an economy
saddled with high levels of foreign debt and very low national income
levels.  Ecuador is a relatively poor country.  GDP per capita income
hovers around $1,000, ranking it 71st in the world for per capita GNP.
(Lonely Planet, 1996).  (See Map 3).  The bulk of its GNP is derived from
oil production and banana exports.  (See Figure 3).  The discovery of oil
reserves in the eastern portion of Ecuador has resulted in a steady and
steep increase in GNP.  (See Figure 4).  Growth rates in the Ecuadorian
economy are largely a function of the prices of its primary exports, oil
and bananas.  (CIA, 1995).  When these products are doing well, Ecuador's
economy follows.   Consequently, its heavy reliance on a limited number of
products has made it vulnerable to international shocks and economic slow
downs in other countries.  (MIEB, 1994).  
Foreign Debt/Debt Service
        Ecuador's foreign debt has steadily increased over the last two
decades, brimming at over $14 billion in 1995.  (See Figure 5 and Table
2).  A large portion of this was a result of overly optimistic
expectations of oil revenues.  The government borrowed from other
countries to fund Ecuador's oil development activities and social programs
but was unable to repay the debts when oil prices dropped substantially.
(MIEB, 1994).  "Under newly renegotiated international debt agreements,
the country must achieve 5 percent-a-year growth over the next 20 years or
face default."  (Goering, 1996).  Without oil development, Ecuador has no
chance of meeting the demands of its foreign creditors.  
Map.  GNP per Capita by Country.
Figure 3.  Estimated Exports, 1994.
Figure 4.  GNP per Capita.
Figure 5.  Ecuador's Total External Debt
(Stocks).
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html (4 of 21) [6/18/2008 10:52:40 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html
Figure 6.  Rainforest Distribution in South
America.
TABLE 2
Ecuador's External Debt in 1995
Type of Debt                    Millions of U.S. Dollars
Total External Debt             14,366
Long-Term Debt                  12,172
Short-Term Debt                 2,015
Total Debt Service              1,234
Interest Payments               750
Source:  "Executive Summary", Statistics and Quantitative Analysis,
Ecuador:  Basic Socio-Economic Data,
http://iadb6000.iadb.org/~http/ecuador/ecbsed.html, 1996.  
Inflation
        Compounding its financial troubles further, Ecuador historically
experienced high rates of inflation, at times reaching as high as 55%.
However, a series of economic reforms helped decrease this considerably in
1994 to 25%.  (CIA, 1995).  This was primarily due to former President
Sixto Duran-Ballen's policies that, inter alia, cut subsidies, balanced
the budget, and raised fuel prices and utility rates.  (CIA, 1995).  These
reforms helped stabilize Ecuador's shaky economy.  
II.  The Ecuadorian Amazon
Ecological characteristics, biodiversity
        While merely the size of Colorado, Ecuador packs a powerful punch
of biodiversity.  It houses more plant and bird species than all of North
America.  (Conniff, 1991; 39-40).  Ecuador is one of the richest in South
America in terms of flora species (including a large number of endemic
species).  "The country perhaps features as many as 20,000 plant species,
compared with an estimated 20,000 for all of Central America including
southern Mexico, and 25,000-30,000 for all of Brazilian Amazonia."
(Myers, 1980; 141).  The region remains largely unstudied so biologists
can only guess what lurks in Ecuador's misty forests.  Unfortunately, huge
amounts of forest have already been lost.  The western half of the
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country, where the bulk of the human population resides, has lost 95% of
its forests in the last two decades.  (Conniff, 1991; 40).  The bulk of
the islands of forest that remain are perched atop coastal ridgelines that
are more difficult to access.  (Conniff, 1991).
        In the eastern third of the country Ecuador's Amazonian rainforest
is a hotspot for biodiversity.  It contains only about two percent of
South America's rain forest, (See Figure 6), but contains a
disproportionate amount of the region's biological diversity.  The region
is very wet with little variation in rainfall as a result it is composed
of predominantly upland moist forest (mostly evergreen rain forest from
tree-like on the eastern side of the Andes to the lowland plains).
(Myers, 1980; 141).  The lush region is threatened with destruction.
Estimates of deforestation in Ecuador vary.  An estimated two percent of
Ecuador's existing rain forest is lost annually.  (Pichon, 1992; 664).
Consequently, Ecuador has experienced the highest rate of deforestation of
all the Amazon countries.  (Pichon, 1992).  "All estimates indicate a
significant deforestation that could lead to a total depletion of closed
forests by the year 2030."  (Pichon, 1992; 667 citing Hicks, Daly, Davis,
& Lourdes, 1990).
Land Clearing and the Link to Oil Exploration and Land Tenure Laws 
        Historically the rain forest and its indigenous people were
protected from disturbance by a lack of access.  The bulk of forest land
is owned by the state as forest patrimony or as part of a public park or
reserve.  However, the government failed to take control of these lands
because the government lacked the resources to police the area and the
forest resources were not seen as valuable enough to warrant development.
(Southgate and Whitaker, 1992; 790).  Instead, the undisturbed land was
classified as "unproductive" under the Land Colonization Laws passed in
the 1960's and, therefore, up for grabs by new settlers.  (Myers, 1980;
142).  The purpose of these laws was threefold.  First, the Amazon was
perceived as an "area with almost infinite space and resources, mak[ing]
it an excellent 'escape valve' for socioeconomic imbalances and population
pressures in other regions, offering a 'land without people' to 'people
without land' . . . ."  (Pichon, 1992; 666).  Ecuador's growing population
was applying increasing pressure to Ecuador's urban centers (See Map 5;
Figure 7); and, as urban populations became more dense, the numbers of
urban poor continued to increase as well.  The government could solve the
problem of urban population pressure and the poor at the same time by
sending them east.  One caveat, however, was that there were no efforts to
help establish the colonists in the east.  Although the policies stated
that settlement would only occur if adequate infrastructure was created,
in most cases this did not occur, and any infrastructure that was created
was to support multinationals working in the area.  (Pichon, 1992).
Second, the agricultural production that would result from this new
settlement would, hopefully, create a surplus that could help support the
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growing population.  Third, the new settlers would help create a "live
border".  For many years Ecuador and Peru have been in conflict over the
border.  Ecuador is particularly sensitive to further encroachments on its
territory because it has lost "more than 70% of its original territory to
Colombia, Brazil, and Peru" since 1830.  (Pichon, 1992; 666).  Populating
the unoccupied land with Ecuadorians was viewed as a prime national
security move to keep out Peruvians.  Thus, under the land tenure laws a
commons was created, but for several years no one took advantage of it
because gaining access was so difficult.  
        The discovery of oil in the Oriente region, which encompasses the
Ecuadorian Amazon, stole the forest's protection.  Oil companies had the
capital to build the extensive road systems necessary to exploit the
forest.  This also allowed outsiders to free-ride on the new road system
and penetrate the rain forest borders.  Settlement ballooned thereafter,
particularly near petroleum zones which grew at a rate of 8% annually
between 1974-82 compared to the national average of 2.5%.  The entire
Amazon region is estimated to have a growth rate of 5% annually;
naturally, the bulk of this growth is derived from immigration.  (Pichon,
1992; 667).  (See Table 1).
Map.  Percent of Population Living in Urban Areas,
by Country.
        Settlement occurred spontaneously as individuals and groups
migrated east from the densely populated west in search of a better life.
Settlers were primarily subsistence peasants looking to make a living on
the pristine lands; under the land colonization laws, settlers could
eventually gain title to land that they cleared and maintained.  (Myers,
1980; 142).  A large number of these settlers engaged in agriculture such
as cattle ranching and farming.  
Figure 7.  Ecuadorian Population Living in Urban
Areas.
        Ecuadorian land tenure laws further contribute to deforestation
because land claims remain insecure until the complex requirements to
create title are fulfilled.  (Southgate & Whitaker, 1992).  Adjudication
of claims takes years because of the country's antiquated record-keeping
system.   Until title is established, claimants are vulnerable to other
settlers establishing conflicting claims.  As long as title is insecure,
settlers do not bother to invest in soil conservation measures or other
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land improvements; indeed some measures such as land fallowing put the
farmer at risk of having another come along and claim the idle land.
Additionally, they clear more land around the perimeter of their farmed
areas to discourage other settlers from laying conflicting claims.  Both
of these factors do not bode well for Ecuador's forests.   Thus, land
clearing under this regime occurs for two reasons:  first, it establishes
ownership; and, second, land must be cleared to make up for loss of
productivity -- rain forest soils are frequently exploited without care so
their productivity decreases rapidly.  (Rudel, 1995; 187).
Logging
        Logging the tropical forests is uneconomic.  Profits from non-wood
forest products exceed those from timber extraction.  (Southgate &
Whitaker, 1992).  For example, rare mahogany trees are harvested and sold
for a mere $3 a tree for plywood.  (Conniff, 1991; 44).  Logging prices
are depressed primarily because of governmental regulations.  In 1982 a
ban was imposed on logging concessions.  Consequently, timber may only be
obtained through agricultural settlers that are far less efficient
loggers.  Settlers agree to sell their trees to lumber companies in
exchange for a price and infrastructure support, such as construction of
roads and schools.  (Gonzalez, M., 1995a).  When the lumber companies
contract to cut down the settlers' trees they will destroy large amounts
of trees in pursuit of the "three or four commercially-viable trees" on
each hectare.  (Gonzalez, M., 1995a).  The heavy machinery used to extract
the trees is the main culprit of forest destruction.  It destroys the many
trees that just happened to be in the path of the commercially viable
trees and crushes the fragile soil below.  The settlers' logging is also
subsidized by low gasoline (subsidized) prices because the gas is needed
to power their chain saws.  But, the biggest reason for low timber prices
is the prohibition on log exports.  From an environmentalist perspective,
such a ban sounds like a good idea; no chopping down of the forest to ship
it off to the developed countries to make paper plates.  However, the
result is essentially the same with a lot less profit.  The trees have
such a low cash value that they are not preserved at all and no
reforestation occurs.  A tree in Ecuador valued at $2-$4 each would be
valued in markets such as Italy at $15 each.  (Southgate & Whitaker, 1992;
797).  There is not much of an incentive to grow trees at the Ecuadorian
rate.  Additionally, forestry research is weak so production returns are
low, (Southgate & Whitaker, 1992), and the government subsidizes
conversion of forests to pasture.  (Pichon, 1992). 
 
III.  Oil Production
        The discovery of oil in Ecuador in the late 1960's/early 1970's
transformed the country.  (See Figures 4 and 8).  Almost instantly,
petroleum became the predominant source of energy, and the country
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experienced explosive economic growth.  (Pichon, 1992).  Although the
amount of oil reserves in Ecuador, 2 billion barrels, is small in
comparison to others (e.g., Venezuela has 63 billion and Mexico has 50
billion), the country was so poor that such an influx of revenue from oil
sales had the potential to overhaul the Ecuadorian economy.  (Reid, 1995).
As a result, the Ecuadorian government became captured by petroleum
interests.  Oil was seen as a quick fix to the problems that had been
plaguing the country for decades.  "Petroleum development offers
immediate, predictable benefits for which the most influential social
groups are clamoring."  (Pichon, 1992; 672).  Thus, many other interests,
such as the protection of natural areas (including those that were
officially protected), were rolled over in favor of oil development.
Indeed, under the Law of Mineral Resources and Hydrocarbons, prospecting
regions in protected areas and other government land are ceded to oil
companies.  (Pichon, 1992).  No amelioration of environmental damage is
required, and even if it was, there is no enforcement of such
environmental measures.  
        Oil development does seem to have had substantial positive effects
on the economy.  For example, after the oil boom began, average incomes
increased 500% since the 1960's.   (MIEB, 1994).  In addition, oil now
makes up 60% of the government's budget, which does not make the
government too keen on reducing oil development.  The government sees oil
development as necessary in light of the need to support its economy and
pay off external debt.  But, others are pressuring it to preserve the
forests first.  The Environment Unit Chief of Ecuador's oil branch of the
government (Petroecuador), Manuel Navarro, stated it plainly:  "All of a
sudden we have pressures from organizations from Europe, from the States,
claiming the Amazonian jungle has to be untouched, the same way they're
demanding we pay off the debt; they're still getting cheap export goods.
I think it's a little unfair the pressure we have from different sides.
They say, 'Don't use this, don't touch this,' but do we have an
alternative?"  (MIEB, 1994 (citing National Public Radio, "Vanishing
Homeland:  Ecuador, Amazon and Oil," Morning Edition, January 13, 1992)).
Hence, the conflict pervades national policy.  
Figure 8.  Total Commercial Fuel Production.
Enter U.S. Multinational Oil Companies
        Multinational oil corporations immediately took notice and began
infiltrating Ecuador's natural areas in search of more oil.  The
Ecuadorian government receives hefty benefits from the presence of the
multinationals through royalties based on production levels and taxes.
(MIEB, 1994).  In addition, after the multinationals' contracts are up the
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html (9 of 21) [6/18/2008 10:52:41 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html
operations are taken over by Petroecuador.  Low and behold, a mutually
symbiotic relationship was formed between the U.S. multinationals and the
Ecuadorian government.  
        Multinational and Petroecuador oil production activities have
resulted in extensive pollution as a result of dumping untreated toxic
wastes into unlined waste pits and water sources.  For example, the waters
that are brought up from the oil wells that have naturally high chemical
content are typically re-injected into the wells in the United States to
prevent contamination of the water supply and other ill effects.  However,
in Ecuador oil companies frequently pump the contaminated water directly
into nearby rivers and streams.  Thus, local people are poisoned by water
pollution and wildlife and plant life are also put at risk.  A 498 km
pipeline was built by Texaco in the early 1970's that connected the
Oriente to the refining and processing stations in the capitol, Quito, and
then on to the port city of Esmeraldas.  (MIEB, 1994).   (See Map 2).  The
pipeline is the main source of oil transport and a major source of
environmental damage.  Leaks from the pipeline have resulted in a larger
quantity of spilled oil (10 million gallons) than was spilled from the
Exxon Valdez.  (MIEB, 1994).
        While multinational oil companies have taken much away from the
Amazonian region, little has been invested in the region itself.  The bulk
of revenues generated are "capitalized outside the Amazon region."
(Pichon, 1992; 668).  Thus, oil production does little for the livelihood
of most Ecuadorians in the region who rely primarily on the agricultural
sector.  
Current Situation 
        Since the oil boom, Ecuadorians have become increasingly reliant
on petroleum domestically.  Government subsidization of oil prices
contributed to this greatly.  As a result, "[e]xperts predict, that, if
new fields are not developed, Ecuador will have no oil exports by the end
of the century."  (MIEB, 1994).  Nonetheless, established oil reserves and
oil exports are increasing.  (See Figure 9).  Ecuador's oil exports for
September 1996 were at 7.21 million barrels of crude oil, up from 6.27
million at the same time last year.  (Reuters, 1996b).  To facilitate this
increase, Ecuador has sold oil concessions for an additional 1.6 million
hectares.  (Ward, 1994).  The primary motivator for this sale was the push
to reduce the ballooning foreign debt.  
     Recently, Indigenous groups and environmentalists from Ecuador and
abroad have been successful in pushing those developing oil in sensitive
areas such as the Amazon to implement sound environmental practices.  For
example, Occidental, a multinational oil company that is preparing to
drill in Ecuador has planned several environmental steps including
"cutting seismic trails by hand for the smallest disturbance to 'surface
vegetation' and having a width no greater than 1.5 meters; keeping road
construction to a minimum by supporting seismic shooting by helicopter;
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html (10 of 21) [6/18/2008 10:52:41 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/rodriguez.html
clustering drilling of production wells, should development go that far;
re-injecting all effluents; having central facilities for separating and
pumping crude at new fields, rather than having each field with an
individual unit; and planting new trees to replace those cut in all
operations."  (Schneider, 1996).  In addition, oil companies such as
Maxus, are establishing security measures to keep out colonizing settlers
to maintain the integrity of the indigenous populations in the regions.
(Reid, 1995).  It is unclear whether the government will continue these
measures when the companies leave the region when their contracts are up
and Petroecuador takes over.  
Figure 9.  Crude Oil Reserves in Ecuador.
Figure 10.  Arable and Permanent Cropland.
        In addition, the government has made some efforts to ameliorate
environmental damage caused by oil production.  For example, companies
exploring for oil must now pay a $100,000 tax to cover environmental clean
ups, (MIEB, 1994), in addition to conducting environmental impact studies
prior to drilling and seismic tests.  (Goering, 1996).  The government has
also developed environmental operating guidelines for these companies.
For example, recently the government announced that a new oil field
franchise in the Amazon would be required to build facilities to safely
process contaminated water and to bury the 165 kilometer pipeline that
would be required to transport the oil out of the pristine region.
(American Political Network, 1996).  The regulations increase operating
costs substantially, discouraging some companies from becoming involved.
It remains to be seen whether the government will vigorously enforce
environmental regulations, but its past record makes it seem doubtful.  If
enforcement does occur, it is likely to be linked to a company's failure
to share its proceeds with the Ecuadorian government, i.e., Petroecuador;
Ecuador has banned Maxus from operating in one area of the Amazon because
it failed to share its revenues with Petroecuador.  (Reuters, 1996a).  
        One of the risks that Ecuador faces when it demands a high level
of environmental protection from multinationals is that of driving away
potentially good companies because of the high costs and political
pressures (externally and internally applied).  For example, Conoco, a
multinational oil company with an excellent environmental record relative
to others in the industry, withdrew its plans to develop oil in Ecuador's
Amazon because of strong environmentalist opposition, potentially low
economic returns, and high environmental protection costs.  (Haines,
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1996).  Shortly after the contract was awarded to a multinational with a
spottier environmental record -- Maxus.  Maxus has promised to enact
environmental protection measures.  Time will reveal the extent of their
commitment.  
IV.  Agriculture
        Although more land has continued to be cleared for agriculture in
Ecuador, productivity has not significantly increased because of the
inefficiency of current farming methods.  As a result, the agricultural
transition has stalled.  Net gains from land clearing seem to be slim.
The causes for this stagnation are discussed below.  
        Agriculture has declined in importance as an export commodity
because it has been replaced largely by oil exports that are far more
profitable.  In 1970 food exports comprised 94% of exports.  By 1985 food
exports plummeted to only 28%.  Nonetheless, in the 1990's food exports
are rebounding and have reached 50%.  (Gonzalez, G., 1996).  Agriculture
makes up a substantial portion of Ecuador's land uses and it has increased
substantially in the last few decades.  (See Figure 11 and Table 3).
Deforestation is the main cause of this increase in agricultural land.
However, arable cropland and permanent cropland have been increasing at a
more moderate pace recently.  (See Figure 10).  
TABLE 3
Agricultural Land Use Trends in Ecuador (Hectares)
                        1965-67         1984-85         Change
Tropical crop land*     1,205,000       1,360,000       +155,000
Pasture:                        
     Sierra             899,000         1,917,000       +1,018,000
     Costa              516,000         2,005,000       +1,489,000
     Oriente            226,000         484,000         +259,000
Source:  M. Whitaker and J. Alzamora, "Production Agriculture:  Nature and
Characteristics," in Agriculture and Economic Survival:  The Role of
Agriculture in Ecuador's Economic Development, ed. M. Whitaker and D.
Colyer (Boulder, Colo. Westview, 1990).  
* Defined as the area planted to bananas, cacao, cassava, castor oil,
coffee, cotton, fruits, hard corn, manila hemp, oil palm, plantains, rice,
soybeans, and sugar cane.  
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        Undervaluation of agricultural inputs causes further damage to the
environment because farmers have no incentives to conserve land, water,
forests, and wildlife.  (Southgate & Whitaker, 1992).  Under pricing
inputs such as pesticide can lead to excess application and pollution of
the environment as the chemicals run off.  Former President Duran-Ballen's
economic reforms may reduce this waste because the reforms ended a large
number of subsidies.  Land will continue to be undervalued as long as the
free access and title-for-clearing policies continue.  With cheap land,
there is no incentive to invest in agricultural research to improve
farming productivity on the fragile lands; thus, more land is deforested
as the cleared land becomes less productive.  (Southgate & Whitaker,
1992).  
        Agricultural development in the Oriente is unlikely to raise the
status of most poor settlers because of the way that the land tenure laws
are designed.  Even if a peasant is able to clear an area of forest and
begin farming or ranching, obtaining title to the land is difficult.  To
obtain permanent title the peasant must pay for the land based on a price
scale established by the government that is based on the land's location
and characteristics.  (Pichon, 1992; 670).  The price is amortized over a
25 year period but this is of little help since most settlers barely break
even in their agricultural production.  (Pichon, 1992).  Little is left
over to pay on the amortized amount.  In addition, the settlers cannot
obtain their title until the amount is paid in full; so they cannot even
sell the property and retain the value of their investment.  All is lost
if they fail to complete the payments.  Without proper title, the settlers
cannot obtain credit either.  Thus, the system is not favorable to poor
settlers and may even widen the gap in wealth distribution between the
rich and poor.  (Pichon, 1992). 
Figure 11.  Land Use; pie chart in landscape
orientation.
        Ecuador's current approach to agriculture, land tenure and oil
exploration spells trouble for a growing population.  Ecuador's population
is expected to double by 2020-30, reaching approximately 20 million
people.  (Pichon, 1992).  Without sustainable development and a reduction
of the current deforestation rates, Ecuador will not be able to provide
for such a large population.  Agricultural production cannot expand to
support this demand unless more research is done to develop more efficient
practices.  In addition, deforestation must slow because the forest soil
is being destroyed.  Farming without fallowing the land leads to eventual
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infertility.  Deforestation in unsuitable areas, i.e., those with unstable
soils and steep slopes, causes heavy erosion that further undermines
agricultural production.  (Pichon, 1992).  
        Much of the land that is being cleared has limited fertility, high
erodibility, and/or poor drainage making it unsuitable for agricultural
production.  Chopping down the rain forest to convert it to agricultural
land has further ramifications than loss of wildlife.  It also results in
increasing carbon-dioxide and other greenhouse gases.  Cattle production
exacerbates the problem by contributing to increased methane levels.
(Southgate & Whitaker, 1992).  Forest clearing also leads to erosion and
pollution of the water supply because of sedimentation and runoff.  This
is an inefficient result.  Clearly, Ecuador has a need for productive
agricultural land.  The best result would require limited land clearing in
the areas most suitable for agriculture combined with proper soil
conservation measures.  Then productivity would remain high and more of
the country's natural resources would be preserved.  
V.  The Indigenous People of the Ecuadorian Amazon
        As with the Homesteading laws in the United States, the Ecuadorian
land tenure and colonization laws paid little attention to the notion that
there were already indigenous people living in the region that should have
a claim to the land themselves.  The "unoccupied" lands were considered
property of the state.  "According to the terms of [the land tenure laws],
'unoccupied' lands are those that (a) as part of the nation's territory
have no other owner; (b) have been returned to the State due to any legal
cause; or (c) have been uncultivated for more than 10 years."  (Pichon,
1992; 669 (citing Hicks et al, 1990)).  This last element strongly
encouraged intense land clearing and discouraged fallowing of land to
preserve the soil.  Consequently, when settlers arrived and land tenure
was based on land clearing, many indigenous people began to clear as well
in an effort to protect their rights to the land.  In addition, like the
reservations established in the United States for Native Americans, the
Ecuadorian government threw the indigenous people a few crumbs under the
Law of Amazon Colonization, providing for the selection of certain areas
to be set aside for the use of indigenous people.  (Pichon, 1992).  It is
doubtful that the government enforced the boundaries of such reserves.  
        Fortunately, Ecuador's native people have become a strong force in
Ecuador.  Although they come from a variety of cultures, the indigenous
groups have organized into a powerful coalition, known as the CONFENIAE,
that has become a force to be reckoned with.  The coalition is aided by
the support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from the community
development and environmental conservation arenas.  In 1992, the coalition
succeeded in obtaining land rights to more than three million acres.  The
Indians were able to accomplish this through a variety of measures.  First
they threatened to boycott the presidential elections if their demands
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were not met.  Also, they staged an "uprising" in which "[t]hey paralyzed
the country by blocking the main highways, cut[]off food supplies to the
capital, and [took] over private land."  (Farah, 1992).  This evoked fear
in non-Indians living in the region that the Indians were demanding title
to and aroused dismay in the military who feared that felt it would
endanger national security to leave such a large block of land near the
Peru-Ecuador border unsettled.  The government soothed these fears by
requiring that current non-Indian settlers in the area be allowed to stay
and by requiring that the military continue to have unrestricted access.
(Farah, 1992).  In the land grant, the government stipulated that title
was granted to the groups and not individuals and that the land could not
be sold.  (Farah, 1992).  Another important caveat:  the government
retains title to subterranean products, i.e., oil and has access to
explore for oil on the land ceded to the Indians in consultation with the
affected communities to minimize environmental damage.  (Farah, 1992).  
        The Quicha and the Shuar were the main indigenous groups
responsible for the land rights reform.  (MIEB, 1994).  The smaller groups
in the northern Amazon have lost a very large percentage of their
populations since the introduction of westerners and oil companies to the
region.  (See Table 4).  Pollution and introduced disease has lead to the
death of many Indians.  (MIEB, 1994).  The most vulnerable groups are
those that rely extensively on forest resources.  Logging and oil spills
have drastically reduced such resources.  
        Indigenous groups have also been successful in bargaining with oil
companies planning to operate in their territories.  For example, Arco
negotiated with the Indians to build a pipeline through their communities
in exchange for payment for socio-environmental damage, development of job
training programs, and creation of a fund for environmental and cultural
restoration.  (Gonzalez, M., 1996b.).  Essentially, Ecuador's indigenous
people are some of the best organized and politically powerful in the
world.  They have representation in government and real clout.  Currently,
the indigenous groups hold eight seats out of eighty-two seats in
Parliament.  (Gonzalez, M., 1996b.).  Partly as a result of support from
this contingent a law was passed recently that would increase protection
of biodiversity.   (Gonzalez, M., 1996b.).  Thus, their political force
promises to make a real difference in the protection of Ecuador's natural
resources.  
TABLE 4
Indigenous People of the Oriente
Native Group            Population
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Oriente Region  
        Quicha          40,000
        Shuar           35,000
        Achuar          2,000
The northern Amazon     
        Cofan           350-400
        Siona-Secoya    400-500
        Huaoroni        850-900
Source:  Management Institute for Environment and Business (MIEB),
Beckenstein, Alan R., Frederick J. Long, Matthew B. Arnold and Thomas N.
Gladwin (eds.).  "Rain forest Negotiation Exercise", Stakeholder
Negotiations:  Exercises in Sustainable Development, 1995.  
        The Indians have also successfully flexed their muscles in the
United States oil and legal communities.  In Maria Aguinda v. Texaco, poor
Ecuadorian indigenous groups filed suit against Texaco in U.S. District
Court to seek civil damages for Texaco's alleged pollution of the rain
forest and subsequent poisoning of the local indigenous population.
Unlike many similar cases against multinationals, the Aguinda case
survived the initial stages of litigation.  Usually, these cases are
thrown out for improper forum.  Texaco sought dismissal not on the grounds
that it did not do what was alleged, but on the grounds that it obeyed the
laws of the country during its operations.  (Millman, 1996).  Of course
these laws resulted in operations that were far less environmentally
friendly than its U.S. operating practices.  Texaco also argued that its
foreign subsidiary created the mess (in compliance with Ecuadorian
operating standards), not the parent, so the case should continue in
Ecuador not the U.S.  The foreign subsidiary is far less solvent than its
U.S. parent.  Texaco also argues that Ecuador's national oil firm,
Petroecuador,  owned 60% of the project while Texaco was involved and has
been operating since.  (Millman, 1996).  Texaco asserts that the
government monitored all of its operations and decisions, and it asserts
that it cannot be shown that the pollution existing now was caused by
Texaco's presence 10 years ago and not Petroecuador's operations there in
the meantime.  Thus far, it appears that Ecuador is supporting Texaco's
position.  If Texaco should lose, Ecuadorian officials fear that other
multinational oil companies developing oil in the region will pull out.
(Goering, 1996).  Most in the government find this to be more frightening
than cleaning up Texaco's mess.  It is unlikely that the Aguinda case will
actually go to trial.  The legal hurdles are considerable.  Nonetheless,
the case may force multinational oil companies to raise their
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environmental standards for operation in Ecuador even when local
enforcement is weak.  
VI.  Management and Protection
        Reforms in Ecuador must be carried out carefully.  Too often,
well-meaning policy makers and NGO's push for broad sweeping changes that
wind up having a severe impact on the most vulnerable members of society,
those without a safety net, the rural and urban poor.   The poor should
not be an afterthought.  Reforms should focus on reducing the need for the
poor to clear land.    
        The first step is land tenure policy reform.  The current system
discourages improvement of cleared land and encourages excessive clearing.
Reform would make titles secure faster to encourage investment in the
land; clearing of land should not be required to obtain title.  However,
such title-granting must be limited to a certain extent to retain much of
the forest in its pristine state.  The trick will be finding the proper
balance where citizens can make a living and where the forests are
protected to the maximum extent.  
        The second step is investment in agricultural research and
informing poor settlers of effective land management techniques.  Greater
efficiency will reduce the need to clear more land while also increasing
productivity levels to provide for a growing population.  (Southgate &
Whitaker, 1992; Pichon, 1992).   NGO's can assist in this effort by
bringing in techniques developed in other rain forest countries and
teaching the techniques to local farmers.  Research should also focus on
identifying crops appropriate for Ecuador's soil, climate, topography and
population.  NGO's, such as the United Nations, can assist in this
endeavor as well.  
        The third step in striking a balance between environmental
protection and providing for the people of Ecuador should be greater
reliance on market forces, i.e., no more subsidies and price controls.
(Southgate & Whitaker, 1992).  These undermine resource conservation
because people have no incentive to produce efficiently or conserve
resources.  For example, elimination of agricultural product subsidies
would reduce waste of items such as pesticides and fertilizer.  However,
these reforms must be combined with educational programs to teach farmers
how to use the products more efficiently.  Otherwise, removal of the
agricultural subsidies could have a terrible impact on subsistence
farmers.  Petroleum subsidies should be the primary target for
elimination.  The subsidies should be phased out slowly to reduce the
impact on the poor and to allow technological adjustments.  Reducing
domestic reliance on petroleum will prolong the economic benefit of oil
exports, where profits tend to be higher.  Former President Duran-Ballen
moved Ecuador in the direction of the market.  This trend should continue
provided there are adequate efforts to preserve resources. 
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        The focus for forest policy reforms should be identification of
high priority regions, i.e., areas with especially high levels of
biodiversity and indigenous populations that rely on their natural
resources.  No doubt all of the Amazon should be protected, but at this
stage that does not seem feasible because of economic pressures and the
demands of a growing population.  Thus, careful planning can allow for
more efficient land uses that maximize the number of areas that are
protected by increasing the productivity of those that are not.  For
example, if agricultural techniques improve such that land cultivation is
sustainable, the need to clear more land will subside.  NGO's can play a
key role in this planning process, but they must act quickly.  NGO's can
help develop the priority list that incorporates several key factors:
biodiversity levels, indigenous populations, soil stability,
accessibility, and oil development potential.  
        The next step is greater investment in forest research and
management.   Better silvicultural methods could lead to increased
reforestation and less damaging tree-removal methods.  If settlers learn
to manage their forests for selected logging and long term sustainability
of its biodiversity, the need to clear indiscriminately will decrease.
This research should be combined with careful forest planning so that the
areas that are of lower priority for preservation purposes and that have a
higher value for agricultural purposes become the focus of forestry
efforts, leaving the remainder in tact for less consumptive forest
practices and biological protection.  
        NGOs and governmental environmental organizations must keep a
sharp eye on loggers entering the Amazon region to harvest.  Improved
logging technology is a real threat to South America's forests.  For
example, Chinese logging companies recently purchased large tracts of rain
forest land and built state-of-the-art processing plants for high level
wood production in Brazil's Amazon.  (NPR, 1996).  This new technology
allows faster destruction of the forests, leaving them no time to
regenerate.  Logging rates will continue to rise in an effort to keep the
factories at full capacity.  Like Ecuador, Brazil has good environmental
laws in place but they have only meager enforcement.  Probably the most
effective way to keep these international loggers in check is through
media exposure to inform the public of their misadventures.   Although the
Amazon is no longer being written about on the cover of TIME like it was
in the 1980's, it may still be able to attract public attention and,
hopefully, some public outrage.  NGOs can mobilize the international
community to put pressure on the governments to control the logging rates.
However,  external funding will be needed to improve enforcement of
logging laws to have any real impact.   
        "Nonconsumptive" uses of the rain forests present a potential
avenue for economic expansion while preserving the forests.  These uses
include the harvesting of plants for pharmaceutical research, harvesting
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of forest products such as nuts for sale to general public, and the
opening of the forest to ecotourism.   However, thus far, these
nonconsumptive uses have not been that effective.  For example, in the
first case the pharmaceutical harvesting has lead to very little revenue
for the rain forest country itself.  In most cases the pharmaceutical
companies pay a small price for the plants; the plants are then taken to a
developed country where they are cloned into a new miracle drug that makes
millions of dollars for the pharmaceutical company.  Ecuador and other
rain forest countries need to establish more beneficial contracts with
these companies, requiring the companies to hand over a good portion of
their royalties from successful products.  In the second case, the forest
product market has not been too successful because such harvesting is
uneconomic in comparison to the broad scale production that occurs outside
of the forest.  This was the case for rubber production.  Finally, in the
third case of ecotourism there is real potential for economic development.
However, ecotourism projects have often had ill effects on indigenous
populations and the environment because they have not been sensitive to
either.  Ecotourism in the Amazon must be monitored closely to ensure that
tourist capacity does not rise to the level where it destroys the natural
areas that the tourists come to see.  Ecotours should be well planned so
that they avoid more sensitive areas and avoid exploitation of indigenous
populations.  
        At the international level, Ecuador's large foreign debt must be
dealt with to reduce the pressure on the government to develop its natural
resources without regard to long term impacts.  Debt-for-nature swaps are
one possibility, but definitely not a sufficient solution.  Through
debt-for-nature swaps, environmental groups buy up Ecuador's foreign debt
at a discounted rate and then forgive the debt in exchange for the
establishment of nature preserves in Ecuador.  It is a good idea, but has
limitations.  First, the swaps have been known to cause inflation because
of increased domestic spending.  (U.S. News & World Report, 1989).
Second, the preserves will not make a difference if the government does
not effectively curb destruction within it.  As long as there are large
numbers of poor people, they will continue to clear the land, preserve or
no preserve.  However, reducing the foreign debt would, hopefully,
minimize the incentive for the government to develop oil in pristine
regions to pay on the debts.  
        Laws to protect natural resources will continue to fail until the
need for the poor to clear land is reduced.  No one would choose to save a
tree if it meant her family would starve.  The problems of the poor must
be addressed before environmental protection will succeed.    
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URBANIZATION TRANSITION AND ITS IMPACT IN THAILAND
Introduction
        Thailand is one of the few countries in the Third World where
economic and social development has been accompanied by a power shift
toward democracy.  Modern changes in Thai society which began in the late
19th century have been accelerated since early 1960s when economic and
social development was consciously singled out as the most important goal
of the country.  The direct foreign investment since 1986 has also had
effect on expanding the GNP and GDP in manufacturing or industry sectors.
Although these economic and social development has succeeded, it is true
that the development strategy have contributed to broaden the regional
imbalance.  In a word, Thailand has failed to narrow the widening gap
between the rural and urban income.
        Rural-urban gaps are most obvious when comparison is made between
the predominantly rural Northeast region and Bangkok, the capital and
mega-city of Thailand.  The bigger the gap, the more people come to urban
areas, especially to Bangkok.  The problems caused by urbanization
transition are varied. It causes not only environmental problems such as
air and water pollution, traffic congestion or the urban poor but also the
serious social problems in both rural and urban areas.
        This paper seeks to illustrate the various kinds of human
resource, environmental, social and economical problems caused by the
urbanization transition from rural to urban area.  I will also deal with
Thai governmental strategy which tries to decrease the regional imbalance.
The analysis is developed with the data from World Resource 1996-97
Database Diskette, Atlas GIS and National Migration Survey Thailand 1995.
This paper is closed by suggesting that an essential plan for decreasing
the regional imbalance exists in rising the public attention and in
encouraging the regional, governmental and non governmental organizations.
 
Land and Climate
        Thailand occupies the territory of the Indo-Chinese peninsula of
Southeast Asia which lies between longitude 97
 E and 106
 E; its southern and northern limits are latitude 5
 N and 21
 N, respectively.  The length from north to south is 1,684 kilometers and
its greatest width is about 780 kilometers.  The coastlines command
roughly 2,875 kilometers of the Gulf of Thailand and about 740 kilometers
on the Indian Ocean.  Listed clockwise, countries bordering Thailand are
Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) and Democratic Kampchea (Cambodia)
on the north and the east, Malaysia on the south, and the Socialist
Republic of the Union of Burma (Myanmar or Burma) on the northwest and the
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north.
        The country is divided into four geographic regions: the central
region which includes the capital city of Bangkok, the northern region,
the northeastern region and the southern region.  The central region is
relatively more prosperous and densely populated than others, whereas the
northeastern region is the largest land-locked area but the least
economically developed.  The total land area of Thailand is about 513,115
square kilometers.  Administratively, the country is divided into 72
provinces, 784 districts, 7,003 tambons and around 63,110 village.
Bangkok Metropolitan Region if the capital and also the principal port of
Thailand.  (Ministry of Public Health Thailand, 1991)  
        Thailand is a tropical country, with rather high temperature and
humidity.  The climate of most of the country is dominated by monsoons.
In most areas, there are three seasons: rainy (June to October), cool
(November to February) and hot (March to May).  Rainfall varies, but is
generally heaviest in the southern portion of the country. (Shin, 1996)
Population
        The rapid economic expansion over the past two decades in Thailand
was accompanied by an equally rapid population increase.  As shown in
Figure 2, during the period of 1965-1990, the Thai population nearly
doubled, growing at an average annual rate of 2.8 per cent, from about 26
million to about 51 million.  However, the annual rate of population
growth has declined from 3.5 per cent during the period of 1961-1966 to
about 1.8 per cent in 1984. (Population Policy Background Paper, 1986)  It
is obvious that the population growth in urban areas is greater than that
of rural areas in Figure 3 and the difference is the biggest in 1995.
When looking at Figure 1, the rural population growth rate has been
declining since 1965 and in 2005, t will be below zero.  This is a
critical indication that the urbanization in Thailand is the serious
social phenomenon.
        The 1990 census shows that Thailand's population is 54.5 million
with a growth of approximately 1.4 per cent annually.  This trend in
population growth indicates that the country is growing more urbanized and
is experiencing and increase in the population of working age and old age
adults and a decrease in the dependency ratio.  
Figure 1.  Urban and Rural Population Growth
Rates.
Figure 2.  Population Growth in Thailand.
Figure 3.  Growth of Total Urban and Rural
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Population.
Figure 4.  Industrialized Country, Thailand.
Inequalities in the Distribution of Gross Regional Domestic
Product, per capita by region, 1978-88.
Map.  GDP in Agriculture in Mainland of SEA
1990.
Map.  GDP in Industry in Mainland of SEA
1990.
        As shown in Map of GDP in Agriculture and in Industry in Mainland
of Southeast Asia, 1990, Thailand is obviously not an agricultural country
any more. Since 1986, Thailand has experienced economic growth, which has
transformed the country from an agricultural into industrial economy.  In
1986, agriculture, fisheries and forestry products accounted for 41 per
cent of the total value of exports and manufactured products accounted for
55 per cent.  In 1991, manufactured goods formed 75 per cent of all
exports, and basic agricultural, fishery and forestry products accounted
21 per cent.  Over the past years, the GDP has risen by an average of over
11 per cent per year in absolute terms. (Far Eastern Economic Review,
1992) However, Figure 4 tells us that this industrialization has been
occurring only in Bangkok and its surrounded areas.  An important
indication o this figure is the very slow increase in productivity of
agricultural labor.  This can be compared to the fact that the Bangkok
Metropolitan Region accounted 77 per cent, and the BMR plus the Central
Region for 89 per cent of the nation's value added in manufacturing in
1987.  This uneven pattern indicates that the combination of industrial
boom brought by direct foreign investments since 1986 and faltering
agriculture has led unmistakably to widening income disparities, with the
largest decline in income shares affecting the poorest 20 per cent of the
population.   
 
Definition of Urban Areas
        In Thailand, there is no official definition of the urban
population.  "A municipal area" has long been formally used to demote a
non rural area by the Ministry of Interior.  This has long been reported
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as equivalent to an urban in all censuses.
        The municipal area (or Mas) are established for administrative
purposes under the Municipal Act of 1953.  There are three classes of
municipalities: nakhon (city); muang (town); and tambon (small town).  An
area which has a total of 50,000 or more inhabitants, with a population
density of not less than 3,000 inhabitants per square kilometer, can
achieve the status of nakhon municipality.  The muang municipality
requires a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants and the same population density
as a nakhon municipality.  But a place which is the seat of the provincial
administration, regardless of whether it has a population size or density
larger than the minimum requires for muang municipality, is required by
law to be a muang municipality.  The status of tambon municipality has no
specific numerical criteria.  It is established wherever it is considered
appropriate through official decrees prepared by the Ministry of Interior.
(Kritaya, 1983)   
        In addition to these municipalities, there are urban sanitary
district, rural sanitary district and village.  Sanitary districts (SDs)
are usually treated as rural, though many sanitary districts have archived
the urban characteristics to qualify as municipality.
Figure 5: Urban Hierarchy in Thailand
METROPOLIS
(Only Bangkok has been designated as a metropolis since 1972)
NAKHON MUNICIPALITY
(Places with population of at least 50,000 and 
population density of at least 3,000 per square kilometer)
MUANG MUNICIPALITY
(Places with population of at least 10,000 and 
population density of at least 3,000 per square kilometer)
TAMBON MUNICIPALITY
(No specific numerical criterion)
URBAN SANITARY DISTRICT
(SDs with population more than 5,000)
RURAL SANITARY DISTRICT
(SDs with population not more than 5,000)
VILLAGE
*Urban and rural SDs are terms used by the National Statistical Office in
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the 1980 census report. 
        Bangkok has been termed a primate city, which heads a single city
in a country in which is found a disproportionately large of concentration
of the administrative, economic, educational, service activities and
wealth of the country along with large of the total urbanized population.
Even though there are other urban areas other than Bangkok as mentioned
above, I would like to discuss the urbanization transition to Bangkok
Metropolitan Region from other areas to make my ideas clear. 
Characteristics of Urbanization in Thailand
Manufacturing
        There is no doubt that, beginning of the mid-1980's, Thailand
entered a new era of economic development that highly depends on direct
foreign investments and worldwide markets for manufactured exports.
Exports of textiles, electric goods and other labor intensive manufactured
goods accelerated from 1986 onwards and have been the major factor
propelling national economic growth.  Much of the push for export oriented
industrialization has come from rapid structural changes in the economies
into labor intensive production in ASEAN countries.
        During the three years from 1987 to 1989, Thailand was the primary
recipient of direct foreign investment among the four 'next generation'
manufacturing exports of Asia (the ASEAN 4 of Thailand, the Philippines,
Malaysia and Indonesia).  With approximately three-quarters of this
investment coming from Japan and Asia NICs, the $17 billion in direct
investment during those years is significant not only as it reflects the
high level of investment and rate of increase but also for what it says
the new position of the Thai economy as a host for labor intensive export
industries being shed from the higher income economies of Asia.
        The very rapid growth of manufactured exports following from
direct foreign investments in Thailand has been accompanied by substantial
increase in employment in manufacturing and related service sectors.  As
many as 500,000 jobs may have been directly associated with the growth of
manufactured exports between 1985 and 1989.  With the entire labor force
growing by 3.8 million workers over this period, these figures imply that
exports directly absorbed the equivalent of somewhat between 11 and 17 per
cent of the additions to the Thai labor force.
        Needless to say, these direct foreign investments based
industrialization have contributed to the concentration of urban
population.  Thailand has been long known for its high spatial
concentration of urban population, urban-based manufacturing and
industrial activities and urban amenities.
        Part of the explanation for this is geographical.  Few other
cities in Asia so solidly occupy the center of gravity of the national
economy and its link with the outside world.  The only significant
challenge to Bangkok is Eastern Seaboard, which in fact is part of the
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emerging Bangkok mega-urban region.  I will discuss Eastern Seaboard
Project in later section.
        A second important contributing source of urban concentration has
been the very narrow increase in productivity of agricultural labor.  This
can be set against the fact that Bangkok Metropolitan Region accounted 77
per cent, and this region plus the Central Region for 89 per cent, of the
nation's value added on manufacturing in 1987. (McGee and Robinson, 1995) 
Tourism and Vietnam War
        The continuing expansion of tourism over the decade fueled
substantial growth in the services in Bangkok's economy, despite the lack
of direct coordination-ordination by government, giving rise to further
growth in the entertainment and hotel districts of Silom-Suriwong and
Ploenchit.  The number of hotel rooms in Bangkok increased from 2,041 in
1964 to 8,763 in 1970, giving rise to claims that there were too many
hotels in the city.
        U.S. military aid to Thailand grew as the conflict in Indo-China
escalated, reaching peak levels in 1962-1967.  The presence of United
States military personnel, both permanent and those on Rest and Recreation
leave, provided and added boost to Bangkok's services sector, particularly
the accommodation and entertainment sector.  Bangkok's red light district
of Patpong areas is a product of this period.  Originally as extension of
the Silom business districts, this through-way between Silom and Sathorn
became a lucrative investment for the family of Udom Patpong during the
Vietnam War years.  The New Petchaburi Road extension was a district of
clubs and bars relying on the custom of American Servicemen.  It is worth
nothing that overseas tourism was booming during the Vietnam War years,
with tourists outnumbering R & R servicemen by 10 to 1 in 1970, although
servicemen probably had a lot more disposable income during their stays in
Bangkok.  But R & R visits dropped drastically in 1972 with U.S.
disengagement from Vietnam, while overseas tourism registered a 28 per
cent increase.  Nevertheless, the R & R program had provided much of the
infrastructure for the investing tourism; and another legacy of the war
period: ex-servicemen were among the groups investing in the bars and
clubs the multiplied in the later 1970s and early 1980s in Patpong,
Sukhumvit and Pattaya.
        This expansion of service sectors in Bangkok have also contributed
to the growth of urban population, especially the number of the women and
children who would like to get heir jobs in the entertainment industry.
The Middle Class and Education
        While Bangkok was becoming a center for western consumer spending
with a retailing and entertainment industry expanding according to
cosmopolitan tastes, the growing city was also the center of consumption
for burgeoning Thai middle-class.  The education expansion program of the
later 1950s, boosted by overseas scholarship schemes, had produced an
educated and well paid processional strum.  By virtue of the historical
concentration of administration and business in Bangkok compounded by ten
years of urban biases development, three quarters of Thailand's university
graduates resisted in the metropolis.  In 1970, the level of concentration
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of this group was higher than it had been 20 years earlier.
        The establishment of new universities in Bangkok added to the
process of attraction which drew students from the provinces to Bangkok.
This served to concentrate consumption power in the metropolis.  The
growing disparities in per capita income between the Bangkok Metropolitan
Regions and the other regions of Thailand was clear enough indication of
this trend.  Between 1960 and 1970 per capita income in the Bangkok
Metropolitan Region grew at a rate higher than Thailand's average, with
income for the metropolis 11,234 Bhat in 1970 compared with 3,849 for
Thailand as a whole. (Marc, 1993)
Among studies of rural-urban migration in developed countries, the most
generally accepted behavioral assumption is that movements is motivated by
the search for a better material standard of living, and therefore results
from inequalities of material welfare between rural and urban areas.
Generally greater inequalities cause greater volumes of migration.
(Theodore, Peerasit, Paul and Sawaeng, 1983)
Reasons for Migration and Data  
Figure 6: Reasons for Migration by Type and Stream of Migration and Gender
                  Place of Current 
Residence                                       
                Bangkok                 MAs                     Rural   
                Single  Repeat          Single  Repeat          Single  
Repeat 
                Move    Move            Move    Move            Move    Move
Reason for Migration from Last Place of Residence               
Male                                            
 Work           50      69              48      53              51      58
 Family         22      9               28      28              37      29
 Education      10      3               6       4               1       3
 Problem        17      18              13      11              11      8
 Other          0       0               4       5               1       3
 Total          99      99              99      101             101     101
Female                                          
 Work           40      39              52      42              26      48
 Family         34      40              28      40              58      40
 Education      5       4               4       2               3       1
 Problem        21      16              15      14              11      11
 Other          0       0               1       2               1       0
 Total          100     99              100     100             99      100
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Reason for Migration to Current Place of Residence              
Male                                            
 Work           35      55              33      44              16      17
 Family         60      44              54      55              83      81
 Education      5       1               6       1               1       2
 Problem        0       0               2       0               1       0
 Other          0       0               4       0               0       0
 Total          100     100             99      100             101     100
Female                                          
 Work           36      43              37      29              14      17
 Family         64      56              61      60              86      82
 Education      1       1               1       7               1       1
 Problem        0       0               0       2               0       0
 Other          0       0               1       2               0       0
 Total          101     100             100     100             101     100
                
        As shown in Figure 6, reasons for moving from the first place of
residents varied both by gender and by the region of destination.  In
Bangkok, males are more likely to seem that they have repeat movers and
single movers.  Both repeat and single movers have a high percentage of a
problem with their previous residence.  Women are more likely than men to
move for family reasons.  Female migrants to Bangkok moves almost equally
for family or for work reasons.  In municipal areas, single movers are
nearly twice as likely to move for work reasons than for family reasons.
The opposite trend is observed for female single movers in rural areas: 26
per cent of work reasons while 58 per cent for family reasons.
        In regards to their current residence, the majority of both men
and women move for family reasons in nearly all locations.  Slightly more
than Bangkok move for work reasons compared to family reasons.  This
indicates that even though economic factors are the main reasons for
migrating to a particular location, familial networks remain important.
While rural networks are particularly likely to chose their location based
on family reasons, there is little difference by gender for moving to the
current destination.
Impact on Environmental Conditions
Air Pollution
        Air pollution is presently most serious, to the point of being
critical, for people living in Bangkok.  Over the past few years, the air
quality has been rated "dangerous" throughout much of the time, with the
annual average air quality index nearing 300 - the maximum acceptable rate
being 100.
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Figure 7: The Number of Motor Vehicles in Bangkok 1990-94
Type of Car     1990        1991        1992        1993        1994
Sedan           899,161     918,595     987,999     1,091,836   1,214,927
Van/Pick Up     268,598     156,136     217,336     272,190     323,902
Taxi/ServiceCar 31,643      32,247      37,081      55,053      64,869
Motorcycle      728,679     887,289     1,006,302   1,105,084   1,233,503
Tractor         9,955       11,993      12,792      13,265      13,860
Farm Vehicle                            33          69          69
Others          4,676       2,658       2,792       2,956       3,293
Total           1,942,712   2,008,918   2,264,335   2,540,453   2,854,423
        
        The major air pollution sources in Thailand are transportation,
fuel combustion from stationary sources, industrial processes and solid
wastes.  Large quantities for toxic gases and particulate matter are
discharged into air by motor-vehicles and factories. (Figure 7) The number
of the cars in Bangkok has been keeping increasing.  Six air pollutant
measured to indicate air quality: carbon monoxide, ozone, sulfur dioxide,
suspended particulate, nitrogen dioxide and lead.  Reports from the
National Environmental Board shows that Bangkok, Samut Prakan, Chiang Mai,
Chonburi, Khon Kaen and Hat Yai, have polluted with smoke churned out by
hundred of industries and the lead-contaminated exhaust fumes emitted from
over one million cars and some 660,000 motorcycles caught in the endless
lines of congested traffic.  As bad as the situation is at present, the
prospects for the future are that it will get even worse.  While dust
causes irritations and allergies, carbon monoxide can build up to harmful
level and cause headaches, impairment of mortal function, impairment of
fetal development and death in the case of very high concentrations.
(Suntree, 1993)
Traffic Congestion
        Traffic congestion is one of the most obvious problems of the
Bangkok Metropolitan Regions.  Many areas in the metropolis are
"super-blocked" where real estate is booming.  Patches of empty land can
be found in between major developments because of speculation.  Also, the
existing transit system is inadequate, forcing people to use private cars,
thereby increasing traffic congestion and the demand for road use.
Culturally, Thai people like to show off their wealthy so that having a
private car can be an explicit indication of their being affluent.  A few
hours of congestion and traffic jams each day and loose concern for safe
fuel consumption can cause air pollution as mentioned in last chapter.
        Public bus service is very poor and control in granting licenses
to an incensing number of private vehicles in going worsen the problem of
traffic jams.  The rate of increase of vehicles in the metropolis is
estimated at about 5.7 per cent annually and if allowed to continue, by
the next decade, the number of vehicles will be doubled.
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        Although a number of subdivisions in the suburbs have built their
own road networks, there is no integrated master plan to guide and link
one subdivision to next.  The result is a patchwork of fragmented and
disconnected roads that could otherwise serve as diversion roads.  At
present, a number of gigantic projects have been identified in order to
cope with the problem, especially expressway and a mass rapid transit
system such as monorail and subways.  However, these mega projects could
be used if there are not enough secondary and feeder road networks to link
them.  It is believed that land acquisitions are the main constraint.
        Construction of the mass rapid transit system has been delayed,
leaving only the inadequate bus service of the Bangkok Mass Transit
Authority to meet transportation on the metropolis.  At the same time,
ongoing road repairs and construction works at many significant points in
the city have caused heavy traffic jams.  On bad days, traffic jams have
been known to stand still hours.           
Water Pollution
        Water pollution is another product of Bangkok's growth, and here
private industry and households are equally blamed.  Traditionally,
Bangkok has been a city with a pot of crisscrossing canals (klong), and
its residents have relied on canals and rivers for bathing, traveling,
drinking and waste disposal.  Before industrialization, water pollutants
went through the usual process of purification by bacteria interacting
with dissolved oxygen which broke down these wastes into works, because
the tremendous quantities of waste discharged into the water is greater
than the available oxygen can cope with.  Further more, some types of
industrial waste sets off a biological process which accelerates the
depletion of oxygen. (Tawanchai, 1987)
        For the majority of the residents are not served by a
piped-sewerage system, sanitary facilities range from septic to nothing at
all, especially in the slums in Bangkok.  Needless to say, these slums are
composed of the migrants from other municipal districts, sanitary
districts or villages.  Human waste is disposed of mainly through septic
tanks and cesspools, and the effluents are discharged into storm water
drains or klong.  Inefficient drainage, together with periodic flooding
and a high water table makes water pollution a health hazard.  It has been
estimated that about 50 per cent of the city's 2,500 tones of garbage
finds its way into klong daily. (Sham, 1993)
Slums
        One result of an inadequate supply of decent housing in Bangkok is
the presence of slums which in the Thai context means a settlements of
low-income people occupying sub-standard housing or merely house-like
structures with no security of tenure, and with virtually no access to
public services.
        According to the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, there were
433 slums in Bangkok in 1982 (Bangkok Metropolitan Administration, 1983)
with about 1,2 million people living there.  A survey of 108 slums areas
by National Housing Authority reveals that the size of slums varied from
42 to 2,000 families, with the average slum housing 247 families.
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(Paiboon)  Slums occupied by workers, street vendors, unskilled labors,
lower level of government officials and others.  The average family income
in slums is 3,000 Baht per month, well below the average monthly income of
Bangkok households which was 4,231 Baht per month in 1982.
        The majority of the slums, 59 per cent, are found on privately
owned land, while 37 per cent are on government owned land and the
remaining four per cent are owned by the slum dwellers.  Slums developed
mainly as a result of the rural poor migrants to Bangkok in search for
jobs.  Without enough income or marketable skills, often having several
dependent, people were unable to afford rental housing and were forced to
set up crude houses on vacant land without the owner's permission.
Although landowners often charge rent for profit while waiting to develop
their land, the government usually does not charge rent and throw out the
poor.  In both cases, there are virtually no public services such as piped
water or sewerage as mentioned in the section of water pollution, since
the slums are not viewed as permanent housing.  Rather it is assumed that
slum residents will eventually the relocated elsewhere.   Some slums have
been established for over ten years.
        One feature that add further misery to Bangkok slum is their
location near marshy areas of the flood-prone city.  Only 22 per cent of
the slums are located on dry land. (Paiboon)  Much slum housing has had to
be built on sites over polluted and stagnant waters, filled with
mosquitoes and germs.  An example of such slums is on the territory of the
government-run Port of Bangkok in the Klong Toey area.
        Another feature id the "moving Slum".  Settlements of construction
workers, living in temporary shacks around a building site until the
project is completed, move with their families to wherever the their
construction company has a project.  There are no figures on the total
size of this type of slums, but given the building boom in Bangkok since
the 1960s, it would be considerable.
Impact on Social Condition
        Socially, migration can have a great effect on both rural and
urban areas.  In many developing countries it has been suggested that
rural migrants are drawn from two extreme types: person s sufficiently
interested and motivated to migrate in search of education or wider
opportunities in urban centers and persons who are driven by the poverty
of the village and are attracted by the opportunities in the city.  In
Thailand, a number of studies of migration show consistent findings on
educational selectivity among out-migrants.  Those who move out, although
not highly educated, generally have higher average education than
non-migrants.  This selectivity has a negative effect on the village of
origin.  The better educated out-migrants take with them the investments
made in education.  Moreover, rural social and economic conditions may
shut those migrants out once they leave in that many of them cannot or do
not return to the village due to the lack of employment suitable to their
education and ability.
        Another aspects of rural out-migrants which is seen as having a
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negative impact is a disruption of kinship or clan ties.  Increased rates
of movement of young people from villages to towns are viewed as a sign of
breakdown of family and village society.  Rural out-migrants may lead to
the reduction of kinship dominance over person's behavior but it is also
argued that the extent of the impact on family and kin in the place of
origin depends on the type, permanence and distance of migration as well
as the ties retained by a migrant with the family left behind in the
village.
        On the positive side, migrants who return to their villages may
stimulate the process of change, functioning as agents for the diffusion
of the ideas and technologies.  Successful rural migrant returning from
urban areas are often equipped with new ideas and skills gained during
their stay in the city which they can share with those who remained
behind.
        It is not only the sending areas that are effected by migration.
Mass movements of population from rural areas affect the social structure
in the urban receiving areas, too.  Migrants who moved to a city with a
different cultural background and behavioral norms can create tensions or
social confronts between migrants and urban native or among migrants
themselves.  While staying in Thailand in past summer, I met a news
article mentioned that a guy from Northeast region working in Bangkok was
arrested of eating a black dog, which is culturally admitted behavior in
Northeast region in Thailand.   This kind of collective violence and
conflict in the cities can result from a lack of the public information
centers or supportive institutions for migrants.  There are problems of
assimilation and integration as migrants, especially recent movers, are
less prone to join with new neighbors or other formal association in the
places of destination.
Impact of Economical Condition
        In general, migration from rural to urban areas is seen to be
beneficial to both urban and rural economic development.  At the
micro-level, however, individuals and families migrating to Bangkok face
competition for jobs from those already resident there.  Poverty and slum
residents in urban areas are associated with the problems of unemployment,
underemployment at very low wages with unfavorable working conditions that
the newcomers face.
        Migration represents a transfer of both labor supply and human
capital.  Lost primarily are persons 15 to 29 years of age, generally
considered the prime years of productivity in rural areas.  The absence of
migrants in the prime years of economic productivity tends to increase the
dependency ratio for those remaining in the areas of out-migration,
especially in areas where the fertility level remains unchanged.  This
demographic effect of out-migration can have economic consequences.  In
the worst case, it may lead to changes in the economic structure of the
community.  Where labor shortage is not too serious, rural families can
adapt to the situation.  The adaptation may be that the women and children
who are left behind take on more responsibility for agricultural work, use
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remittances receives from migrants to hire extra labor for farm work or
switch to less labor intensive crops.  Where the absence of male manpower
is too great or hired labor is unavailable or too expensive, the result
may be a reduction of agricultural production or even leaving the land
uncultivated.  If these situations remain unsolved in the long term, they
would not only have a strong impact on the economic situation but also
would alter social conditions in the community through the disruption of
family stricture changing the role of women, etc. (Bahssorn and Penporn,
1987) 
Policy of Thai Government and Its Implementation
National Economic Social Development Plan       
        Thai government have tried a variety of policies intended to
achieve more equitable distribution through influencing population
movement.  Policies or measurements have been initiated or adopted to
discourage migration or to direct the flows of movement away from large
cities. I will discuss the National Economic Social Development Plan,
which, I think, one of the significant policies of Thai government.
        The National Economic Social Development Plan (NESDP) was
established to draw up five-year development plans in economics,
education, society and administration in 1961.  In the Forth (1977-81) and
the Fifth (!982-86) Plans, it sought to control the growth of Bangkok and
achieve better balance between rural and urban development.  The principal
means to accomplish this was to direct investments to a select number of
growth poles and lower-order rural centers in each of the major regions.
However, during this period, polarization in the Bangkok Metropolitan
Regions continued and rural-urban inequalities remained high.
        The Fifth Plan was critical of past policy and planning efforts,
because it empathized that the major development issue was how to slow
down Bangkok's population growth and lessen its economic dominance.  To
overcome those deficiencies, it outlined a comprehensive strategy for
Bangkok's development in the form of a "Structural Plan for the
Development of the Bangkok Metropolis and Vicinity Towns".  The basic aim
was to decentralize economic activity and thereby diffuse growth from the
capital city to the five surrounding towns of Samut Prakan, Pathum Thani,
Nonthabuti, Nakhon Pathom and Samut Sakhon, located in the five adjoining
changwats (prefectures) of the same names.
        The plan proposed that these outlying areas be developed as
planned communities with a high degree of self-sufficiency, thereby
ensuring that residents would not need to commute Bangkok for employment
or lower-level of services but only periodically for special cultural or
entertainment facilities.  It also intended that agricultural land in and
around the five towns would be preserved and in order to prevent the
urbanized parts of Bangkok from spreading farther, a green belt would be
designated around the current boundary of the city.  Thus, Fifth Plan,
through the 'Structural Plan', continued to advocate multi-nucleared or
polycentric metropolitan regional development of Bangkok.  
        Another key spatial component of the Fifth Plan was the decision
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to develop the Eastern Seaboard into a major location for the basic
industries.
        Although many opportunities to link rural and urban development on
a regional scale remained relatively unexpected, the Sixth Plan (1987-91)
adopted a much more clearly urban oriented view of development, which
reversed the previous position on limiting the growth of Bangkok
Metropolitan regions.  According to the summery of the Sixth plan,
controlling the growth of the Bangkok metropolis remained an important
national goal.  However, despite of the very clear statement of the
objective to control Bangkok's growth, a considerable amount of investment
in large-scale infrastructure projects was still being planned for a
capital city.  This means that instead of trying slowing down of the
growth of Bangkok Metropolitan Regions, policies were directed towards
improving urban management through privatization.  The extended Bangkok
Metropolitan Regions still represents the most important economic and
employment base in the country itself.
        The regional policies of the Sixth plan have been substantially
carried over into the current Seventh Plan (1992-96), except that the new
plan does not formally recognize the extended Bangkok Metropolitan Regions
as a geographical entity for the government investment.  The focus remains
on regional growth centers, and investments are to be coordinated through
the Ministry of Interior form central to provincial and municipal levels.
Local levels of government are to be strengthened to enhance planning and
implementation.
The Eastern Seaboard Project
        This is one of the development projects to accelerate the
provincial development with decentralization.  These regions include three
prefectures which are facing to the Gulf of Thailand and aim to develop
the oil chemistry utilizing natural gas and its associated industries.
They are far from Bangkok enough to establish the individual economy and
society and close enough to keep the communication with Bangkok.
        The infrastructures which Thai government developed included two
industrial areas. The one focuses on a light industry with no pollution,
the other oil and heavy industry.  In addition, irrigation pipeline, new
town housing, telecommunications were established.  Thai government
expects that there will be new job opportunities for about 13,000 people
and also these regions will substitute for Bangkok Metropolitan Regions.
There is a expressway between Northeastern region and the Eastern
Seaboard, which must contribute to the development of Northeastern region
and decentralization of population to Bangkok from this region.  
        As part of the metropolitan region, the Eastern Seaboard will
serve as the country's major industrial base and a new gateway to
industrial growth.  The seaboard is seen as a countermagnet, providing
alternative investment locations to reduce congestion in the Bangkok
metropolis and its vicinity towns.  It is considered that the seaboard
will be served with a regionally integrated transportation network of a
high standard, which would link the metropolis with the inner parts of the
country. m Communication networks and the new deep-sea port in the Eastern
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Seaboard development will increase international contacts for the
metropolitan regions.  
        To accomplish these development schemes, it is necessary to speed
up expansion of major infrastructure in the seaboard, especially roads,
rail and communication systems connecting the major ports of to industrial
estates at Leam Chanbang and Map-Ta-Phut.  All the major urban centers of
the seaboard must be well equipped with standard social services and
infrastructure, community environmental improvement programs and upgraded
administrative bodies.  The seaboard must be connected to the rest of the
nation via new transportation and communication networks, and an improved
international communication network will be needed to maximize its role as
a new economic zone.  The success of the Eastern Seaboard Project is
attribute to the multi program of Thai government and private sectors.  
Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan
        National Economic Social Development Seventh Plan recommends
studying how to target the metropolitan region for development by using
the Bangkok Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan to provide the region
with a proper plan of orderly growth.  The Bangkok Metropolitan Region
Structural Plan emphasizes growth to the northern and southeastern parts
of the metropolis in order to link Bangkok with the Saraburi Industrial
Complex and the Eastern Seaboard.  The clear direction offered for
regional growth in the plan will assist the alignment of major
infrastructure investments rather than allowing growth to sprawl in every
conceivable direction.
        This plan formulates measures to relieve congestion in the
metropolis through construction of satellite cities and new towns,
controls on building construction of city core, and prevention of housing
sprawl along the main highways.  The following strategies are laid out in
the plan:
-Empty and unused lands in the suburban areas will be used efficiently by
providing access roads to link them with existing main roads.
-Promotion zones will be established, with proper controls on high-rise
buildings, especially in areas directly served by rapid mass transit.  The
high standard of services that these areas need could be met by requiring
relevant private entrepreneurs to participate in investment projects to
solve traffic problems, water supply and waste water treatment and other
environmental issues.  In fact, a master plan for waste water treatment
and a garbage disposal system has been jointly undertaken by the Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration and a number of private firms and could
eventually serve the entire metropolitan areas.
-Urban communications will be improved and rehabilitated, provision of
more recreation areas will be encouraged, and historically and culturally
significant areas will be conserved.  This last point applies particularly
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to Rattanakosin Island, where it would also benefit tourism. (McGee and
Robinson, 1995)  
        In this Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan, the northern part
of the metropolitan region is especially considered as the industrial zone
for the Upper Central region, the center for industrial activities
relocated from Bangkok metropolis (Saraburi Industrial Complex).  The
regional network of roads and rail will directly link the industrial zone
with the seaboard for transporting export commodities without having to go
through Bangkok.  This direct network is important not only because it
will save time but also because it could help reduce congestion in Bangkok
as mentioned above.
        This industrial zone can be divided into three areas: (1) Saraburi
as the main urban center and economic base of the Upper Central Region in
trade, transportation and support services (Saraburi Industrial Complex);
(2) Kaeng Koi as the center for cement and construction industry and other
industries relocated from Bangkok and its vicinity towns; and (3) The
Rua/The Luang as an agree-processing center for exports. (McGee and
Robinson, 1995)  To make the zone function effectively and attract
industrial relocation and new factories, it is important to provide
incentives beyond the speedy provision of necessary infrastructure
services.  The creation of export promotion zones is an example. (See Map
of Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan)       
Suggestions
        Success in stimulating regional development through a focus on
four or five regional cities, Eastern Seaboard or Bangkok Metropolitan
Regional Structural Plan has had only limited success over the past few
years.  Whether investments were too modest or institutional frameworks
too centralized is a matter of debate, but more substantial limitations
exist within concept itself.
        For the most part, even the largest provincial cities are too
small in comparison to Bangkok.  A Chiang Mai study shows, for example,
that investing in municipal services and infrastructure in this city have
a marginal impact as a whole.  The country site cannot provide what is
needed in a modern industrializing economy and also there is no effort has
been made to develop new business to use what is available in rural areas
of the region.  Policies are needed to consider the urban-centered
approach toward rural regional development.
        In regards to traffic congestion in Bangkok, the public
transportation system should be developed to reduce congestion in densely
populated areas.  Current Bangkok Governor, Phichit, has been trying hard
to construct the new expressways, sky monorails and also begun to
construct the subways.  It is not until the completion of these
constructions that we can debate the new suitable policies toward the
traffic problems in Bangkok.  However, it is true that the traffic
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congestion in Bangkok is worsen and worsen everyday, partly because of
this construction of new transport systems.  I suggest that Bangkok
Metropolitan  Administration should bring public attention to share the
car in the morning and evening at the time of the worst traffic condition,
speed up the constructions, and implement the water transport systems and
bus services.  
        In regards to the slum problems, this is directly connected urban
poor problems.  Most of the urban poor from other districts in search for
jobs are struggling for put themselves in the urban framework such as
better life, giving education to their children and so on.  One Japanese
NGO called SVO (Sotoshu Volunteer Organization)  has been working in the
Klong Toey Slum, biggest slim in Bangkok, to help especially children
there.  They are providing school education, medication, sanitary
facilities and parental education.  Their activities are well known to not
only the Japanese but also people in Bangkok.  
        Bangkok Metropolitan Administration should recognize that the
urban poor represent potential labor power and this labor power should be
encouraged by providing training in new skills and promoting small scale
enterprise and self employment development skills in order to upgrade its
production capability.  In order to accomplish this suggestion,
Administration should recommend a policy to enact specific legislation to
protect the housing rights of the urban poor in the slums. 
Conclusion
        The population problem has the effect on social and economical
development in every country.  The  imbalance between Bangkok Metropolitan
Regions and other municipal areas or villages is one of the most
significant inequalities in the world.  Managing the future of Thailand
itself has a number of policy dimensions.
        The policies in the Seventh Plan and Metropolitan Regional
Structural Plan aim to enhance the positive functions of the metropolitan
regions to create a center that can provide opportunities for higher
incomes and better services and living standards.  However, we cannot
ignore the importance of the encouragement of the other municipal areas
such as Chiang Mai in North, Khon Kaen in Northeast and Songkhla/Hat Yai
in South.  More specific regional plans for those areas are needed in
order to decentralize the population.  These plans should focus on
providing the job opportunities with better incomes, the good educational
institutes so that the young do not have to go to Bangkok and bringing the
infrastructures to catch up with the growth of Bangkok.
        From this perspectives, policies to manage the Bangkok
Metropolitan Regions and to encourage the growth of other districts will
require two aspects; first, how to continue attracting and keeping mobile
investments: and, second, how to translate them into suitable development
that closes gaps between urban and rural areas in terms of economics,
infrastructures, services an environment.
        Thailand, in fact, has a unique opportunity to provide a new model
for urban and rural development that is likely to Southeast Asia.  This
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opportunity drives, in part, from the capacity of the Thai economy to
develop along both urban-industrial and rural-agricultural lines of
economic growth.  Thailand still has a rich and diversified agricultural
base, which is expected to contribute to substantially to economic growth
in rural areas in the future.  Agri-industry now accounts for more than
half of the industrial GDP for the nation, and the economies of the most
regions outside of Bangkok depend on agriculture as the basic economical
sector.  A national strategy of economic growth with the imbalance and the
poverty reduction should take advantage of these various opportunities to
raise the incomes of rural people where they live and to reduce the extent
of urbanization transition.  It is also necessary to enhance the power of
administrative, political and private organizations in rural areas in
Thailand.
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NINE NATIONS, ONE NILE
"Scarcity and misuse of freshwater pose a serious and growing threat to
sustainable development and protection of the environment.  Human health
and welfare, food security, industrial development and the ecosystems on
which they depend are all at risk, unless water and land resources are
managed in a more ecologically appropriate manner than they have been in
the past.  The problems are far from speculative in nature - they are
here, and they affect humanity now." 
Dublin Statement, January, 1992
Introduction
Water Scarcity
        "Scarcity is an odd word for something that covers almost
three-quarters of the surface of the globe."   This sentence is, of
course, referring to water.  Globally, water is plentiful: the total
volume of water on Earth is estimated to be one billion, three hundred
sixty million cubic kilometers.   Unfortunately, 97% of the water on our
planet is saltwater which, without desalination, is not readily available
for human use: the global supply of usable fresh water only amounts to
about 1% of the total water supply.  (See Table 1.)
        Although water is not a globally tradable commodity, it is shared
by humans throughout the world.  It is continuously used and reused as it
travels through the hydrologic cycle and its volume is constant -- neither
increasing nor diminishing.  Freshwater is a fundamentally important
resource because it is essential for survival, because its use underlies
all agricultural and industrial processes, and because it cannot be
substituted for technologically.  Freshwater, as fate would have it, is
not evenly distributed throughout the world: it is often available at the
wrong time, place, or quality.  Thus, when discussing water scarcity the
issues at hand are both the quantity and the quality of freshwater
resources available to a particular region.  (See Figure 1.)
Table 1:  Water in the Hydrosphere 
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Water Source    Global          % of    % of    Avail.  % water
                Volume          Total   Total   for     Avail.
                (1,000's km3)   Global  Global  human   for human
                                Supply  Fresh   use?    use.*
Salt Water                                      
   Oceans       1,370,000       97.61           No      
   Saline Lakes 104             0.008           No      
                                        
Fresh Water                                     
  Frozen                                        
   Polar 
   Ice Glaciers 29,000          2.08    80.0    No      
  Unfrozen                                      
   Groundwater  4,000           0.29    19.7    Yes     99
   Freshwater 
   Lakes        125             0.009   0.2     Yes     1
   Soil & 
   Subsoil 
   Moisture     67              0.005   0.04    No      0.2
   Rivers, 
   Streams      1.2             0.00009 0.02    Yes     0.1
   Atmospheric 
   Water Vapor  14              0.0009  0.02    No      0.1
* Fresh and unfrozen water.
Figure 1.  Annual Internal Renewable Water Resources
per Continent--Percents and Cubic Kilometers.
        In many lands water scarcity poses a threat to both health and
wealth.  Hydrologists designate water stressed countries as those with
annual supplies of 1,000 - 2,000 m3/person.  When the figure drops below
1,000 m3, nations are considered water scarce.  Chronic water shortages
affect 40% of the world's population, spread across 80 nations; current
estimates show the demand for water increasing at 2.3% annually, or
doubling every 21 years, thus deepening the need.   Water shortages are
worst in poor countries: 26 countries today fall into the water scarce
category and face severe constraints on food production, economic
development, and human and environmental welfare from a lack of usable
fresh water.  The conservation of water and the regulation of rivers for
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irrigation and generation of hydroelectric power are matters of great
social and economic importance in the world today, particularly in arid
countries.
International River Basins
        "An international river is one whose water course traverses, or
whose catchment basin lies in, the territories of two or more sovereign
states."   More than 200 separate river basins in the world are shared by
two or more countries.  These international rivers constitute a
significant portion of the world's freshwater resources and are great
assets to the nations that share them.
        Since a basin is interconnected through the flow of a river's
waters, the use of waters in one part of the basin may affect the use in
another part.  Incentives for cooperative management do not exist when an
upstream country uses an international river to the detriment of a
downstream country that has no reciprocal power over the upstream country:
the management of water is further complicated by the tendency to treat
water as a commodity rather than as a finite natural resource.
Consequently, shared river resources often suffer greater environmental
abuse and are not as productively used as comparable national water
resources.  The uneven distribution of positive and negative physical
impacts stemming from differing demands among the basin countries for
water resources frustrate cooperative action to manage and develop the
river for mutual benefit.  East Africa, specifically the Nile River
region, is an area that exemplifies these concepts.
The Nile River Basin
        In East Africa and the Middle East freshwater is scarce and widely
shared by countries with enormous economic, military, and political
differences; over-exploitation, depletion, and deterioration of freshwater
in rivers, lakes, and groundwater aquifers are prevalent problems.  Most
of the known conventional water resources have already been developed or
will soon be fully exploited in most of the region's countries and, by the
end of this century, six Nile riparians will exceed the hydrologic measure
of water scarcity.  The water resources in this arid area are unevenly
distributed and used, and every major river in the region crosses
international borders, thus making the potential for conflict over water
great.  (See Maps 1 and 2 in appendix.)
Figure 2.  Nile River Watershed Area by
State.
        The Nile River Basin, along with all the water it carries,
traverses the territories of nine separate nations: Burundi, Egypt,
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, the Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire.  (See
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Figure 2.)  Although these countries share one of the greatest rivers in
the world, many inequities over this common resource exist and are
especially difficult to redress.  The Nile presents a classic riparian
problem: a river does not recognize boundaries between states - it flows
continuously.  The water flowing from the source is the same water that
leaves the mouth of the river and enters the ocean.  (See Figure 3.)  The
ways in which it is diverted, collected, used, and returned to the stream
determines the quality and quantity of water each successive downstream
nation will receive.  Conflicts over Nile River water provide examples of
unresolved international water issues in a shared basin.
Project Focus
        Water is pervasive in all biological and physical systems, and its
use is inextricably intertwined with many of society's efforts to enhance
economic and social well-being.  Water is a substance of paramount
ecological, economic and social importance.  Interrelationships inherent
in water use should encourage integrated basinwide management strategies.
Nile basin countries, instead of opposing each other, could direct their
attentions toward multinational agreements and policies, defining
collective basinwide management strategies.  Developing the Nile's water
resources for common benefit will require a cooperative approach treating
the Nile Basin as one hydrologic unit and all riparian states as equal
stakeholding partners.
Figure 3.  The Nile River.
Issues In an International River Basin
The Nile region boasts a unique situation with regard to economics and
development.  The pattern of water demand and use in the Nile basin
contrasts sharply with the pattern of supply: the upper valley states, in
particular Ethiopia, are best placed geographically, but the lower valley
states, especially Egypt, have the vital resource interest and can
exercise decisive military and economic power.  The paradox is that the
countries contributing the most water are using the least, but the
countries using the most are those that have the power.
        The utilization level of Nile waters by the co-basin states varies
with their respective socio-economic development:  Egypt, the most
developed nation in the basin, uses 55.5 km3 of water each year and
projects demands of 65.5 km3.  The Sudan, the most rapidly developing
basin nation, consumes about 13 km3 per year with a projected use of 30
km3 expected as agricultural irrigation expands.  Egypt and the Sudan
account for over 90% of the water drawn from the Nile.   However, there
are seven other basin states and their demand for water will inevitably
grow.  (See Figure 4.)  The upper riparian states, Tanzania, Uganda,
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Rwanda, Kenya, Burundi, and Zaire, utilize 0.05 km3 collectively; Ethiopia
utilizes only 0.6 km3.  This is ironic because combined, these states
contribute 72 km3 of water per year, or about 86 percent of the Nile's
flow. 
Figure 4.  Water Situations for Selected Nile Basin
States.
        Political boundaries present real obstacles to efficient water use
and are often more difficult to overcome than physical ones.  Much of the
strain surrounding water in the Nile basin stems from a zero-sum game
perception: one nation's gain is another nation's loss.  As long as
nations remain locked in such thinking, the tension and distrust among
them will persist.  A country faced with the prospect for a cooperative
endeavor has three broad options: (1) to seek international agreement with
neighboring states for joint management or development; (2) to develop a
national plan that will maximize the country's net benefits from the same
resources irrespective of other basin countries' actions; or (3) to retain
the status quo and do nothing.  The determination of the most favorable
option is based upon the assumption that for each party the net benefits
desired from international agreement must be greater than those associated
with the national option, which in turn must be greater than the status
quo alternative.  All nine basin states could equitably share, utilize,
and manage natural resources to the benefit and welfare of the basin's
population, but optimum development will require treating the drainage
basin as a unit and breaking through the barriers.
        "The tendency of political analysts has been to make alarmist
predictions based on extrapolations of competing demands for water in the
face of dwindling supplies while ignoring the great potential for managing
and moderating those demands internally."   The task calls for a
fundamental change in perception and attitude.  Water must be recognized
as a valuable and vulnerable resource.  It must no longer be taken for
granted as an inexhaustible free good: this leads to perceptions of water
scarcity.  Scarcity is, to some extent, a relative concept.  The Nile
states, although not water rich, do have a fairly substantial freshwater
resource available for their use.  Unfortunately, the pattern of water
allocation, along with policies that discourage (or at least do not
encourage) efficient utilization lead to a perception that water is more
scarce than in actuality.  Nile water is currently mismanaged and heavily
misused which exacerbates regional water problems.  Management, therefore,
must be addressed by all the basin states to maximize available water
resources, since options for developing new supplies are severely limited.
        A management model has to be a combination of efficient allocation
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principles for locally competing demands and rules for fair regional
sharing between up and downstream users.  Integrated water management can
be contemplated on at least three levels: basinwide, regional, and local.
Great opportunities exist for better use of water before it is eventually
lost through discharge to the sea or evaporation: most involve improved
management practices at all levels.  The Nile is a geographical unit --
projects for its full development must also form a unity, the parts of
which must work together.
        Before discussing the shared problems and management opportunities
available to the parties involved, it is important to understand the
region's hydrology, or where the Nile water comes from in the first place.
Nile River Hydrology 
        The Nile is one of the great natural wonders of the world: it is
the longest river, flowing south to north 6,825 kilometers (km) over 35
degrees of latitude.  The Nile's catchment basin covers approximately
one-tenth of the African continent, with an area of 3,007,000 square
kilometers. (km2)  (See Map 3 in appendix.)  The Nile basin, because of
its size and variety of climates and topographies, constitutes one of the
most complex of all major river basins.  For the vastness of the Nile
basin, however, the river's annual discharge is relatively small.  The
annual flow of the Nile is about 84 billion cubic meters  (bcm).  The Nile
is distinguished from other great rivers of the world since half of its
course flows through country with no effective rainfall.  Throughout the
northern reaches of the Nile human civilizations have been dependent upon
the river for their very survival: without the river, Egyptian
civilization would not exist.  (See Maps 4 and 5 in appendix.)
        The Nile has two major tributaries, the White Nile and the Blue
Nile.  These two principal headwaters are very different from each other:
they arise in contrasting climatic and physiographical areas and are
characterized by disparate hydrological regimes.  (See Figure 5.)  The
White Nile flows out of the tropical rainbelt of Central Africa with
relatively little interseasonal variation.  Its principal source is Lake
Victoria, the second largest freshwater lake in the world after Lake
Superior.  Nearly one-third of Victoria's entire inflow is derived from
the 60,000 km2 Kagera River catchment.  Most of Rwanda and Burundi lie in
this basin, while 33 percent and 10 percent of the catchment area fall
within Tanzania and Uganda, respectively.  Lake Victoria straddles the
equator and lies 5,611 km from the mouth of the river.
Figure 5.  Cross Sections of the Two Major Nile
Tributaries from their Sources to the Mediterranean Sea.
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From this lake issues the Victoria Nile, which passes through Lakes Kyoga
and Albert.  From Lake Albert to Nimule on the Uganda-Sudan border, the
river is known as the Albert Nile.  After plunging through the Fola rapids
and into the Sudan, the river becomes the Behr el-Jebel (meaning mountain
sea) and travels over a 168 km distance to reach Juba, the capital of
southern Sudan.  At this point the river has 4,787 km to travel before
reaching the Mediterranean Sea.
        A great deal of the Behr el-Jebel's waters, however, never reach
the sea.  North of Juba the river reaches the bottom of its upstream
drainage basin.  Its slope flattens dramatically: water spills out over
its banks and spreads out in all directions, forming a giant papyrus swamp
called the Sudd (the barrier).  The total area of the great swamps of the
upper Nile can never be measured with precision since their size varies
with the season, governed by the fluctuations in outfall from the
equatorial lakes.  But the size has been estimated to range from 16,931
km2 to 30,600 km2 during the rainy season,  and the permanent swamp area
is about 6,000 km2.  As the river moves through the Sudd it loses about
one-half of its total discharge - approximately 14 bcm - through
evaporation, but maintains sufficient velocity to cut a slow meandering
600 km course until it reaches Lake No.  There it is joined by other
tributaries: the Behr el-Ghazal, which receives its water from Zaire, and
the Behr el-Arab and Lo Rivers of western Sudan.  Known then as the White
Nile, the river jogs east, picks up the flow of the Sobat River that rises
in the Ethiopian Highlands, and turns to Malakal, 3,832 km from the
river's mouth.  From this point to Khartoum (the convergence point of the
White and the Blue Nile Rivers), a distance of 807 km, the White Nile
receives no additional water.
        The Blue Nile flows from the highlands of Ethiopia and is strongly
seasonal, subject to the annual monsoons streaming in from the Indian
Ocean.  The principal source of the Blue Nile is Lake Tana, but over its
course, it picks up the flow of two seasonal tributaries, the Dinder and
the Rahad.  The Blue Nile flows approximately 2,500 km from its headwaters
to Khartoum.
        Flowing downstream from Khartoum is the main Nile itself.  Except
for the seasonal discharge of the Atbara River that enters 320 km north of
Khartoum, the Nile receives no perennial sources of water over the rest of
its 3,000 km journey to the sea.  This is the longest stretch of river in
the world for which this can be said, and is all the more notable
considering the flow is through the eastern reaches of the largest desert
in the world, the Sahara.
        All waters of the Nile are derived from rainfall upon the
Ethiopian plateau and upon the hinterlands of the Equatorial lakes.  As
one moves downstream from these regions annual precipitation declines in
volume and increases in variability.  While rainfall at the headwaters of
both Niles is abundant it is by no means consistent.  The seasonal
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rainfall fluctuations in the Blue Nile headwater region of Ethiopia are
much more marked than those prevailing at the source of the White Nile.
During the summer months (the flood season) the Blue Nile predominates,
accounting for some 90 percent of the united river's flow, an average of
10 bcm per month.  During the winter and spring months (the dry season),
however, the Blue Nile delivers no more than 0.5 bcm per month, so it is
the White Nile that sustains the flow with its delivery of about 2 bcm per
month.   (See Figure 6, also see Maps 6 and 7 in appendix.)  In sum,
approximately 86 percent of the Nile's flow originates in Ethiopia: the
Blue Nile contributes 73 percent and the Atbara 13 percent.  The other 14
percent is contributed by the White Nile. 
        The united Nile's annual delivery to Aswan generally ranges from
80 bcm to 90 bcm.  However, depending on the vagaries of the monsoonal
weather over Ethiopia, the variation can be much greater.   This is the
heart of the matter: the total volume of water available in any given year
is subject to substantial hydrologic variability.  Precipitation over the
Nile basin, and consequently Nile discharge, has fluctuated both
historically and prehistorically.
Figure 6.  Relative Contributions of the White Nile,
Blue Nile, and Atbara Tributaries to the Main Nile River.
        Substantial variations in Nile precipitation have occurred on long
(>1,000 year) and short (<10 year) timescales.  In the past, these variant
factors have been exclusively natural in origin, but the progressive human
impact on the global environment over recent centuries has now led to the
possibility of anthropogenic forcing of Nile Basin precipitation.  In
other words, natural processes are affected by human practices.  The
magnitude of historical fluctuations in Nile discharge experienced both in
this century and in previous millennia is unlikely to be lessened in the
future.  Regional land-cover changes, agricultural and urban development,
population explosion, and increased global greenhouse gas concentrations
may well increase the amplitude of such fluctuations to main Nile
discharge.  Any future management plan of the Nile must consider these
factors.
Basinwide Management
The most broad approach to integrated water management addresses the
interrelationships between water and social and economic development.  At
this basinwide management level, interest lies in overarching policies and
practices that can benefit all riparian countries within the basin.  The
concern is to determine the extent to which water is both an opportunity
for and a barrier against development, and to ensure that water is managed
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and used such that social and economic growth may be sustained over the
long term.
The multiplicity of nations represents both the single most powerful
obstacle to basinwide development planning as well as the most compelling
argument favoring such an approach.  Almost all countries in the Nile
basin face a number of environmental problems, such as deforestation, soil
erosion, and sedimentation, as well as social and political problems, such
as lack of appropriate institutions, financial resources, and trained
manpower for environmental protection and management.  These problems,
coupled with poverty and high population growth, pose serious threats to
the water resource and hence the life support system of the basin's
environment.  It is therefore important that all Nile basin states pool
their efforts to protect the environment and avert disasters such as
drought, famine, desertification, and floods.
Optimal development of the basin's water resources depends on agreement
and cooperation between individual countries that share several common
difficulties.  Among them are population growth, insufficient agricultural
production, and evaporative losses.  These all directly impact the
available water supply for all basin countries.  An integrated approach to
resolving these issues is most logical given the fact that all countries
have a stake in the outcome.  In addition, since these dilemmas transcend
international boundaries, any action taken by one nation will almost
assuredly impact other nations in the region.  Prior to a discussion of
the benefits and constraints associated with a basinwide management
approach, the major problems driving the need for such an approach must
first be addressed.
Population
        Not surprisingly, as population grows and demand increases, so
does the pressure on freshwater supplies and the capacity for conflicts.
"In many countries in the Nile basin population growth, often at about 3
per cent per annum, is on a collision course with water resources."
Population growth is the most fundamental constraint aggravating the water
shortage in the Nile basin.  Increased populations affect the demand for
water in several ways.  A larger population will need more water for human
consumption, for livestock, and for industrial and commercial activities.
Population growth increases the demand for food, and hence for irrigation
and agricultural development.  In water scarce countries, population size
and consumption patterns will determine quality of life.  As a
consequence, the Nile riparians' freshwater needs to support health,
quality of life, and socioeconomic development are rapidly increasing.
        Until recent years the use of Nile water has gradually increased,
keeping pace with the increase in population.  The nine Nile basin states
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are, however, faced with the prospect of continuing population increases,
but with only limited further water available.  The population increase in
these regions with already high levels of water scarcity may be expected
to generate water crises as increased numbers of humans will impact both
water quantity and quality.  The populations of Egypt, the Sudan, and
Ethiopia have grown steadily since 1960.  Egypt's population alone grows
by another million people every nine months.  By the year 2025, Ethiopia
is forecast to have a population of approximately 122 million, 20 percent
higher than that of Egypt.   Along with the Nile countries themselves,
pressure is added by the fact that the Horn of Africa harbors one of the
world's largest refugee populations.  In total, the population of co-basin
states is expected to reach 812 million from the present 246 million by
the year 2040.
        Close relationships exist between water resources, population
health and land use.  (See Graphs 1, 2, and 3.)  A growing population
needs not only water, but also biomass to provide food, fodder, fuelwood,
and timber: the demographic element of food supply will continue to
undermine the attempts of all governments to meet food demands.  Water
scarcity may constrain land-use options through the risk of crop failures
and water supply problems caused by growing populations and industrial
sectors.  In addition, headwater resources of the Nile have not been
extensively developed - the main development has taken place in the
semi-arid and arid zones of the basin - where water is most lacking.  In
view of Egypt's population growth and arid climate, Lake Nasser (the
storage reservoir created by the Aswan High Dam) by itself cannot provide
Egypt with the total hydrological and agricultural security that was the
original rationale for the High Dam.  Population increases will also
require Ethiopia and the Sudan to 
Graph 1.  Egyptian Agricultural Production and
Population.
Graph 2.  Ethiopian Agricultural Production and
Population.
Graph 3.  Sudanese Agricultural Production and
Population.
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expand food production dramatically, but there are few avenues open to
Ethiopia for such expansion, and the Sudan will require greater amounts of
irrigation water - amounts that do not exist.  Given the current
co-basin's population growth, the question to be asked is whether they
will be able to maintain a reasonable degree of food self sufficiency or
whether they will become dependent on food imports.
        Among the basin states, seven are least developed countries with
per capita annual income ranging from 120 to 310 US dollars.  The
relationship between population growth and poverty is important - if the
growth of the economy is not sufficient to absorb and remunerate rapidly
expanding labor forces, poverty will not be reduced.  The Nile basin
countries have a very low financial base and are internationally indebted.
Rapid population growth combined with international debt begs the question
of whether meaningful economic development is possible.  Reducing
population growth would be the single most beneficial development in terms
of addressing problems of feeding populations and enabling the formulation
of sustainable and economic water use policies.  Controlling population
growth would also reduce political tensions over water availability.  It
is urgent that a conceptual framework be developed linking population,
including its sociocultural systems, with the various functions of water
in the landscape, elaborating the connection between environment and
development.  Increases in populations and demand for higher standards of
living dictate that natural resources be developed to the maximum benefit
of humankind.
Agriculture/Irrigation
        Even more than population pressure, yet directly linked,
agriculture lies behind most of the region's water problems.  Given the
present composition of their overall economies, the major determinant of
the water balance remains the agricultural sector.  The Nile has provided
the basis of agricultural development in Egypt and the Sudan since the
start of agriculture about 7,000 years ago, and for political reasons,
most East African nations have adopted policies of self-sufficiency when
dealing with food supplies.  In the Nile basin agriculture accounts for at
least 80% of all water consumption.   (See Maps 8, 9, and 10 in appendix.)
Whereas a few liters of water per day are a basic minimum for human
survival, at least a ton per day is required to produce the food needed
for a reasonable diet for just one person.   Ideally, all of the water
used for agriculture should be passed through a crop on its way into the
atmosphere or to sea, and much of it actually is.  However, that does not
necessarily mean that it is used most efficiently.
        There is little doubt that the most dramatic improvements in the
use of water can be made in the agricultural sector.  To begin with,
certain current water use practices should be discouraged.  Among these
are the irrigated production of water-guzzling crops in arid regions that
can readily be imported from water-rich regions; and the continued
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reliance on inefficient irrigation methods that tend to waterlog and
salinize the soil.  For example, in Egypt, the growing of rice and sugar
cane, which both require a great deal of water, is questionable.  In the
hot climate, the return on agricultural yield per unit of water evaporated
is poor and thus inefficient.  Also, the most prevalent method of
irrigation in the region is still the surface flooding of basins or
furrows, a process that has, at best, a 50 percent efficiency.  This
irrigation technique involves the needless percolation or runoff of half
or more of the water delivered.  As viable alternatives, sprinkler
irrigation can be operated at an efficiency of 70 percent or more, while
drip irrigation can attain an efficiency as high as 90 percent if
competently managed. 
        Agriculture has a significant impact on water - it influences not
only the quality of water passing on to downstream parts of the river
basin, but flow as well.  Land use also involves waste handling and the
output of chemicals to the atmosphere, the land, and the water bodies,
polluting the water circulating in the system.  Proper management,
therefore, demands that land and water management be integrated.  As a
result, the basin nations need to cooperate with each other in their
respective agricultural planning.  A partial solution could lie in the
distribution of different crops to areas of the basin where they would be
most bountiful.  For example, water intensive or long season crops could
be grown in the upper basin while crops requiring less water and growing
time could be produced in the lower basin.  Agricultural trades between
the states could then ensue.
Egypt
        With the lowest per capita arable land base in Africa, and with a
rapidly increasing population, sustainability of agriculture in Egypt has
now become a critical issue.  In Egypt, the major resource constraint to
sustainable agricultural development is water, not land.  Less than 4% of
the country's land area is cultivated at present.   Egyptian agroclimatic
conditions are particularly suitable for irrigated agriculture and the
technology already exists for substantial increases in crop yields.  It
has been estimated that the yield in most crops could be increased by
one-third or more.  The High Dam at Aswan has assured two crops per year,
but there exists every possibility that by using shorter term crop
varieties, a third crop could be introduced - judicious crop selection
could help achieve greater yields without use of additional water.  The
scope for agricultural improvement is enormous and the return on
investment is high.  Egypt has significant quantities of irrigation
drainage water that could be reused, and increased efficiency of water
utilization could free up even more water for alternative uses, in Egypt
and elsewhere.
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the Sudan
        In the 1970s, the Sudan was widely perceived to be a potential
breadbasket capable of alleviating the growing food deficit in the Middle
East.  Unfortunately, these high expectations have not yet been realized,
apparently owing to poor management.  The potential is still there,
however.  Within the Sudan there is still much highly fertile and easily
irrigable land, given adequate river control.  Plans for irrigation in the
Sudan are concerned with the rehabilitation and modernization of existing
agronomic designs, intensification of cropping, and the development of new
irrigation schemes.
Ethiopia
        At present Ethiopia cultivates 90 thousand hectares of irrigated
land, compared to Egypt's 3.2 million hectares, most of which is located
in its eastern parts.  In all only 4 percent of the potentially irrigable
land has been developed.   The implication that Ethiopia might utilize
water to irrigate even half of its 3.7 million irrigable hectares is very
significant to downstream users.  The fact that it has an estimated
average of 112 km3 of water available for use annually means that Ethiopia
has the possibility to command sufficient water to irrigate a much greater
area than currently irrigated in Egypt and the Sudan combined.
        The basic problem facing Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Sudan is thus a
familiar one: there is not enough Nile water available to complete all of
the irrigation schemes on the drawing boards of these three riparian
nations.  (See Table 2.)  Adding to this already tense situation is the
possibility that Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya will bring another 1/2
million acres under irrigation by the year 2000.   If this occurs, these
upstream states will certainly pull greater amounts of water from their
Nile resources, thus reducing further the amount available to downstream
nations.  (See Graph 4.)  As time progresses, the need for water to keep
pace with the expansion of irrigated agriculture will have to compete with
water needs for other purposes.  Water requirements for the domestic
sector will continue to increase because of increasing population.
Industrial water demands will also increase significantly; thus the amount
of water available for agriculture will decline, forcing the agricultural
sector to do more with less.  This therefore requires an efficient high
input agriculture making intensive and effective use of land and human
resources.
                 Table 2:  Projected Water Balance Sheet - Year 2000 
Supply (as calculated at Aswan) 
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Mean discharge assumed in Nile Waters Agreement 84.0 km3
Actual increase in century mean                 4.1 km3
Benefit of Jonglei Phase I                      3.8 km3
Total                                           91.9 km3
        
Demand (as calculated at Aswan) 
Egyptian                                        68.9 km3
Sudanese                                        32.0 km3
Ethiopian                                       2.0 km3
Total                                           102.9 km3
Graph 4.  Projected Irrigated Areas.
Evaporation
        The heavy evaporation and general dryness of the climate in Egypt
and most of the Sudan have severe implications.  (See Figure 7.)  For
example, substantial water losses from the surface of Lake Nasser occur,
which,  estimated at about 10 x 109 m3 per year, eliminate approximately
10% of the reservoir's net storage volume.   In southern Sudan, enormous
amounts of water, estimated to total at least 20 bcm, are lost in the Sudd
swamps each year. 
        As if those facts are not alarming enough, evaporation losses are
likely to increase over the next century.  Although these may be partially
compensated for by the increased precipitation yield over the White Nile
catchment, the need for completion of water preservation projects and
other planned water conservation methods is implied.  Measures to reduce
evaporative losses have been under consideration for many years; however,
substantial political, social, and environmental problems are associated
with most of the proposals and have thus far blocked most efforts.
        Opportunities exist that could substantially reduce evaporative
losses in the Nile basin.  Storing more of the rivers' waters in Ethiopian
highland reservoirs, where evaporation is much lower than in Egypt's Lake
Nasser, could result in more water for all downstream countries.  Shifting
the major storage from Lake Nasser to reservoirs located in Ethiopia would
reduce water losses not only because the climate in Ethiopia is less
evaporative than the desert climate of Egypt, but also because the
topography of the Blue Nile gorge in Ethiopia allows for a more favorable
volume-to-surface ratio.  The proposed upstream reservoirs would also
regulate the water flow to the possible benefit of both upstream and
file:///C|/545/1996/smith.html (14 of 32) [6/18/2008 10:52:59 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/smith.html
downstream users.
        Other opportunities for cooperation exist in the Sudan.  The
reservoir behind the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile, 40 km south of
Khartoum, has annual evaporation losses of about 2.8 bcm.   Elimination of
this reservoir would substantially reduce these losses.  Works upstream in
the Southern Sudan could substantially increase the total water available
by draining the marshes of the Sudd.  The potential yield from Sudd
projects could provide an additional 14 km3 per annum.   Finally, over 200
possible water storage combinations exist in the upper riparian states,
which would significantly reduce water losses from evaporation.   However,
implementing any one of them will require accord and cooperation between
all basin countries.
        All Nile countries, in the long term, would benefit by working
together to reduce evaporative losses on a basinwide scale.
Figure 7.  Evaporation's Effect on Water
Supplies.
Constraints to Basinwide Planning
Nile Waters Agreements
The quest for basinwide management was actually begun by the British, who
held sway over the greater part of the Nile basin until the middle of the
twentieth century.  Their idea was to develop the entire basin in an
integrated fashion, through a series of dams controlling the outflow from
the equatorial lakes feeding both tributaries and a canal for the White
Nile to bypass the Sudd.  Prospects for the comprehensive integrated
development of the Nile basin dimmed when British colonialism ended and
the newly independent basin nations began to assert their distinct
national interests.  From 1898 until the late 1940's attention on the
waters of the Nile focused almost entirely on the irrigation needs of
Egypt and the Sudan.  The possible future requirements of Ethiopia and the
other basin nations were ignored.  The countries at the headwaters of the
Nile, with substantial annual rainfall, were not thought of as areas where
irrigation might be needed, despite the unpredictability and uneven
distribution of rainfall in some parts and a high level of aridity in
others.
The most recent, and most famous, accord was the Nile Waters Agreement of
1959.  The agreement assumed the following availability and proposed
allocations (in km3): 
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Average Annual Nile Flow                                84
Reservoir Losses Due to Evaporation and Seepage         (10)
Net Water Availability per Annum                        74
Allotment to the Sudan                                  18.5
Allotment to Egypt                                      55.5
Total Water Usage per Annum                             74
No other potentially interested party or state was consulted about the
final agreement between Egypt and the Sudan which was announced in Cairo
and Khartoum on November 4, 1959.  The upstream states' reaction was that
the downstream states had simply divided the recognized average flow of
the Nile between themselves, leaving nothing for any other countries.
This is exactly what happened, and the inequity continues to the present
day.  Although the Sudan has yet to utilize its full share of water, Egypt
already uses its full allotment plus the surplus that the Sudan does not
use, thus fully exploiting all available water resources.  Ethiopia and
other nations have over the last 40 years stressed their rightful
entitlement to the use of Nile water.  Since they were not included in the
1959 Agreement between Egypt and the Sudan, they therefore do not feel
bound by the treaty in any way and contend that they have a right to
exploit natural water resources within their borders.  The current
situation is characterized by distrust, disagreement, adversarial actions,
and threats.  It is completely unproductive and unfair.
In addition to the 1959 Agreement, six other major agreements regarding
the utilization of the Nile waters have been signed in modern history:
none of them included more than three states.  It is obvious that such a
fractured approach will not serve to promote the interests of all nations.
It will be necessary to develop a basinwide management strategy for the
future and to renegotiate a new Nile Waters Agreement that includes all
nine riparians.  Despite the long-term necessity of negotiating a new
agreement, there are numerous barriers to such an accord that must be
addressed.  These include, among others, factors such as perpetual
political and economic instability, lack of skilled manpower, and a
shortage of financial resources.
Control
        The concern for sovereignty is a major obstacle in the way of
integrated international river development.  Confidence must be felt
between neighbors before they are willing to commit treasured natural
resources to interdependent development and management.  "Even where
states are willing to cooperate for mutual benefit, each generally desires
to preserve as much control as possible over territories and resources
within its own boundaries." 
        Because Egypt and the Sudan are the most dependent on the Nile
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waters for survival, they are extremely concerned with securing their
water supplies.  It has been stated that, "the national security of Egypt,
which is based on the water of the Nile, is in the hands of other African
countries."   This makes Egypt especially wary of development schemes
proposed by upstream riparians.  Two possible ways of assuring Egypt and
the Sudan of their water supplies would be for all the countries to
develop and agree upon specific operating rules for upstream reservoirs
and agree to abide by general principles for water sharing.
        Not one of the riparian states to the south of Egypt has
implemented any water schemes that could threaten Egypt or the Sudan's
water resources - Egypt's Aswan High Dam is the only scheme with far
reaching consequences for a neighboring country.  One reason for this is
that the other Nile countries are extremely poor and none of them, with
the exception of the Sudan, have been able to get assistance from donor
nations or lending institutions for any major water projects.  A more
important reason, however, is political: all nine riparian states have
been ravaged by civil war or engaged in interstate warfare, which is
thwarting development.
Equitable Use
        For a development strategy to be sustainable, it must consider the
achievement of a reasonable and equitably distributed level of economic
well-being among basin states.  Basinwide cooperation should be founded on
principles of equitable apportionment of the drainage basin waters in such
a manner as to both meet the needs of co-riparian states and minimize
disadvantages to them.  The term "equitable" does not necessarily imply
equal division between the nations involved.  Rather, its application to
specific cases must be flexible, taking into account a wide range of
factors.
        What constitutes reasonable and equitable is the crux of all
water-sharing agreements and is open to widely different interpretations.
Population size, geography, climate, historical use, and availability of
other water sources are among the many factors that could be taken into
account in determining equitable allocations among basin countries, but a
clear formula for doing so does not exist.  Definitions of equitable
utilization must be negotiated and applied to any future Nile water
agreements.
International Law
Unfortunately, there are no well-established international laws on river
basins that could help lead the Nile states to a cooperative
understanding.  As previously stated, the current situation is such that
Egypt and the Sudan, who do not contribute to the water resources, are the
main users while the rights of the other seven riparians have been denied.
The first step in international law development must be the promulgation
of a set of principles on which to base a legal code.  For shared river
file:///C|/545/1996/smith.html (17 of 32) [6/18/2008 10:52:59 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/smith.html
basins, the question is which nation should be given priority: whether the
one upstream or its neighbor downstream; the nation whose territory
contributes most to the resource or the one that occupies the greater
proportion of the watershed; the nation with the greater need or the one
with the greater population; the nation that has used the resource longest
or the one with fewer alternative sources.  In the absence of an agreed
set of principles, it is typically the nation with the greater power or
the stronger international alliances whose interests predominate.  This is
what occurs in the Nile region.  Almost all the nations lack hydrological
data, capital, modern technology, and support from international
organizations and donor countries.  Egypt is the only riparian possessing
advanced technology, river basin information, and adequate financial
backing by developed countries and international organizations.
International laws would help promote a basinwide perspective for river
resource development, and would bolster support for the less developed
basin nations.
Advancement Toward Basinwide Management
New Agreements
        Even though the above constraints to basinwide river management
exist, several compelling reasons for such development necessitate the
renegotiation of a Nile Waters Agreement in the near future.  The most
important are the demographic and agricultural trends in Nile Basin
states.  A new agreement should focus on opportunities for expanding the
usable yield of the Nile River and encourage interdependencies among basin
countries, the general objective being the maintenance and enhancement of
the overall social and economic development of all people in the basin.
Cooperation based on clearly identified objectives will accrue benefits to
all nine countries.  Some of the possible components of a new agreement
that would lead to collective improvements are discussed below.
Water Markets
        It could be possible for the Nile states, especially Egypt, the
Sudan, and Ethiopia, to buy and sell water rights from one another.  The
establishment of a mechanism for basinwide buying and selling of water
would be one of the most significant innovations that could be introduced
in a new water agreement.  A regional water market would have numerous
benefits.  Foremost among these would be the ability of a market to
allocate water to areas where it will have the highest returns, thus
promoting regional economic development.  Second, it would encourage
sustainable agricultural policies and judicious crop selections, since
overuse of a nation's water allotment would mean having to pay for water.
Third, if a new treaty guaranteed that a certain proportion of each
country's share of Nile water would be available to be traded, it would
probably be easier to reach agreement on the allocation of the long-term
Nile yield among Egypt, the Sudan, and Ethiopia.  Fourth, markets could be
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used to assist with rationing during times of water shortage.
Trading
A basinwide development plan should take into account the natural
occurrence and location of the resource and the potential for development
and use of the Nile waters in each country.  Development in one nation
should aim to maximize the benefits for as many other riparian states as
possible.  For example, hydroelectric power in Uganda and Ethiopia could
benefit several other riparians, while increased agricultural production
in Egypt and the Sudan could do the same.
Ethiopia's potential for hydropower development is enormous.  A
proposition of far-reaching potential importance to the future of Nile
water supplies would be the construction of a series of dams in Ethiopia.
It is argued that Egypt's development is constrained more by lack of power
than lack of water.  Thus, a mutually beneficial arrangement would appear
to be possible with respect to water and power, whereby Egypt would agree
to a greater water allocation for Ethiopia and to the construction of Blue
Nile Reservoirs on the condition that a certain percentage of the
electricity generated would be sold to Egypt at a specified price.
Because of Egypt's growing demands for electricity, the Blue Nile
Reservoirs may be more valuable for their hydroelectric power generation
than for water regulation and storage.  Reservoirs would also control Blue
Nile floods, which could be particularly beneficial to the Sudan.  Added
upstream storage would facilitate expansion of the Sudan's gravity-fed
irrigated areas, which in turn would mean greater crop production.  It
could be possible to negotiate a trade arrangement whereby Ethiopia trades
electricity to Egypt and the Sudan in return for agricultural and/or
industrial products.
        Although it may seem odd in light of the current trend toward a
world economy, the nine states of the Nile basin, though connected by the
river are not moved to relate intensely with each other.  The dominant
trading partners of all nine nations for both exports and imports are the
industrialized economies of Europe, North America, and the Far East.  The
basin states do not have a history of trading amongst themselves.
Establishing trade relationships through a basinwide agreement would be a
novel approach that could provide unrealized gains within the region.
Nile Basin Commission
        Among the basin countries, there must be at least a latent
willingness to work for a cooperative agreement and accept its
obligations: this is crucial for states to be able to address joint
problems.  In terms of willingness to cooperate the most encouraging sign
is the existing proposal for a new basinwide commission to include all
nine member states.  Egypt and the Sudan have submitted a draft proposal
to the Nile riparian states for the establishment of a Nile Basin
Commission.  The Commission, to be composed of one representative from
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each country, would assist the riparian states in cooperating to draft
rational plans for the conservation, allocation, and development of the
water resources of the entire Nile basin.  Because it bestows a spirit of
cooperation, advances mutual interests, and settles issues through
discussion and negotiation, this framework is gaining acceptance within
the basin states.
A New Nile Waters Agreement
In order to negotiate a new agreement among all basin states, several
things must occur: the first is that other riparians must be able to make
credible commitments to Egypt with respect to future shared development.
Second, the upstream riparians have very few people with the necessary
hydrological expertise or knowledge of the history of Nile water
management efforts to participate effectively in negotiations; they must
train or hire educated people to help with this.  Third, in all of the
riparian countries, Nile water issues are being handled primarily by
diplomats - scientists must begin to play a greater role.  Last, any new
policies or potential agreements must be shared with and agreed to by all
states.
        There are four types of favorable conditions that can exist among
shared river basin countries: (1) the countries have the same technical
perception of problems within the basin; (2) the countries share similar
values and tastes for goods and services such as environmental quality or
river basin development; (3) the countries use the same technologies for
production activities; and (4) between countries there exists an extensive
network of transnational and transgovernmental contacts.  Unfortunately,
the Nile basin states currently have none of these commonalties.  A new
compact should address these issues through mechanisms for bringing all
sovereign states into equal membership of a community to equitably utilize
land and water resources and to protect the physical, biological, and
social environment.  Along with the above suggestions, other general
recommendations for the nations include: preparing national water plans,
designing and conducting adequate water studies on the river basin,
introducing improved storage/augmentation projects, and developing the
most efficient uses for water.  Each country's right to use the Nile
waters within their territory should be recognized, as long as it does not
cause appreciable harm to other riparian users.
        Much can be done to promote efficient use of water and to augment
water supplies.  Integrated river basin development should be perceived as
a set of anthropogenic activities which takes place in an interlinked and
complex ecosystem.  The Nile basin is one such system which represents a
very large and highly valued hydrological unit.  It is only when a
meaningful, comprehensive, and integrated strategy and plan of action is
developed and implemented that the problems of the Nile nations can be
tackled effectively.  It should be stressed that the basin's environment
should be seen as one ecological entity and that its sustainability
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requires concerted action by all basin states.
Regional and Local Management Strategies
        The value of the Nile's water varies among the nine basin nations
with respect to their uses for irrigation, hydro-electric power,
navigation, water-based recreation, and industrial and municipal purposes.
Ideally, Nile water should be divided in such a way that the allocation of
a quantum supply to one individual nation can improve the well-being of
that country without decreasing the well-being of the other eight nations.
Basinwide management strategies are best suited to address these issues
and can provide the greatest number of benefits to the most people.
However, they cannot work alone: they must be supported by management
strategies at lower levels - regional and local.  Together these three
levels provide a comprehensive approach to planning and development.
Regional Management
        Integrated water management implies that while water is, by
itself, a system, it is also a component of and actor in larger systems.
In that respect, the interactions between water, land, and the environment
must be addressed, recognizing that changes in any one may have
consequences for the others.  This is a regional management perspective.
Interests here focus on issues such as erosion control, pollution control,
wetlands preservation, agricultural drainage, and recreational water use.
Currently in the Nile basin, the countries with the greatest potential to
impact water scarcity at the regional level are Egypt and the Sudan.
Before constructing the Aswan High Dam, groundwater was used as a
supplement to irrigation in the winter, but since that time this practice
has fallen into decline.  This is unfortunate because Egypt's available
groundwater storage is estimated to be around 400 km3 - considerably
larger than that of Lake Nasser (130 km3) and unlike the lake, aquifers
are recharged through irrigation and are not subject to evaporative
losses.  Groundwater resources in the Sudan are also available for
development.  Although small, they are, nevertheless, resources and are
estimated to have a potential yield of 2 km3 per year.   Since Egypt and
the Sudan are the major users of water in the basin, it is reasonable that
they should put forth an effort to utilize all the water resources within
their own borders in efforts to reduce the amounts they take from other
upstream countries who will themselves need more water in the future.
Local Management
        The local level of integrated water management accepts that water
comprises an ecological system  formed by a number of interdependent
components.  Each element may influence other components and, therefore,
needs to be managed with regard to its interrelationships.  Local water
development and allocation is not only a quantitative problem: with
intensified water use, pollution becomes rampant.  At this level of
integration, management attention is directed toward joint consideration
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of such aspects as water supply and demand, wastewater treatment and
disposal, and water quantity and quality.
        Controlling demand, rather than supply, at the local level will
prove cost-effective and sustaining for all Nile basin states.  The demand
for water by a society is not a preordained, unquestionable quantity that
must be satisfied at all costs simply because it exists or is claimed, yet
the prevailing supply orientation treats demand as a "given" that must be
satisfied by ever-greater supply.  What is needed is a more balanced
approach that regards demand as a variable quantity to be controlled, and
recognizes conservation, efficient use, and protection of quality as
primary goals of rational water resource management.
        Nile states wishing to resolve ongoing water disputes must go
beyond bickering over competitive allocation of existing supplies for
traditional uses and instead concentrate on longer-term programs.  Such
schemes should be aimed at augmenting supplies, avoiding waste, improving
utilization efficiency, and capturing wastewater for treatment and reuse.
Implementing conservation measures, on any scale, tends to be far less
expensive than the construction of capital-intensive projects such as
desalination plants and dams.  Industries and households could recycle and
reuse water for many purposes, thus reducing the need to increase supply.
At present there is much latitude for improving the way Nile water is used
on a local level, and doing so seems the most immediate, practical, and
economical approach to tackling the water shortage.  In other words, think
basinwide - act locally.
Cooperative Policy Formulation
Redistributive politics is a term used to describe the reallocation of
wealth and income or goods and services, or control over resources between
or within nations.   For purposes of an international rivers discussion,
redistributive politics is more widely defined to also include those
controversies in which one group must give up something directly to
another group.  This would include reallocation of river water rights and
the redistribution of authority between nations.  Establishing or changing
the allocation of water rights for a major international river such as the
Nile is a substantial political undertaking on any level.  Hydrologic,
economic, and foreign policy considerations influence the Nile nations'
policies toward cooperation on their international watercourse.  Improving
international relations will help form basinwide management policies, but
the success of such policies in the international arena depends greatly on
conditions that exist within the basin countries.
To effectively co-manage a water resource, policies geared toward
cooperative efforts must be developed at all management levels.  Policies
for cooperative river basin management may be advanced from any number of
different sources, including interest groups, parliamentary committees,
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political leaders, and/or government departments.  One possible way to
begin this process would be to divide responsibility between the different
levels.  The local and regional levels could have day to day
responsibility over the resource in question, while the basinwide
management group would have the authority to oversee all activities and to
initiate international negotiations when necessary.  Opening lines of
communication and sharing information between and among the nine Nile
riparians would be the first step toward forming cooperative policy-making
coalitions.
A nonpolicy approach toward integrated basinwide management is based on
economics.  It may be possible to apply market mechanisms as a means of
achieving better allocations of water.  With this approach, each unit of
water could be demanded and used where it would give the highest value in
return.  In addition, the cost of supplying the water demanded could
ideally be reduced if its development and distribution are taken care of
by actors in the market, as compared to arrangements made by a political
or administrative system.  From a resource perspective, a
demand-management approach is promising, since it tends to reduce
overconsumption, thus making relatively more water available for all of
the Nile nations.
The question of how to begin the implementation of any of the water
management strategies discussed is extremely difficult.  The need for
cooperative effort is clear, but the force to propel their achievement has
not yet been strong enough to overcome the many obstacles inherent in such
processes.  Before cooperative efforts can benefit any of the Nile
nations, new policies and agreements for water allocation and use must be
reached.  Unfortunately, the constraints involved are of such magnitude
that it will likely require a serious threat to the livelihood of more
than one riparian before serious efforts are initiated.  It is, however,
most encouraging that common problems are being identified and
acknowledged, and possible joint working groups are being considered
between nations who have historically been linked only by a common water
source.  The Nile states are far from reaching the point where they act
cooperatively for mutual benefit, but strides are being made toward that
end.
Conclusions
        Increasingly and inevitably, water has been and will continue to
be a complex, emotional issue in the water-scarce East African Nile River
basin.  The current water situation could provide motivation for both
violent conflict and cooperative effort.  In considering prospects for the
future, one must remember that the Nile basin is a unique and single
geographical, hydrological unit.  All people living in the basin,
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regardless of their great ethnic, cultural, religious, and political
differences, depend on the same river, and hence on one another's use of
it.  There is no single solution to the Nile Basin's water problems and
ultimately a combination of efforts and innovative ideas must be applied
to a new accord.  A neoteric respect for water must replace present
utilitarian views which are founded on mechanical, disconnected views: a
new professionalism must be introduced whereby water is properly
acknowledged as a finite, vulnerable, and multifunctional resource.  To
keep pace with population growth and provide a higher standard of living,
the Nile states must utilize all available land, water, and related
resources intensively, efficiently, and sustainably.
        Decisions made by each country regarding investments in water
resource development, new irrigation schemes, and industrial projects will
have consequences far into the future when available water resources will
be in much greater demand.  Sharing expertise, opening access to
hydrologic data and exploring joint water conservation and supply projects
offer some of the best opportunities for reducing the risk of future
tensions over water in the Nile basin.  Efficient management of the basin
as a whole will require international coordination and integration based
on the equitable sharing of the invaluable resources of water and energy
contained in this unique river.  Ultimately, all countries in the Nile
basin stand to gain from cooperation in the development and sustainable
utilization of the river's water supply.  
"Where nature conspired to provide common resources, there can be no
ultimate independence, only mutual dependence." 
Appendix - Maps
 Map 1 - Annual Internal Renewable Water Resources
in the Nile Basin.  This map illustrates the amount of water that flows
annually through each Nile riparian, including rivers, rain, and
groundwater.  Amounts include flows from other countries and do not
necessarily represent water that is directly available for use.  (Source:
World Resources Database, File WA22101.)
Map 2 - Nile Basin States Total Annual Water Withdrawals
This map depicts the pattern of freshwater use in the Nile basin in cubic
kilometers per year.  (Source: World Resources Database, File WA22106.)
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Map 3 - The Nile River Catchment Basin
This map shows the outline of the Nile River Watershed area which
represents ten percent of the entire African continent.  (Source: Abate,
p. 228.)
Map 4 - The Nile River in the Sudan and Ethiopia
A closer look at the White Nile (flowing north toward Khartoum from the
lacustrine states on the left), the Blue Nile (flowing north toward
Khartoum from Lake Tana on the right), and the Atbara (meeting the main
Nile north of Khartoum).  (Source: Digital Chart of The World.)
Map 5 - The Nile in Egypt
A closer view of the Nile river as it flows through Egypt.  The High Dam
at Aswan is represented (red triangle at Aswan) and Lake Nasser (the
reservoir created by the dam) is shown.  Note the locations of all major
Egyptian cities along the river, and the fact that no water is introduced
to the Nile in Egyptian territory.  (Source: Digital Chart of the World.)
Map 6 - Intermittent Water in the Nile River Basin
During the wet season flooding occurs all along the main Nile and its
tributaries.  During this time the Blue Nile contributes approximately
ninety percent of the united Nile's flow.  (Source: Digital Chart of the
World.)
Map 7 - Permanent Water in the Nile River Basin
During the dry season the floods recede and the desert returns.  During
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the dry months the White Nile sustains the flow of the main Nile river.
(Source: Digital Chart of the World. )
Map 8 - Annual Water Withdrawals for Agriculture
The yearly water withdrawals for agriculture are linked to the annual crop
production of the Nile states.  Note that the areas which are most
agriculturally intensive are also generally the most arid area of the Nile
basin.  (Source: World Resources Database, File WA22109.)
Map 9 - Annual Water Withdrawals for Domestic Use
This map illustrates the yearly amounts of water used for domestic
purposes in the Nile states.  (Source: World Resources Database, File
WA22109.)
Map 10 - Annual Water Withdrawals for Industrial Use
This map depicts the yearly amounts of water used for industrial purposes
in the Nile states.  (Source: World Resources Database, File WA22109.)
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POPULATION POLICY AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN VIETNAM
Introduction
        Just as population is crucial to each country,  so is population
policy.  It means the future of the nation.  A country with a high
population and limited area has to consider seriously the ramification of
their population policies.  Vietnam has faced this situation for decades.
Vietnam has adopted two policies:  1)  family planning programs,  2)
population redistribution to the New Economic Zones (NEZs).  With these
strategies,  the government has set goals to decrease the population
growth rate and distribute the population out of urban areas.  After three
decades,  these policies are still in use.
        My purpose of this study is to find out how population policy has
impacted:  1)  population growth and distribution and  2)  socio-economic
development.  I will address the effectiveness of population policy and
how these policies can be improved.  I will begin this paper with an
introduction to Vietnam's   geographic,  natural resources,  economic and
demographic characteristics to explain  Vietnamese policy makers
instituted programs of population control.  Then I will evaluate Vietnam's
population policy,  including the results of each specific population
plan.  Apart from the national goal of population control,  the goal of
socio-economic development will also be elaborated.  Four categories of
socio-economic development will be discussed:  1)  labor force and
employment,  2)  agricultural production,  3) urbanization, and 4)
forestry.   I will demonstrate how these policies of socio-economic
development are   relevant to population control in Vietnam.  I will use
Thailand as a country of comparison in this paper.  Thailand has been
successful in population control through family planning and land
settlements.  It has also enjoyed economic growth in the last two decades.
With slight difference in development level,  Thailand's experience will
be helpful in studying Vietnam.  Eventually,  policy suggestions will be
added for Vietnam's future socio-economic development.
Vietnam's background
Geography and natural resources
        Geographically,  Vietnam is located on the eastern edge of the
Indochinese Peninsula.  The total area is approximately 331,700 sq. km.
Its "S" shape stretches 3,000 km. from the northern border with China
south to the South China Sea.  The coastal terrain on the east side causes
Vietnam to have monsoon rains every year and some years Vietnam suffers
from flooding and typhoons.  In regard to its terrain,  the north and the
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south are level plains.  Two major rivers--Red River in the north and
Mekhong River in the south--have created alluvial deltaic plains.  Hills
and mountainous areas,  which cover almost 75%  of the country are located
in a narrow strip in the central part and in the north. 
        Vietnam is blessed with many natural resources:  petroleum,  coal,
iron,  tin,  bauxite,  copper,  and forests.  The land in the Red River
Delta and the Mekhong River Delta are the most fertile in the country and
suitable for farming.  The south central coast are also large deltaic
alluvial plains but arable land has eroded.  Hills and mountainous areas
which include the Northern midland and North Central coast have poor in
nutrient soils.  The Central highlands has reddish brown soil as forest
were destroyed.  The large part of this area is unsuitable for 
cultivated. 
Economy
        Generally,  Vietnam's economy is not in good condition.  Compared
to China and Thailand,  Vietnam's average of GDP per capita in terms of
purchasing power parity in 1991 was US$ 1,100 whereas China has US$ 1,190
and Thailand has US$ 3,986 (Thrift,  1986).  Vietnam's per capita income
in 1987 was only US$ 198 (Thrift,  1986).   Although the government has
adopted tight financial measures,  inflation rate was 60% in 1991.
        Vietnam's economy is dominated by agriculture (fig. 1).  Although
the percentage of GDP distribution of the agriculture sector is declining,
agricultural labor force is the largest part of total labor force and
Vietnam's leading major export products are rice and agricultural
products.  Rice is the major crop of Vietnam.  During World War II and the
Vietnam War,  Vietnam was unable to compete with other countries but in
1996 Vietnam improved its rice production capacity to be the fourth
largest rice exporter of the world.  Services sector used to be ignored by
the government.  After the Fifth Five Year Plan was employed during
1991-1995,  services sector has increased its proportion in GDP
distribution and surpassed agricultural and industrial sectors apparently
in 1993.  Industrial sector has been promoted by the government since
1976.  Industrial sector's growth rate did not increase dramatically
because lack of infrastructure.  The government has promoted heavy
industry but it could not provide sufficient facilities and infrastructure
for it.  Vietnam's industry also suffered from was devastation.  However,
It is likely that  percentage of industrial sector in GDP distribution
will rise up as well as services sector whereas agricultural sector will
go down.  
Figure 1.  GDP distribution in three sectors from
1990-1993 (%).
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                                Vietnam's economy has been influenced by 3
major factors:  wars,  natural disasters,  and foreign aid.  Wars has
interrupted Vietnam's agricultural and industrial production.  During the
Vietnam War,  Vietnam's factories were severely damaged.  Approximately
1.8 million has.  of  forest were destroyed.  Natural disasters have been
a major threat to the country,  especially to agriculture,  owing to the
country's geographic location.  During 1978-1979,  agricultural farmland
was damaged as a result of natural disaster causing sharp decrease in
agricultural production.  The last and very important factor is foreign
aid.  After the independence of the country in 1954,   North Vietnam was
supported by China,  Soviet Union,  the Eastern Europe .  South Vietnam
was supported by the US and capitalist countries. Most of foreign aid was
used in national defense rather than economic development.  After 1975,
Vietnam was chiefly funded by Soviet Union,  the Eastern Europe.  When
Vietnam invaded into Cambodia in 1978,  the country's economy was affected
by the cessation of foreign aids from China,  Japan,  and some countries
in Europe.  After the collapse of the Soviet Union,  Vietnam lost US$ 
1 billion from the Soviet Union and other East European countries.    At
present,  structure of foreign aid to Vietnam changed.   Vietnam receives
foreign aid from Japan,  the World Bank,  the Asian Development Bank(ADB)
and UN organizations.   
Population Situation
        Vietnam has a large population:  an important factor in national
development.  At present,  Vietnam's population is approximately
74,545,000;  the second largest in the Southeast Asia.  Vietnamese people
in average have a primary level of education.  The literacy rates of adult
females and males was 87% and 95%  in 1990 respectively (WRD,  1995-95).
        The population is not equally distributed throughout the country
(See Map 1).  Although the average population density was 225 people per
sq.km.  in 1995 (WRD,  1995-96),  most of population resides in the
deltaic plains.  The population density in the Red River Delta was 468
people per sq.km.  and in the Mekhong River Delta was 353 people per
sq.km. (Jones,  1984).  In some parts of the country,  including
mountainous ares in the north,  the west,  and the southwest of the
country,  population density was only 20-50 people per sq.km.;  due to
lack of good farmland and arable land.  Moreover,  the government has
provided water control systems--irrigation and drainage--in the deltaic
areas,  especially near Hanoi.  Likewise,  the south of Vietnam was
improved by American assistance before the reunification of the country in
1975.  Hence,  there is high motivation for people to move to the big
cities such as,  Hanoi,  Ho Chi Minh City,  Hai Phong,  and Da Nang.
        The high growth rate of population together with high population
density have brought Vietnam problems.  Food shortages has been a chronic
problem in North Vietnam.  North Vietnam has suffered from this dilemma
since the colonial period.  The French rulers had to bring rice from the
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south in order to feed the Northerners. The first time that the Vietnamese
government became aware of food shortage was after World War II.  An
estimated 2 million people died of starvation.  After the reunification of
the country,  many Northerners believed that the reunification would help
alleviate food shortages in the north because of larger area in the South
and higher rice production.  On the contrary,  the southern part was not
ready to a food producer for the whole nation owing to was destruction.
The government also had burden to provide job opportunities for 300,000
people in the south who used to work with military service.  At the end of
the Vietnam War,  there were 21 million in the labor force and 8 million
were unemployed.  In 1988,  Vietnam still had to import over 450,000 of
rice(Thrift,  1986).  Not until 1989 that Vietnam was able to produce over
21 million tons of food for domestic consumption,  reserves and exports.  
 
Map.  Population Density.
Population Policy
             In regard to the socialist ruling system,  Vietnamese
socialist government used centralized control,   the government therefore
is the most important mechanism for national development.  In response to
these problems,  the Communist Committee decided  to control the
population and improve economic development.  The Vietnamese government
has adopted two population policies to deal with population problems:
family planning programs and population redistribution to NEZ.
Family Planning
                Family planning in Vietnam can be divided into two
periods:  the first period was before the reunification of the country in
1975,  and the second family planning period was after the reunification.
Prior to  the reunification of the country in 1975,  family planning
programs had been conducted separately in the north and the south.  In the
early 1960s,  North Vietnamese leaders were concerned about a rapid growth
of population as an impediment to an economic development.  In 1962  North
Vietnam started a family planning program with the target to reduce
population growth from 3.5% to 2.5% and 2% in a few years.  Two -to- three
children per family with 5 to 6 year-spacing was the encouraged family
planning program standard.   The Committee for the Protection of Mothers
and Children was established to promote birth control.   This policy was
adopted widely in cities and the deltaic plain.  The population in
mountainous areas was not targeted rather the Vietnamese government
encouraged population growth.   The widespread contraceptive device was
the intrauterine device (IUD).   However,  during 1965-1975  the
government paid more attention to shifting economic and military sources
to support the Vietnam War,  and the family planning program was
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inadequately promoted. 
                In regard to South Vietnam,  there was a scarcity of
available data concerning family planning.  In 1971 South Vietnam prepared
an annual report on birth control and proposed the program to the United
Nations Secretary- General in 1973.  The National Council on Population
was established in 1973.  There was no official policy on population and
family planning in South Vietnam.  However,  the government has targeted
to reduce population growth rate from 3%  in 1973 to 2%  in 1980.  A new
governmental decree called for a limitation of family allowances.  These
family allowances used to be allotted to each family for each new-born
child,  later the South Vietnamese government would only provide each
family with allowances for only their first four children.   This was
applied to  military families and civil servants' families.   Giving this
new decree,  it is surprising  that a  law restricting birth control and
banning a dissemination of contraceptives enacted by the French ruler in
1920 was still in use.  Nevertheless,  records show contraceptives  were
used in South Vietnam and promoted by the private voluntary agencies.  In
1974,  South Vietnam also attempted to seek the United States and the
United Nations' assistance for a family planning program before it was
annexed to North Vietnam in 1975.        
                 The second period of family planning in Vietnam was after
1975.  In the mid-1980s,  the government encouraged people to limit the
total number of children per family.  To enhance this program,  the
government regulated financial and work penalties for couples who had more
than two children  (Banister,  1993).  In 1990,  the 2-child policy was
changed from mandatory to voluntary.  Overall,  the family planning was
operated on voluntary basis.  The government attempted to persuade and
educate  couples about the benefits of family planning.
                     According to demographic indexes,  a health survey in
1988 and national census in 1989,  
it showed the government's failure to achieve their target goals in the
family planning program.  From 1979-1989,  the average annual population
growth was 2.1%.  In 1995,  population growth rate increased to 2.23%. 
        Overall,   family planning programs in Vietnam have not been very
successful. The fertility rate has decreased from 1970 to 1995 but did not
achieve 2 children per woman as the government set a target (fig. 2).  The
mean rate of population growth has increased since the beginning of family
planning programs in 1962  and it likely to rise up in the future.  If
population growth rate increases 2% a year as shown,  there will be at
least 14 million people more in Vietnam in 2005.  
Figure 2.  Mean rate of population growth and
fertility rate from 1955-1996.
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        There are four primary reasons why Vietnam did not achieve its
goals for population control. The first reason is that the government
lacked adequate funds to fully support a family planning program,  caused
by a fluctuating economy since the World War II and the Indochinese wars.
Intrauterine device was the only modern method that the government could
afford.  The funds for family planning before 1988 were supported chiefly
by foreign assistance.  The UNFPA provided 28 million dollars from 1977 to
1987 and the Vietnamese government started providing its own funding in
1988.  The second reason  is Vietnam had contradictory policies.  At
first,  the government provided the enforcement of limitation of the child
per family in 1988 but in 1989 the Vietnamese National Assembly issued the
decree allowing the policy to be voluntary.  Hence,  both the citizens and
Vietnamese bureaucracy were confused regarding these policies.  The third
reason is that Vietnam overestimated their target for population growth
rate reduction,  3% to 1.7% within short period and incorrectly
hypothesized that the Vietnam economy would improve enough to
independently support these family planning policies.  The last cause is a
paucity of data.  The first national census was held in 1979 and the
second in 1989.  Before 1979 census,  all data,  particularly demographic
data,  was unofficial and estimated.  The data for  South Vietnam before
the reunfication is even more sparse.  The insufficient data caused an
uncertain projection and estimation of setting target of population
growth.  Moreover,  in terms of birth control device use,  the percentage
of women using IUDs was above 50% but the population growth rate was still
high.  This is assumed that the birth control provided by the government
did not meet demand of the users,  and women interviewed by government
officials regarding their birth control,  gave affirmative answers in
order to regardless of their personal practices (Banister,  1993)..     
Population Redistribution
                        The Population Redistribution Policies can be
divided into three phases. The first one was in 1961.  The second phase
was conducted in 1975 in the whole region of Vietnam.  And the third phase
was started in 1981 as a long term plan.  The target is to mobilize the
population to NEZs (See map 1).  The government tried to promote industry
all over the country but the NEZs were used mostly for agriculture.  The
purpose of these policies was to re-distribute the population to the
slightly populous uplands,  and create more urban areas apart from Hanoi,
Ho Chi Minh City and Hai Phong.  With this strategy,  the government
wanted to equalize:  population density,  employment,  and income
throughout the country.  Moreover,  the government also wanted to improve
the uncultivated land in the highlands by moving people from the deltaic
plains to use and teach their rice-production skills to local people in
the NEZs.
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Phase I
                         The first redistribution was conducted
successfully under the First Five Year Plan (1961-1965)  solely in the
north of Vietnam.  The target was to mobilize one million people from the
Red River Delta to the upland areas:  Bach Thai,  Son La,  and Lai Chau
provinces.  (Map 2)  Thai Binh was the first province where the population
was mobilized as it was the most populous province.  According to the
plan,  150,000 people should be moved in five-year period.  During
1961-1963,  70,000 inhabitants of Thai Binh joined this program and during
1965-1966 it was concluded that 110,000 of Thai Binh's former residents
moved to the NEZs. (Jones,  1982)  This policy was conducted,  similarly,
in the densely populated deltaic provinces.  The campaign gained more
support by the fear of US bombing threats propagandized by the Vietnamese
government.  Approximately  500,000 people from major cities and minor
urban areas moved to the northwestern provinces. (Jones,  1982)  In one
decade,  1961-1970,  there were over one million people shifted to the new
settlements.
                     This population mobilization was unsuccessful in
terms of improving quality of life.  First,  there were natural
calamities.  Second,  there was an inadequate planning.  Lacking tools and
funds,  the settlers could not farm and faced an unpredictable future.
Moreover,  the ethnic minorities who lived in upland areas long before the
coming of new settlers were not prepared to encounter the influx of
newcomers.  It was also found that the minority peoples were not respected
by the people in the program.  Food production,  especially rice,  did not
increase though the settlers were moved to apply their skills in the
upland areas.
Phase II
                        Before the reunification,  it was assumed that 1.3
million soldiers and police were living in the south.  The government
tried to solved unemployment problem and also found that the southern area
would be suitable location to continue population redistribution program.
During 1976-1980,  1.5 million people were moved to the NEZs.  People were
moved from north to south,  north to north,  and south to south in 16
provinces.  The government regulated more new economic zones shown in
table 3.  Virgin land was opened for 527,649 ha. in this period.
Agricultural production was 436,480 or 82% of new land and 34.8% was used
for growing rice.
Map.  New Economic Zones.
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                From            To                      Number
North to South  Hanoi           Lam Dong                100,000
                Thai Binh       Kien Giang              100,000
                                Song Be                 120,000
                                Gia Lai Cong Tum        10,000
                Hai Hung        Long An                 150,000
                Ha Nam Ninh     Minh Hai                100,000
                                Dong Nai                24,000
                                Dac Lac                 10,000
                Binh Tri Thien  Dac Lac                 69,000
                Ha Son Binh     Lam Dong                19,500
                                Tay Ninh                5,000
North to North  Hai Phong       Quang Ninh              15,000
                Ha Nam Ninh     Hoang Lien Son          35,000
                Ha Son Binh     Son La,Vinh Phu,        35,000
                                Ha Tuyen and Bac Thai   
                Thai Binh       Bac Thai                5,5000
                                Lai Chau                10,000  
South to South  Ho Chi Minh CityDong Nai                170,000
                                Song Be                 100,000
                                Tay Ninh                100,000
                Nghia Binh      Gia Lai Cong Tum        40,000
                Quang Nam       Dac Lac                 45,000
                                Total                   1,263,000
Table 1  Population redistribution in phase II catagorized by north to
south,  north to north,  and south to south.  Most of population moved to
the south and central highland,  particularly,  Dac Lac,  Lam Dong,  Gia
Lai Cong Tum.           
Source:  Jones,  1982.
                         According to table 1,  it is obvious that
Southern region was a main target of the government in order to distribute
population from the Northern deltaic plain and big cities.  Thai Binh was
the province among northern provinces where largest population were moved
to new settlements.  As for southern provinces,  Ho Chi Minh City's
300,000 people were mobilized.  This is explained that the southern
provinces did not have severe population density as in the north except Ho
Chi Minh City .   
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Phase III
                   The third phase is a long term plan from 1985 to 2000.
The target for the third plan was to mobilize 1,600, 000 people to the
Mekhong Delta,  the eastern areas and mountainous areas.  In 1980,  the
government issued regulations for people moving to the NEZs,  including
training before redistribution and allowances for the basic living in new
areas.
        In conclusion,  an estimated 6 million farmers have settled in the
NEZs.  1.7 million hectares of virgin land was used in agricultural
production.  Thai Binh was the most successful in this program in terms of
population decrease because 74,400 families were sent to new economic
zones and enjoyed better living  than in Thai Binh.  The third phase was
the most successful because the previous plans were ill-prepared and had
inadequate supervision,  causing many settlers to go back to their
homeland.  However,  due to a small budget,  30% of people in this program
are in poverty.  Thus,  in planning for redistribution from 1985 to 2000,
the government emphasizes increased provision for technical planning,
water control systems,  rice field construction,  infrastructure,
schools,  and medical stations.  
Socio-economic impacts
        Population policies in Vietnam are not successful in the overall
decrease in the population growth rate and population density reduction.
These inevitably affected socio-economic aspects of the country.  I will
discuss how these policies have affected labor force and employment,
urbanization,  agricultural production,  and forestry.
Labor force and employment
        Population policy has had an impact on the future labor force of
Vietnam.  First of all,  population redistribution has increased the
agricultural labor force because most of the jobs in the NEZs are related
to agriculture.  The agricultural labor force has increased from 15, 140,
000 people in 1980 to 
19, 797,800 in 1986. (Statistical Public House,  1990)  Moreover,  the
NEZs has created an estimated 8 million jobs not only in agriculture
sector but also services sector during the past decades.  However,  the
structure of labor force in Vietnam has not changed.  Agricultural labor
force still remains the large part of Vietnam's labor force. 
        According to the population growth rate,  in the next 10 years,
Vietnam's structure of population by age group will change.  The country
will be replete with young population (fig.  3). 
Vietnam will have more labor force in the future which is good for
economic development.  However, the government has to be concern about
unemployment in the future.  Large population in 15-64 age group can
suffer from unemployment if  the country's economy cannot afford
sufficient job in the future.
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Figure 3.  Population by age group.
Agricultural production
        One of the objectives of population redistribution is to alleviate
food shortages. To extend the cultivated land is one way to increase food
production.  In average,  the production of major crops has increased.
The cultivated land area has increased as well as food per capita.
Although food per capita decreased to 239 kg/person in 1978 which is lower
than World Health Organization (WHO) standard,  240 kg/person,  an overall
of food capita is above the WHO standard.  It signifies that population
redistribution program has helped increase productivity and alleviate food
shortages problem of the country (fig. 4 ).
        Agricultural production in the NEZS provinces increased in
average.  In the northern area,  agricultural production increased more in
average than in the southern area.  It is because the northern part has
been provided better water control systems and irrigation.  The most
successful province is Long An in which the production grew 63.4%  from
433,300 tons in 1980 to 708,000 tons in 1986.
        The industrial crops also increased during 1976-1984.  During
1985-1990,  the production of industrial crops fluctuated,  some crops had
higher yields while some had lower yields as a result of calamities.  The
higher production capacity of Vietnam has affected its export of
agricultural products,  especially in 1986,  the amount of major crops
increased sharply.
Figure 4.  Food per capita in Vietnam.
        The increasing volume of food production is partially caused by
the population redistribution policy.  It is interesting that agricultural
production is increasing while food per capita does not highly increase.
At the same time,   Vietnam is the fourth largest rice exporter of the
world and industrial crops also increased in the country's exportation.  
                
Year            1980    1986    1988    1989
North
  Quang Ninh    79.0    125.1   129.6   139.7
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  Hoang Lien    222.1   248.8   267.8   281.9
  Son
  Son La        147.3   150.9   164.7   168.9
  Vinh Phu      286.5   385.9   416.9   432.9
  Ha Tuyen      194.1   264.9   266.4   283.1
  Bac Thai      161.0   228.0   217.7   249.9
  Lai Chau      122.9   137.2   147.7   150.5
South
  Lam Dong      86.8    127.0   131.9   128.7
  Kieng Giang   603.7   689.7   726.9   809.5
  Song Be       91.2    166.1   158.9   146.8
  Gia Lai Cong 
  Tum           217.2   214.2   198.4   223.9
  Long An       433.3   708.0   785.5   890.6
  Minh Hai      688.7   671.2   707.4   829.4
  Dong Nai      335.6   464.2   432.8   405.9
  Dac Lac       144.7   202.6   232.2   244.2
  Tay Ninh      242.7   239.3   249.9   239.5
Table 2  Production of food crops and food crops per capita by provinces
in the NEZs
Source:  Statistical Publishing House,  1991.
Urbanization    
               Urbanization accompanies modernization. The developed
countries have passed through the urbanization transition whereas the
developing countries still operate in different stages of urbanization. 
The Vietnamese government has attempted to decentralized development
throughout the country.  Population redistribution is one of the means to
motivate people to create new urban areas besides Hanoi,  Ho Chi Minh
City, or Hai Phong,  and reduce population in the big cities.
                However,  the urban population has increased each year
since the end of World War II with annual average growth rate of 3.31%.
The urban growth rate dropped during 1970-1980 as a result of the fear of
the US bombing threats.  Urban population is expected to increase in the
next century.  The unsuccessful creation of new urban centers is blamed on
a lack of funds and inadequate infrastructure and facilities in the new
settlements.  The government emphasized increasing agricultural production
and redistribution population, but did not develop sufficient
infrastructures.  The highly increasing urban growth rate is likely to
occur in the future if the government cannot provide facilities and
infrastructure in the NEZs.  People who join population redistribution
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policy may decide to go back to their former settlements instead.
Figure 5.  Urban and Rural Growth Rates.
        According to Drake,  urbanization transition is created by two
forces:  rural to urban migration;  and central city population growth.
(Drake,  1994)  Vietnam is in the early stage of this transition.  The
Vietnamese government is in a way to pass through the transition.  The
government has attempted to create new urban areas by using  "pull"
forces--jobs and allowances in mobilization--formed in the NEZs.  The
"push"--crowded community and unemployment--motivates people to move to
different provinces.  However,  an increase of urban growth rate according
to WRD's projection could be explained by the return of people to big
cities or their homeland if new urban areas still lack of infrastructure
and support from the government.
Forestry        
        According to MacAndrews,  land settlement in Southeast Asia
usually opens up and develops previously cultivated land. (MacAndrews,
1982)  Likewise,  during 1976-1979,  527,647 has. of virgin land in
Vietnam was opened up and used in agricultural production for 436,  480
has. or 82%  of the newly opened land.  According to WRD,  during
1981-1990,  there was an annual -0.83%  change in forest areas.  In 1980,
Vietnam had 10, 663, 000 has. of all forest and the extent decreased to
9,782, 000 in 1990.  Although the new policies on land location and use
are employed,  it is effective in some areas.  The yearly afforestation of
50, 000 to 100, 000 has.  is inadequate in substituting 88, 100 has. of
deforestation each year (WRD,  1995-96).  Therefore,  the NEZs partly has
destroyed forests.   An increasing population in newly settled areas
causes higher consumption of fuelwood as the government does not provide
sufficient infrastructure.   According to figure 6,  wood production has
obviously increased,  especially fuel wood and roundwood since 1961.  Wood
production is also expected to increase in near future. 
Figure 6.  Wood Production.
Comparison with Thailand
        Overall,  Vietnam's  family planning programs and population
redistribution are not totally successful.  Thailand is one of many
countries that have used both family planning and land resettlement
policies.  Thailand has been able to cope with high population growth.
Its development level is not distant from Vietnam,  including the size of
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the country and population size.  Thailand is a good case study in
comparison with Vietnam in a discussion of population policy.
        Thailand has also faced population problems.  First,  Thailand
experienced rapid population growth since World War II.   In 1958,  the
World Bank recommended the Thai government to control rapidly growing
population which will obstruct a national economic growth.  The government
has employed family planning programs which has helped decrease the
population growth rate from 3.2 in 1947 to 1.7 in the 1980s(Sternstein,
1976).  The fertility rate also decreased from 6.62 in 1955 to 2.10  in
1995.  (WRD,  1995-96)  Secondly,  Thailand adopted a land settlement
policy in 1935 as a result of the government's regulation prohibiting
trishaws in Bangkok.  The government offered new settlements to trishaw
drivers. After that,  many programs were developed under various titles.
From 1935 to 1980 at least  1.2 million people had been moved to the new
settlements,  opening up and developing previously uncultivated land.  The
objective was to raise the living standards of farmers and improve
productivity.
        Thailand's population policy has been successful in terms of
population growth control. The government has put high priority for
population control,  including a significant allocation of funds.  As for
land resettlement,  these have also been more successful than in Vietnam.
It is explained that Vietnam's resettlement program is larger both in size
of population and of newly settled areas.  The common problems are
inflexibility of policy and there is no long-range planning.  Moreover,
there was no careful planning,  no initial site survey,  no sufficient
facilities and services.  The staff was not well-trained for working in
new settlements.  However,  Vietnam has been successful in creating new
urban areas such as Haiphong,  Da Nang,  Da Lat and Nha Trang.   In
contrast,  Bangkok still remains the most important and largest city of
Thailand and center of the country.
        Another problem  that is more severe in Thailand than in Vietnam
is deforestation.  In the past,  more than half of the country was forest.
The forest extent of 18, 123, 000 has.  in 1980 decreased to 13, 264, 000
has.  in 1990 with  -2.68%  of annual change (WRD,  1995-96).  Thailand
consequently suffers more severe flooding every year.  Thailand is able to
cope with population growth and land resettlement is one of government's
plan to conserve forests.  However,  the rate of  deforestation is still
increasing sharply since the 1960s until 1978 (fig. 7).   It  could be
argued that Thailand passed through an  "economic boom"  which was fueled
in part by a utilization of forests without adequate conservation.  In
regard to Vietnam,  it has maintained family planning policies for more
than 3 decades but could not control population growth.  Although a rate
of deforestation has not been as severe as in Thailand,  Vietnam is
currently going through economic boom as Thailand was.  If Vietnam  still
cannot control population growth rate and population redistribution to new
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land,  it is possible that Vietnam is going to lose its valuable natural
resources as higher increase of wood production previously presented.
Afforestation should be seriously taken into consideration in
environmental policy of Vietnam.
Figure 7.  Forest and woodland in Thailand and
Vietnam.
Policy suggestions and conclusion
        According to the study of the population policy in Vietnam,  the
results are not completely satisfactory.  However,  population policy has
begun many solutions for population problems.  The government still
maintains this policy.  If the population keeps growing,  I argue that
family planning programs are important for Vietnam.  Population
redistribution policies should also be continued in order to reduce
population density in some areas and equalize development throughout the
country.  These policies need adjustment to be more effective.
        As for population policy,  the Vietnamese government should focus
on fund management.  At present,  it is known that Vietnam's economy has
not in good condition.  Foreign assistance is needed,  and it is crucial
that this fund is managed effectively.  The second suggestion is cautious
planning.  In particular,  the population redistribution program in the
past was not successful because the people were sent to new settlements
without sufficient support and planning from the government.  The third
suggestion is target setting.  Both family planning programs and
population redistribution target should be set by the real situation.  It
means that the government should take into consideration socio-economic
factors,  and the extent to which the government can support the programs.
Previously,  the government set too high of a target within a short period
which was difficult to achieve if looking at the country's economy.  The
next suggestion is that infrastructure should be developed in new urban
areas.  At present,  Vietnam still receives financial support from foreign
sources,  especially the World Bank,  the Asian Development Bank,  and
Japan.  Most of this aid is targeted for projects such as:  rehabilitating
highways,  irrigation system,  power development,  water supply,  port
development, for present urban areas such as Hanoi,  Ho Chi Minh City and
Haiphong.  Infrastructure development should be more focused on rural
areas in the NEZs.  This could help alleviate conflict between resident
and new settlers.  The ethnic minorities could change their attitude
toward this population redistribution program and the settlers into
positive way if facilities and infrastructure were created in their
region.  This also increase the likelihood for economic development in the
NEZs.  Apart from population policy implementation,  a very important
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policy to be included is forest conservation.  Although the government has
produced an outline of environmental policy but it has not been in use
yet.
        Population and socio-economic development are related to each
other,  in both positive and negative feedback cycles.  Thus,  to achieve
national development goals,  these two factors should be considered and
implemented simultaneously.  Vietnam is trying hard to go through this
process.  As for socio-economic development,  Vietnam has better
opportunities than other countries in the Indochinese region as an
interesting spot for foreign investment.  Foreign aid also helps support
the country's socio-economic development.  However,  concerning
population,  it is an internal dilemma that Vietnam has to solve by
itself.
References
Banister,  Judith.  1993.  Vietnam Population Dynamics and Prospects.  CA:
The Regents of the      University of California.
Benedict,  J.  Tria Kerkvliet.  1994.  Dilemmas of Development:  Vietnam
Update 1994.  Canberra,         Australia:  Panther Publishing and Press.
Central Census Steeing Committee.  1990.  Sample Results:  Vietnam
Population Census-1989.  Hanoi,         Vietnam.
Drake,  D. William.  1993.  "Towards Building a Theory of Population
Environment Dynamics:  A        Family of Transition."  In:  Ness G.D.
(eds.)  Population Environment Dynamics.  
        Ann Arbor,  MI:  University of Michigan Press. 
Gavin,  W.  Jones.  1984.  Demographic Transition in Asia.  Singapore.
Gavin,  W.  Jones.  1982.  Population Resettlement Programs in Southeast
Asia.  Canberra,  Australia:    The Australian National University.
General Statistical Office.  1991.  Economy and Trade of Vietnam
1986-1990.  Hanoi,  Vietnam.
General Statistical Office.  1991.  Statistical Data of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam.  1976-1990.        Hanoi,  Vietnam:  Statistical
Publishing House.
General Statistical Office.  1990  Statistical Data of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam.  1976-1989.        Hanoi,  Vietnam:  Statistical
file:///C|/545/1996/tinpanga.html (15 of 16) [6/18/2008 10:53:05 AM]
file:///C|/545/1996/tinpanga.html
Publishing House.
Kurth,  Helmut.  1989.  Economic Growth and Income Distribution.  Quezon
City,  Philippines.  Moed       Press.
Neil,  L.  Jamieson.  1992.  The Challenges of Vietnam's Reconstruction.
VA:  The Indochina Institute.
Stermstein,  Larry.  1976.   The Environment of Modernisation in Thailand.
Victoria,  Australia.
Tan,  Teng Lang.  1985.  Economic Debates in Vietnam:  Issues and Problems
in Reconstruction and   Development (1975-1984).  Pasir Panjang,
Singapore:  Institute of Southeast Asian        Studies.
Thrift,  J.  Nigel.  The Price of War:  Urbanization in Vietnam 1954-1985.
London,  UK:  Allen and         Unwin (Publishers) Ltd.
Tran,  T. Dang.  1994.  Vietnam:  Socialist Economic Development,
1955-1992.  CA:  An International       Center for Economic Growth
Publication.
Vietnam.  1993.  Vietnam: A Development Perspective.  Hanoi,  Vietnam.
Vietnam Courier.  September 1996.
World Resources Database.  1995-96.




RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THE CHAPTERS
Kazuhiro Arai
        What I have discussed in the paper is the history, the transition
and the impact of the labor migration of Yemen.  Yemen is a typical
country whose economy depends on the remittances from workers living in
foreign countries.  This phenomenon has a close relationship with the
issue of population and regional economy, as one of the reasons for the
migration is demographic pressure and the lack of job opportunities.  It
is also related to the politics of the region.  The large scale of labor
migration and return migration may be caused by political transition to
some extent.  The return migration at the time of the Gulf Crisis is the
typical example of how the politics influence the trend of labor
migration.  My discussion and suggestion is mainly in light of these
factors.
        Among the papers presented in the lecture, Kuramitsu's study is
the most closely related to my topic.  He examines the urbanization of the
Middle East, and makes a model of the relationships between the percentage
of each sector and population growth or urbanization.  The result of the
simulation is rather interesting: the number of the people in the service
sector directly influences the fertility rate.  According to the result,
the increase of migrant laborers may cause the increase of fertility rate,
as the workers returning from foreign countries tend to employ themselves
in the service sector.  This conclusion, however, must be evaluated very
carefully because the result of Kuramitsu's study is probably the only one
found in the world so far, and I did not study the direct relationship
between the number of migrant laborers and that of people working in the
service sector.
        I did not suggest the model of the system of labor migration in my
paper.  I tried to make the model by using Stella.  However, I finally
gave up, because I could not find out the relationship among the factors
which seem to be related to the transitions of labor migration.  In other
words, I could not explain those relationships by using equations.  Some
books show the model of labor migration, but without concrete data and
thus without concrete relationships among the factors expressed by
equations.  The essence of the problem can be divided into two kinds.  One
is insufficient data.  As I stated in the paper, the information on labor
migration in the Middle East is very limited.  Thus one cannot obtain the
data enough to construct a model.  However, this kind of problem is
surmountable, if a large scale of census is conducted, and reliable data
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is provided.
        Another kind of problem is more problematic and seemingly
insurmountable.  As I stated in the paper, the trend of labor migration is
influenced by the political situation of the region to large extent.
First of all, the status of migrant workers depends on the policy of the
receiving countries of the foreign workers.  Although the receiving
countries greatly depend on migrant laborers, these workers are not  given
any political power.  Therefore the change of policy is made for the
benefit of the receiving countries, though there are the negotiations
between the sending countries and the receiving countries to some extent.
Second, the political situation is still unstable in the Middle East.
Nobody had predicted the Gulf Crisis in 1990 and the subsequent wave of
return migration.  This unpredictability is the essence of the problem of
labor migration.
        There are two opposing view on the function of the labor
migration.  One is that the migration functions as the safety valve for
the economy of the sending countries of migrant workers.  When those
countries have surplus laborers, labor migration can relieve the problem
of unemployment and economic stagnation.  This is the case in former North
Yemen, as the country somewhat encouraged the labor migration.  This
theory, however, can be applied to the countries which have enough
laborers for development programs or industrialization.  The other theory
is that the labor migration hinders the development of the country.  In
former South Yemen, labor migration caused the shortage of workers needed
for state development, and thus the country had to receive the foreign
workers from the East African countries.  As I discussed in the paper, the
government of former South Yemen restricted the number of the migrant
workers leaving the country from 1973.  Even in North Yemen, the decline
of agriculture caused by the shortage of labor force became one of the
issues in the country.  In my view, labor migration has negative effects
on the sending countries in the long run.  Because of the unpredictability
of the transition, depending on the migrant workers makes the country's
economy unstable, and vulnerable to the policy of the receiving 
countries. 
        Labor migration in the Middle East seems to be in the transition
period now.  Even if one excludes the influence of the Gulf Crisis, the
boom of migration to the Gulf States was going to decline, and substantial
number of workers had already returned to their home countries in the
beginning of the 1990's.  If the transition theory can be applied to this
phenomenon, now is the middle of the transition from the state of heavy
dependence on the remittances from the migrant workers to that of stable
development and independent in terms of economy.  Therefore now is the
most dangerous and unstable period of the phenomenon.  In the case of
Yemen, the economy is in serious stagnation.  The rate of inflation and
unemployment is still high.  These problems, according to the theory, will
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be solved toward the completion of the development of the country.  The
economic condition may turn better in the future.  However, it should not
be the revival of the boom of labor migration.  What is needed is the
sustainable development of the country and the whole region.
Hideo Kuramitsu
        Every student select a very interesting topic, and I learned a lot
from each of them.  First of all, I found that most of them focused on the
country where they are from or are carrying researches in their major.
That gives them do further researches in comparison with me, because they
know how to get the information through various approaches.  Of course,
they are familiar with the geography as well as the history and the
culture.  It seems to me that they can answer questions persuasively in
their presentation.  
        As for their researches, some of them used the economic transition
by the distribution of Gross Domestic Product, which I also used in my
research.  Through their researches, I found that GDP per capita in
developing countries has been decreased over time due to the population
growth.  This finding is the same as mine.  One thing which I learned from
them is that one of them used the political transition in order to know
when rapid changes occurred in some categories such as the GDP trends and
some agricultural factors.  This transitional period gives us clear
information why those things happened.          Second, most of other
students compare the categories among countries in the world.  It is sure
that such maps make us easily understood to what extent of the category in
the country is situated in the world.  Since I mainly focused on the
relationship between the distribution of GDP and population factors in
Egypt by using STELLA II, I can carry researches into further studies
regarding my topic after the example of their maps comparing among the
world. 
                Third,  a couple of other students used STELLA II,
modeling the situation which they are focusing on.  Since I also made a
model which makes it sure the relationship between the distribution of GDP
per capita and population growth factors, their modeling interests me a
lot.  However, it seems to me that they met a difficult situation in
making the model, because they have their own flows based on their
assumptions.  I also met a difficult situation in linking between the
distribution of GDP per capita and population growth factors; however, I
overcame this situation by using the results from multiple regression
analysis.  It seems that such a statistical analysis would be very useful
to link different factors in modeling as well as to create some
assumptions in the flow.   
        Finally, I feel a little regretful to focus on the effect of the
GDP to the population growth due to time constraint.  After the example of
the researches by other students, my topic would go further, and their
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approaches would bring about better relationships with other factors in
the STELLA model.  For example, relationships with other countries such as
trade and migration can be or should be included into my model.  I hope my
research will be also useful for other students and will bring about
better analysis regarding population growth in the near future.
Peter Murchie and Rebecca Spector
        Many of the papers presented in this term's Population-Environment
Dynamics course reflect transitions occurring across a number of sectors
in countries across the world.  The papers refer to transitions in
demographics; political environments; economics; natural environments;
agriculture; forestry; and others.
        One unifying theme among many of the papers is that a lack of
progressive policies intended to accurately respond to these transitions
is evident in countries throughout the world.  Our paper on organic
produce consumption in the United States strongly suggests a lack of data,
awareness, and hence effective agricultural policies at the national
level.  Such ignorance has resulted in the implementation of agricultural
policies which discourage and dismantle small-scale and organic farming
production and consumption.
        Other papers also refer to similar deficiencies on the part of
government and its ability to respond to population-environment
transitions.  For example, in Ecuador, the current transitions in
deforestation are leading to unsuitable farming conditions; unsustainable
rainforest practices; increased inefficiency and environmental
degradation.  This paper refers to the failure of the Ecuadorian
government to provide an adequate infrastructure for these transitions.
The result is that impacts on indigenous people and the environment are
ignored.  Other papers referring to rapid urbanization trends in Thailand,
Egypt and Korea indicate extreme transitions, such as movements away from
agriculture toward industry.  These papers also reflect a lack of
governmental recognition of the potential impacts of these transitions, as
well as a lack of proper governmental research and support.  Papers on the
water crisis in the Middle East also refer to a lack of effective
political support and policy intervention in dealing with these tremendous
transitions.
        As evidenced by all the papers presented in this course, there are
a number of important transitions occurring across the world that are
affecting people and the natural environment.  A better understanding of
these transitions will hopefully lead to appropriate policies that will
result in smoother transitions that have minimal effects on populations
and the environment.
Tamana Nishiguchi
                   Since the concern of my paper is the impact of policy
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on the agricultural transformation in Burma, I will indicate the
agriculture in relation with the population in Burma and Vietnam, which
Luejit Tinpanga described. Policy-makers in the governments of both Burma
and Vietnam had carried out inward-looking, seclusive national policies.
Thus there will be some similarities.
                   Geographically, Burma possesses twice as large an area
as Vietnam, (676,577 sq. km. in Burma against 331,700 sq. km. in Vietnam).
However, as can be seen in FIGURE #1, the total population of Vietnam
exceed twice over that of Burma. Despite of the two restrict population
policies, the growth rate has still risen sharply upward. On the other
hand, the growth rate of Burma demonstrates moderate growth without any
population policies. Considering land area and the upward tendency of
population, Vietnam has the potential to suffer from population pressure
in the near future. 
 
Total Population.  Burma and Vietnam.
Source: World Resource Database
 
                   The economy of Vietnam, similar to Burma, is dominated
by agriculture, which provide sixty-five percent of employment and shares
about thirty percent of Gross Domestic Products. Unlike Burma, however,
Vietnam has occasionally experienced severe food shortages, especially in
the South, since World War II. Since 1961, the Vietnamese government has
introduced Population Redistribution Policies, aiming at mobilizing the
population by allocating people for the industrial sector and for the
agricultural sector. This mobilization was one of the contributors to the
alleviation of food shortages through the input of labor force into the
agricultural sector. However, a set of these population redistribution
policies also caused the natural disasters due to a lack of capital and
inappropriate frameworks. 
                   The similarities in the features of both governments
seem to imply that a set of policies is inefficient. These polices
resulted in worsening the existing serious problems rather than benefiting
the populace. Although Burma and Vietnam have suffered from lack of donor
country assistance and many inherited constraints, it is necessary to
emphasize an 'efficient' allocation of human and natural resources to
alleviate poverty.  
Rasolofoson Allain J.
        Population growth is evidently underlying several situations we
can nowadays encounter on our planet. This point appears to be the main
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link between the different projects which are presented in the class for
Population-Environment Dynamics (NRE 545/EIH 575) during the Fall Semester
1996. In fact, many countries, mainly those in the Third World, are
actually in their early demographic transition after having experienced an
epidemiological transition sometimes during the last century. 
         In my own project about the Case of Deforestation in Madagascar,
although it is worth to be considered, population growth is still a
secondary element since the density is relatively low in several regions
of the country. However, the same strong attraction towards the bigger
cities we can observe in the modern society has just started an urban
transition in the 1980s, desarticulating the economy traditionally based
on agriculture. On this matter, when presenting the Urbanization in Egypt,
Hideo Kuramitsu mentioned the International Conference on the Habitat
whose goal has been to prepare the global community to an urbanized life
when facing the resulting deteriorating living environment. The policy of
Population Redistribution through the creation of New Economic Zones, as
applied in Viet-Nam (Luejit Tinpanga), cannot be  implemented in
Madagascar because of the attachment of the Malagasy people to traditional
values and kinship; the land on which a family has been living is most of
the times an ancestral legacy that she cannot easily depart from.
Moreover, a passive resistance against the governing authorities has been
expressed through the History into reticence to new technology or other
innovative techniques, hindering any modern improvement such as the Green
Revolution which was introduced in Burma (Tamana Nishiguchi).
Nethertheless, the southern Malagasy tribes have the propensity to migrate
internally, driven by sporadic financial needs and always to come back
their homelands after a period of absence. Such movement has the same
motivation as the labor migration in South Yemen (Kazuhiro Arai). 
        The alarming deforestation of Madagascar has not followed a
rational process as it might be found elsewhere. For instance, the
Ecuadorian forests (Julie Rodriguez) are depleted mostly because of a need
of space for modern structures such as fuel oil exploitation, urban areas,
or other communication structures. In Viet-Nam, it results from the
population pressure as well as from an internal economic policy which
lessens agricultural activities in favor of industriali- zation. For
Madagascar, it has a remote origin in the country's history and a
relatively long process of social behavior change needs to be adjusted
with a required rapid intervention.
Julie Rodriguez
        It was amazing to see the commonalities among the various projects
this semester.  What seemed to be incredibly diverging topics in the
beginning, boiled down to a few underlying themes and challenges.  This
illustrates the real value in studying other regions, cultures,
environments to develop better strategies on the home front.   The themes
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that emerged from the projects, in relation to my study of Ecuador, all
evolved around the challenge of providing for a growing population when
financial resources and natural resources are limited.  
        In several countries discussed governments have attempted to
redistribute their populations for a variety of purposes.  Security was
one purpose.  For example, Lipchin discussed the attempts of Iraq and
Israel to populate regions with particular ethnic groups to maintain
political power.  This is similar to Ecuador's attempt to populate the
Amazon to keep Peruvians from infringing on Ecuador's border.  
        Pressure on urban centers was another reason for population
redistribution.  Tinpanga discussed the relocation of populations in
Vietnam to reduce the pressure on urban centers and to encourage the poor
to cultivate "unproductive" lands.  Governments seem to ignore the impacts
that this redistribution will have on the local indigenous populations and
the environment.  In addition, infrastructure is often inadequate or
completely lacking.  Sasaki pointed out the opposite problem in Thailand
where populations were migrating from rural areas to the cities.
Kuramitsu discussed a similar situation in Egypt's cities.  Thus, the
urban environment cannot support its new inhabitants because the
infrastructure, such as sewer and sanitation facilities, is grossly
inadequate.  
                Another challenge observed is inefficient use of
resources.  For example, Smith discussed the use of large amounts of water
wasted farming regions of the desert in Egypt.  This is partly due to
resistance to change and failure to update to newer, more efficient
methods and technologies.  In Ecuador, similar challenges arose in the
area of agriculture; improved farming methods would preserve the soil and
perhaps much of the rainforest.  Nisiguchi raised the issue of
alienability of land in terms of land use efficiency.  As in Ecuador, laws
that make title difficult to obtain discourage investment in and
preservation of land; consequently, land is used inefficiently.  Murchie
and Spector offered an attractive and realistic approach to agricultural
reform that could help increase resource efficiency and help alleviate
some of the difficulties being experienced in the countries of this
monograph.  Organic farming helps protect our health, our environment, and
our resources.     
        Of course the projects also manifested appreciable differences
among the regions studied.  These differences do not mean that information
cannot be transferred.  It merely means that the information must be
molded for situation at hand.  Incidentally, the differences allow for
more experimentation and creativity that can lead to better solutions in
the long run.  Overall, there is a need to address the population and its
needs on a more holistic level that considers social, economic, and
ecological impacts.   In the past, reforms have frequently been too
narrowly focused and too short-term oriented.  Indeed, these are grand
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plans, but sensible goals.
Hitomi Sasaki
        By 2020, the ASEAN regional will have moved to become one of the
largest and most prosperous of the Asian trading blocs.  During much of
the period after 1995, the growth of GDP for the original six members -
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Burunei Darussalam and the
Philippines - have continued at between four and seven per cent per year.
For three additional members - Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam - rates of GDP
growth have been lower but will begin to accelerate in the period after
2010 to catch up to the original ASEAN six.  As the region benefitted from
the opening up of the world trading system, from a less-regulated global
financial environment and particularly from the growth in Southeast Asian
demand, the nine ASEAN countries will exhibit rapid growth and become a
free trading bloc with a population of close to 690 million.             
        Therefore, it is favorable to consider the policy to sustain the
development in Southeast Asia, which stimulates economies with narrowing
the regional imbalance within each country.  According to the Population
Policy and Socio-Economic Development Plan in Vietnam by Leujit Tinpanga,
Vietnam faces same problems as Thailand in terms of the centralization of
population in urban areas.  Even though the urban population growth rate
in Vietnam have dropped during 1970-1980, the urban population has
increased each year since the end of World War 2 with annual average
growth rate of 3.31 per cent.  If  making comparison with Thailand's
annual growth rate of 2.8 per cent,  the population concentration is more
serious problem in Vietnam than in Thailand.  In her paper, there is no
clear comment in regards to the problems caused by urbanization
transition, however, it is obvious that Vietnam will follow the same step
as that of Thailand if there is no effective policies in early stage. 
        Thailand has expanded its economies after bringing the direct
foreign investments since 1986, which stimulated the urbanization
transition to Bangkok.  If Vietnam starts to receive such foreign aids
especially targeting the industry and service sectors, the urban
centralization will be inevitable.  Vietnamese government may have
succeeded in terms of family planning and population distribution,
however, it is crucial to enhance the regional development plan/policy to
encourage the development of rural areas.  From this perspective,  the
government should refer to the National Economical Social Development Plan
or Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan in Thailand to avoid the serious
population concentration beforehand.
        The ability of ASEAN may largely depend on the extent of the
success of all the governments, working with the world business community
and international aid in regards to not only to retain its current
position as one of the world's fastest growing regional economies but also
to continue improving the quality of life for its citizen.  From this
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point of view, both Thailand and Vietnam will be coping with urban
problems while taking advantage of the positive features of urban regions.
This will require new approaches, new policies and new administrative
governmental arrangements.     
Julie Smith
        The Nile River Basin is one distinct geographical unit containing
nine separate countries which share a common river resource and face
several common difficulties.  As I wrote my Nile project I focused on this
region as a singular area that faced rather unique problems and needed
narrowly directed solutions.  But while I listened to the project
presentations of other colleagues I began to see that the Nile region is
not unique.  Many economies and regions have limited resources and many
other pressing priorities that restrain the development of wise resource
practices.  The similarities between different regions of the world and
the problems they face are astounding.
        Most projects examined the relationship between human society and
the environment using concepts of transition theory.  Transition theory
states that a society moves through periods of rapid change followed by
periods of relative stability; it provides one way of thinking about the
complex dynamic that exists between populations and their environments.
Societies may move through many separate but related transitions at one
time.  Although the regions studied for our projects spanned the globe,
several commonalities exist among all, most of which are transitions.
        The overriding similarity is population growth, or the demographic
transition, which generally appeared to drive the other transitions.  From
the Nile region in East Africa to Ecuador to Southeast Asia rapidly
increasing populations are putting pressure on natural resources.  The
demographics of many countries are rapidly changing as well.  Shifts from
rural to urban areas and from agriculture to industry are occurring around
the globe: these changes represent urbanization and agricultural
transitions.  The agricultural transition is the next most prevalent
commonality between the different studies.  As population increases, the
need to provide more food also grows.  Many countries are facing agronomic
problems which are worsened by inefficient practices and lack of proper
technology, as is the case in the Nile Basin.  Finally, the trend toward
urbanization pushes many transitions, such as forestry, epidemiology, and
energy, forward.  As more people move into urban areas, population density
increases, the need for goods and services increases, and in turn so does
the pressure on resources like water and forests.
        Some of the other common themes I recognized included:  political
instability and lack of appropriate governmental leadership to move
countries out of negative situations and into more stable ones; lack of
education and proper training to help many poverty stricken people improve
their livelihoods; international debts caused by unsound economic policies
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and practices and narrow views toward interactions with other countries or
regions.  The importance of global factors in the analyses of transitions
was downplayed by administrations in many regions.
        Most encouraging, however, was that many projects focused on
policies and ideas which could help reverse or slow current and potential
negative trends caused by many concurrent transitions.  Looking beyond
one's own borders for help in solving problems was a common theme.  The
international community and international policy will play an increasingly
greater role for many nations as the push for a global economy increases.
The challenge is to create policy that is effective in bringing about
positive change, remembering that policies enacted in any one region
impact other regions.  Nations around the globe must begin to view
themselves not as sovereign and distinct entities, but instead as parts of
a whole, working together for mutual benefit.  Many countries need to look
and think beyond themselves when addressing social, political, and
environmental problems.  Because most nations have limited resources,
pooling their assets and working toward cooperative agreements could help
solve problems both within and transcending national boundaries.  This is
true for the Nile basin states and was also implied for many other regions
in the projects.
        Although many problems were identified in the studies presented,
the problems are not insurmountable -- individuals and creative ideas can
make a difference in our world.  Our class represented a microcosm of the
global community, just as the regions we studied do, and it was great to
hear innovative ideas for mitigating problems found across the planet.
Luejit Tinpanga
My project is about population policy and socio-economic development in
Vietnam.  The context of my paper includes an overview of population
situation in Vietnam which links to Vietnamese leaders' policy making.
Apart from demographic impact,  urbanization is a sector that I believe it
has been affected by population growth and high population density.   This
part can be related to Sasaki's project which is a case study of
urbanization transitions and its impact in Thailand.   Sasaki's project
illustrates Bangkok as a primate city,  the only large city in Thailand as
mentioned in section of Characteristics of Urbanization in Thailand.
Tourism industry,  the Vietnam War,  and better education have brought
people to seek their better condition of living and opportunities in
Bangkok.  In case of Vietnam,  apart from Hanoi,  Vietnam has Ho Chi Minh
City as Southern center.   However,   majority of population resides in
these cities together with high population growth rate cause
socio-economic problems.  Sasaki's project and mine show both Thai and
Vietnamese governments'  attempt to solve these problems and improve
socio-economic conditions.   The Thai government has adopted the National
Economic Social Development Plans to guide the way to achieve
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socio-economic development including population growth control.  The
Eastern Seaboard Project and Metropolitan Regional Structural Plan are
also the Thai government's intention to distribute population to suburban
regions and reduce population in Bangkok Metropolitan area.  Similarly,
the Vietnamese government has employed family planning programs in order
to reduce population growth and population redistribution policy to reduce
high population density in  deltaic plains.  This also implies the
importance of the government in managing the country's population policy
and socio-economic development direction no matter what ruling system that
country has.  
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